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Imagine your life and subtract every social interaction you ever had.  
What is left? 
1 INTRODUCTION 
You are living proof of your own and your caregiver’s social-cognitive skills. As 
babies cannot speak or feed themselves, non-verbal communication is vital. This is as 
true today as it has been in the past. Now that you are grown-up and, in contrast to our 
long-ago ancestors, living in a civilized world, you do not need other people to survive. 
And still, being rejected can be just as hurtful as physical pain (Eisenberger & 
Lieberman, 2004). 
When thinking about our role in the world, we often think intelligence is the one 
outstanding factor differentiating us from other species. However, what might have 
given us the greatest evolutionary advantage and what might have fundamentally 
influenced who we are and how we live today is indeed our superior social cognition, 
which allowed us to find our ecological niche and grow our brains. Studies have shown 
strong correlations between brain size and social network size across and within 
species (Robin IM Dunbar, 1998; R. I. Dunbar, 2009), and nowadays this relationship 
even holds true for our social networks on the internet (Kanai, Bahrami, Roylance, & 
Rees, 2012).  
Apparently, social interactions are critical for our lives, as is breathing and eating. 
Yet, while the exact mechanisms involved in breathing and eating are known, the 
seemingly simplest processes of social cognition are only poorly understood. 
Consequently, the main question for my doctoral thesis is one that also bothered other 
researchers for many decades: How exactly do our brains perform social cognition? 
My main focus will be on mirror neurons which cannot be directly measured in humans, 
but have to be assessed by indirect methods. Due to this challenge, the study of mirror 
neurons encouraged me, like other researchers, to also look into non-standard 
procedures, as will become evident throughout this thesis.  
In study 1, I investigated by functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) whether 
different social-cognitive processes share a common neural basis, and whether these 
are located in the putative mirror neuron system1 (MNS). To find out whether the MNS 
                                            
1 I want to point out that mirror neuron system is not the most scientifically accurate term when referring 
to results obtained from neuroimaging studies, as we cannot make inferences about neurons. Some 
studies solve this by calling it the putative mirror neuron system. However, in this thesis, I choose to 
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is not only involved in different social-cognitive processes but also in the processing of 
different emotions, I conducted study 2 using an fMRI adaptation paradigm. Based on 
the assumption that the MNS alone is not sufficient in the case of ambiguous emotional 
faces, I conducted fMRI study 3 to investigate the involvement of the nucleus 
accumbens (Nacc) with its role in salience and reward for social decision-making.  
In the introduction of my thesis, I will first explain the MNS, including the theory of 
embodied simulation which is particularly relevant to social cognition. After introducing 
different social-cognitive abilities on a conceptual level, I will present influential two-
pathway models that attempt to explain social-cognitive functioning with respect to fast 
and automatic versus slow and deliberate processing. Using the context of the two-
pathway models, I will explain neurobiological findings behind distinct processes 
central to social cognition, which are emotion perception, empathy and theory of mind. 
The last part of my introduction will be dedicated to the challenges researchers face 
when measuring the MNS. In the main part of this thesis, I will present studies 1 to 3. 
While studies 1 and 2 of my thesis are focused on the automatic processing associated 
with the MNS, study 3 additionally involves deliberate decision-making.  
1.1 Mirror neurons 
Mirror neurons “opened a window into the neural clockwork that allows us to 
understand other individuals”.   
(Keysers & Fadiga, 2008, p. 193) 
  
More than 30 years ago, Italian researchers made an unexpected discovery that 
has substantially influenced our understanding of the mechanisms underlying social 
interactions. When studying the specialization of neurons to different types of grasping 
movements in macaques, di Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese and Rizzolatti (1992) 
discovered by chance that some neurons in the premotor cortex would fire not only 
when a macaque performed a specific movement, but also when the experimenter 
performed that movement and the macaque simply observed it. The existence of this 
phenomenon has been confirmed in many studies since (Caggiano et al., 2012; 
Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996; Kraskov, Dancause, Quallo, Shepherd, 
                                            
write about the “mirror system” when writing it out, and prefer to use the common abbreviation MNS, as 
I expect it allows for easier readability with MNS literature. 
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& Lemon, 2009), possibly even in birds (Prather, Peters, Nowicki, & Mooney, 2008), 
and these neurons are commonly known as mirror neurons (MN). MN in macaques 
have been shown to respond to action-specific, goal-oriented movements (Bonini et 
al., 2012; Bonini et al., 2011; Caggiano et al., 2012; Fogassi et al., 2005; for a review, 
see Ocampo & Kritikos, 2011; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). They provide an 
explanation for motor learning by imitation (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004), which has 
been assumed to have contributed considerably to human evolutionary success 
(Dean, Kendal, Schapiro, Thierry, & Laland, 2012) as individuals can learn from others 
and build upon that knowledge.  
In monkeys, MN are routinely measured using single-cell recordings. In humans 
however, this accurate but invasive technique can only be applied in patients 
undergoing brain surgery for medical reasons, so most MNS research was conducted 
using fMRI, which is non-invasive and has comparatively high spatial resolution. I will 
discuss the problems with assessing MN in more detail in section 1.7 of the introduction 
of this thesis and in my studies. 
The first target area to identify mirror mechanisms in humans was the 
homologue structure to the macaque MN region, which is the pars opercularis of the 
inferior frontal gyrus (IFG). Studies in humans have confirmed that the IFG is activated 
both when observing someone else perform a specific action and when oneself 
performs the same action (Iacoboni et al., 1999; Kilner, Neal, Weiskopf, Friston, & Frith, 
2009; Molnar-Szakacs, Iacoboni, Koski, & Mazziotta, 2005; Montgomery, Isenberg, & 
Haxby, 2007). Further studies indicated that the IFG, together with premotor cortex 
(PMC) and inferior parietal lobule (IPL), builds the core of the MNS (Cattaneo & 
Rizzolatti, 2009; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). To date, only one publication reported 
the use of single-cell recordings in humans undergoing epilepsy surgery. It confirmed 
the existence of MN in various brain regions, including supplementary motor area 
(SMA), hippocampus, parahippocampal gyrus, and entorhinal cortex (Mukamel, 
Ekstrom, Kaplan, Iacoboni, & Fried, 2010). Finally, a meta-analysis on the basis of 125 
fMRI studies (Molenberghs, Cunnington, & Mattingley, 2012) revealed a large set of 
areas with reported mirror properties, including IFG and the adjacent ventral PMC, IPL, 
primary visual cortex, cerebellum, and parts of the limbic system (see Figure 1). 
However, most intriguing about the MNS is that it might not only be relevant for 
the understanding of motor actions, but to be the key to social understanding in 
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everyday life (Gallese, 2007a), as I will explain in the next paragraph after introducing 
the umbrella term social cognition. 
 
 
Figure 1: Brain regions associated with the MNS according to Molenberghs et al., 2012. 
IFG= Inferior Frontal Gyrus, IPL = Inferior Parietal Lobe, PMC = Premotor Cortex. Note: 
Only the regions identified in the meta-analysis that are thought to belong to the core 
MNS network (Cattaneo & Rizzolatti, 2009; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004) are depicted 
in this figure. 
1.2 Social cognition and embodied simulation 
Social cognition is an umbrella term, comprising many different psychological 
processes that allow us to understand our own as well as other individuals’ emotional 
and mental states (Beer & Ochsner, 2006; Brothers, 2002). We can infer meaning from 
many different social signals, including gaze direction (Hamilton, 2016), facial 
configurations (Montagne, Kessels, Frigerio, de Haan, & Perrett, 2005), body language 
(Atkinson, Dittrich, Gemmell, & Young, 2004), and vocal prosody (Pereira, 2000). On 
top of that, in social interaction, as the word interaction indicates, one does not merely 
perceive these signals, but also react to the perceived ones and send out own signals.  
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Quickly, one gets an impression of the conversational partner, and while it 
seems to be an overwhelming amount of information when explicitly thinking about it, 
the information is processed automatically and with ease, most of the time without any 
awareness. To accomplish this, our brains rely on several basic mechanisms. First, 
attention needs to be directed to the faces and relevant facial features, which occurs 
automatically in healthy humans. In particular the eye area, but also the mouth, are 
majorly responsible for transmitting emotion information (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, 
Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001; Calvo & Nummenmaa, 2008). This processing advantage 
for faces, and in particular for the eyes, has been shown to be present even in young 
children (Taylor, Edmonds, McCarthy, & Allison, 2001). Once the brain is attentive to 
the relevant signals, the actual social-cognitive processing takes place. However, there 
has been an ongoing debate on how this is accomplished. Many areas of visual 
perception are hardwired, such as color perception, for which we have different types 
of receptors, or simple shape orientations, which are represented by neurons in the 
visual cortex . Indeed, some researchers have suggested that perceiving an emotion, 
or more generally inferring a mental state, happens equally automatically, via MN 
(Gallese, 2003b, 2007a, 2007b; Gallese & Goldman, 1998; Keysers & Gazzola, 2009). 
This line of thought gave rise to the theory of embodied simulation, which states that 
we understand other persons’ mental states because our brain activation is the same 
when we observe someone expressing an emotion, as when we experience that 
emotion ourselves. Obviously, this would solve the long existing mystery of how 
seemingly automatic social cognition actually works, and indeed, studies have since 
confirmed that processing or imitation of faces is also related to activation in the MNS 
(Carr, Iacoboni, Dubeau, Mazziotta, & Lenzi, 2003; Enticott, Johnston, Herring, Hoy, & 
Fitzgerald, 2008; Schulte-Rüther, Markowitsch, Fink, & Piefke, 2007). Shared brain 
activation for own and observed mental states has been reported for several emotions 
or actions. For example, own and observed positive facial affect have been associated 
with shared activation in insula, IFG and PMC (Hennenlotter et al., 2005). 
Social cognition however does not end at a brain’s automatic simulation of what 
others feel. In reaction to the perceived feelings of another person, additional emotions 
and thoughts arise in ourselves. We may react with empathy (see section 1.3.1), infer 
our conversational partners hidden intentions (see section 1.3.2), or even develop the 
urge to help. Whether different social-cognitive processes indeed rely on common 
activation in the MNS will be subject of study 1.  
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In the next subsections, I will first introduce the different subprocesses of social 
cognition on a conceptual level. After explaining the two-pathway models, I will present 
findings on the neural correlates associated with the distinct social-cognitive processes 
and connect them to the two-pathway models.  
1.3 Introduction of social-cognitive subprocesses 
Humans possess the ability to perceive emotional content via several 
modalities, including vocal intonation, body posture and facial configurations. My focus 
was on the latter, so for all my studies, I used facial configurations intended to express 
specific emotions. While one can imagine a possibly endless number of facial 
configurations and specific characteristics of emotional states, emotions are usually 
described either categorically or dimensionally. Categories commonly used include 
anger, fear, sadness and happiness (P. Ekman, 1992; Tracy & Randles, 2011), and 
the dimensional approach mainly builds on the central features valence, ranging from 
positive to negative, and arousal, ranging from low to high (Mehu & Scherer, 2015; 
Ortony & Turner, 1990). 
For each emotional state we infer, there usually is someone who expresses and 
possibly feels an emotion. Of course, we are not merely inferring others’ emotions, we 
are also reacting to them. On the one hand, we may feel with the other person, which 
is known as empathy. If the feeling of the other person’s negative state becomes 
intensive and the focus is shifted from the other to the self, this would be called distress 
(for a detailed explanation of empathy, please refer to the next paragraph 1.2.2.1).  
While many studies employ obvious stimuli, involving body parts in painful 
situations, to elicit empathy, similar processes are assumed to apply for subtler stimuli 
such as facial configurations that are perceived as being emotional. Besides empathy, 
also theory of mind (ToM) is considered a central social-cognitive ability. ToM requires 
the perceiver to take another individual’s perspective and reason from that point of 
view, which may oppose own beliefs and perceptions (for a detailed explanation of 
ToM, please refer to 1.5.3). 
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1.3.1 Empathy 
Empathy represents a central component of social interactions. Yet, even 
among researchers investigating empathy, there is no consensus on a definition, as 
exemplified in a literature review by Cuff and colleagues (2016) who identified 43 
distinct definitions of empathy. These differences are also reflected in the wide range 
of tasks used to investigate empathy, impeding comparability between studies. As 
Preston and de Waal (2002) argue, this diversity arises from the problem that the 
mechanism of empathy is not truly understood. “Despite the various definitions of 
empathy, there is broad agreement on three primary components: (a) an affective 
response to another person, which often, but not always, entails sharing that person’s 
emotional state; (b) a cognitive capacity to take the perspective of the other person, 
and (c) emotion regulation” (Decety and Jackson, 2006, p. 54). Importantly, most 
researchers agree on the distinction of cognitive and affective empathy (Cuff, Brown, 
Taylor, & Howat, 2016), which is elaborately described in a publication by Walter 
(2012). He defines affective empathy as an affective state which is elicited by the 
assumed or inferred affective state of another person. This induced affective state is 
similar to that of the other individual and oriented towards them. Furthermore, the 
observer is aware of the causal relation of his or her own and the other’s affective state, 
including self-other distinction. Thus, affective empathy must be differentiated from 
emotional contagion, which is the adopting of another person’s emotions without clear 
self-other distinction. Cognitive empathy on the contrary does not necessitate an 
affective state in the observer, but only a cognitive understanding of a perceived 
affective state of another person. It is therefore more closely related to emotion 
perception or ToM (for details on ToM, please refer to section 1.5.3) which comprises 
the cognitive understanding not only of affective states but of mental states in general, 
extending to beliefs, intentions and desires (Walter, 2012). If the cognitive reasoning 
is directed towards another person’s affective state, this aspect of cognitive empathy 
can also be referred to as affective ToM. Cognitive ToM, in contrast, entails the 
cognitive reasoning process focusing on another person’s cognitive states (Walter, 
2012).  
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1.3.2 Theory of Mind 
ToM, often used synonymously with mentalizing, refers to our attribution of 
mental states, including intentions and desires, to other people (U. Frith & Frith, 2001). 
It has even been proposed to be the crucial mechanism setting us apart from other 
primates and central to advanced human abilities such as cooperation (Gallagher and 
Frith, 2003). 
Traditionally, mentalizing ability or ToM is assessed using a false-belief 
paradigm. First developed by Wimmer and Perner (1983), the now most famous 
adaptation is known as Sally-Anne task (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985): Sally 
places a marble in a basket and leaves the room. Anne takes the marble and puts it in 
a box. The question is, where will Sally look for the marble when she comes back? 
Healthy adults know that she will look in the basket, where she had placed it, because 
she does not know that Anne put it somewhere else. So, even though we know the 
true location of the object, information that is salient in our thoughts, we can inhibit this 
knowledge and instead adopt Sally’s perspective and reason about her wrong belief, 
whereas children younger than 3 to 4 years of age are not able to adapt Sally’s 
perspective (A. M. Leslie, Friedman, & German, 2004). 
Before presenting the neurobiological correlates of these social-cognitive 
processes, I want to introduce important conceptual models that go beyond individual 
brain regions or networks, but focus on the general processing of social information, 
thereby supporting the understanding of the mechanisms of social cognition.  
1.4 Two-pathway models of social cognition 
As is the case for many psychological processes, also for social cognition, two 
routes of information processing have been suggested. While the proposed names and 
details differ between scientists, the two pathways can be summarized as one being 
fast and automatic, and the other being slow and deliberate.  
In the following sections, I will focus on three concepts: The first two, 
distinguishing implicit versus explicit processing mechanisms (e.g., C. D. Frith & Frith, 
2008), or the so called c- and x-system (Satpute & Lieberman, 2006) are mainly 
adopted from cognitive psychology. The third has its foundation in (social-)cognitive 
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neuroscience and concerns the distinction of mirroring and mentalizing (Becchio et al., 
2012; Van Overwalle & Baetens, 2009). 
1.4.1 Implicit versus explicit processing 
Cognitive processes can generally be explicit or implicit. Implicit processes are 
fast, inflexible, automatic and mostly unconscious, whereas explicit ones are slow, 
flexible and mentally effortful (C. D. Frith & Frith, 2008).  
Interestingly, implicity versus explicity may not necessarily be intrinsic to a 
specific social-cognitive process, but both can occur in the same task, as will become 
evident in the following example for ToM. In the Sally-Anne task, the famous task 
introduced in section 1.3.2 that requires understanding of the false belief of a 
protagonist, children younger than about 4 years and individuals with autism will give 
the wrong answer (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Wimmer & Perner, 1983). Remarkably, 
non-verbal variations of the task indicate that also infants attribute the right beliefs to 
the protagonist (Buttelmann, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009; Onishi & Baillargeon, 
2005). This contradictory finding has been explained by the difference of implicit and 
explicit ToM. For example, it has been found that very young children will (explicitly) 
tell the experimenter the wrong answer, but (implicitly) look to the correct location. 
However once they are older, children can hold explicit knowledge about the false 
belief and can articulate that accordingly (Clements & Perner, 1994). Interestingly, also 
in a large study on adults, explicit mentalizing during ToM questions was associated 
with activation in the same neural network that was implicitly activated when watching 
associated ToM videos (Kanske, Böckler, Trautwein, & Singer, 2015). The authors 
suggest that this finding supports the assumption that mentalizing may occur 
spontaneously and implicitly. Furthermore, the overlap of brain regions might reflect a 
close relationship of implicit and explicit mentalizing in healthy individuals. Individuals 
with autism, in contrast, seem to lack the implicit understanding, but can acquire the 
correct (explicit) reasoning for false believe situations (U. Frith, 2004). Generally, it is 
assumed that the ability to infer emotions, desires and intentions develops before the 
reasoning about beliefs (Saxe, Carey, & Kanwisher, 2004). 
To summarize, in this section, using the example of ToM, it was shown that 
social-cognitive processes can occur implicitly and explicitly, a distinction that is not 
necessarily intrinsic to tasks, but may depend on other factors such as the 
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developmental stage of the individual. Another factor that is also central to the concept 
of implicit versus explicit processing, also plays a role in the next section: Speed. We 
know that explicit learning is fast, and implicit learning occurs slowly (McDougle, Bond, 
& Taylor, 2015). As we will see in the following, there are even certain sets of brain 
regions that are associated with either fast or slow processing, thereby building the 
basis of two systems proposed to underlie social cognition. 
1.4.2 The x- and c-system by Satpute and Lieberman (2006) 
In a seminal paper, Satpute and Lieberman (2006) propose a dual-process 
model of automaticity and control for social perception. The x-system (x for reflexive) 
is slow learning, fast operating, apt to parallel processing and does not need to be 
conscious. Due to its bidirectionality, it can process implicit semantic and evaluative 
symmetric relationships and it represents common cases. The phylogenetically likely 
younger c-system (c for reflective) is fast learning, slow operating and possesses 
symbolic computational ability, which helps to represent asymmetric relationships, 
exceptions and special cases. It is important for holding inferential goals in mind and 
integrating prior knowledge including situational constraint information; we often 
experience it as inner monologue and the feeling of agency (Satpute & Lieberman, 
2006). 
With regard to social cognition, Satpute and Lieberman (2006) propose as parts 
of the x-system, the amygdala, with its role in fear processing and its relationship to 
fight-and-flight responding, the basal ganglia, including Nacc involved in developing 
statistical models of the world and attaching emotional significance to them, 
ventromedial (vm) prefrontal cortex (PFC) which is strongly connected with basal 
ganglia, amygdala, and other limbic structures and included in the formation of intuition, 
and dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) which is involved in emotional distress. A 
further major region of the x-system, the lateral temporal cortex, comprises superior 
temporal sulcus (STS), temporal poles and lateral and inferior temporal lobes. The 
authors highlight the relevance of these regions for semantic and perceptual processes 
and their assumed involvement in constructing stereotypes, individual impressions and 
dispositional attributions. Specifically, they point out the key role of the STS in social 
cognition, its involvement in recognizing people, following eye-gaze, processing 
biological motion, understanding peoples’ actions and goals, inferring intentions, ToM, 
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and perspective taking. As further support of the STS’ placement in the x-system, the 
authors refer to studies showing that neuronal discharge in STS and behavior 
associated with STS function are very fast.  
In contrast, the c-system (Satpute & Lieberman, 2006) is composed of lateral 
PFC, including dorsolateral PFC (DLPFC) which is involved in many demanding 
cognitive tasks, such as reasoning and logic, fluid intelligence, problem solving, 
emotion regulation and behavioral inhibition, the posterior parietal cortex, which is 
associated with working memory, reasoning, self-focused attention and perspective 
taking, ventral ACC, known for its role in the processing of emotional conflict and also 
the anticipation of pain, medial temporal lobe, which is involved in memory retrieval, 
and medial frontal cortex. Satpute and Lieberman (2006) suggest that processes like 
ToM could first rely on the c-system, but with more experience shift to the x-system.  
To summarize, the x- and c-system are composed of defined brain regions and 
representative for different social-cognitive subprocesses. It is therefore a 
comprehensive concept, in which also the distinction of implicity and explicity could be 
integrated. Figure 2 illustrates areas of the x- and c-system that are relevant to this 
thesis. In addition, Table 1 (page 14) lists the brain regions and specifications of both 
systems. I will also refer to this distinction throughout the thesis, to integrate it with 
further research findings and also my own studies. 
The theories on implicit versus explicit and x- versus c-system also fit the 
popular distinction of mirror versus mentalizing network, which I introduce as a third 
concept.  
 
Figure 2: Illustration of brain regions that are involved in social cognition. These brain 
regions are mentioned in particular as part of the x- and c-system (1.4.2), and for 
empathy (1.5.2). ACC = Anterior Cingulate Cortex. DLPFC = Dorsolateral PFC.  Nacc 
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= Nucleus accumbens which is part of the basal ganglia. PFC = Prefrontal Cortex. 
pSTS = posterior Superior Temporal Sulcus.  
1.4.3 Mirroring versus mentalizing 
While the MNS is a focus of this thesis and has been thoroughly introduced in 
1.1, I will additionally summarize the most important aspects of another system 
important to social cognition, the mentalizing system. Mentalizing has been defined as 
“the capacity to understand ourselves and others in terms of intentional mental states, 
such as feelings, desires, wishes, attitudes and goals” (Luyten & Fonagy, 2015, p. 
366). As explained in section 1.2, mirroring is assumed to occur automatically and 
intuitively and understanding of a mental state is based on a shared representation in 
our brain. Mentalizing, in contrast, is thought to require cognitive perspective taking 
and reasoning from this other point of view, which is likely based on previous 
experiences. Mentalizing is therefore a high-level social-cognitive skill, the 
development of which seems to be largely dependent on one’s environment (for a 
literature overview, please refer to Luyten & Fonagy, 2015). In a meta-analysis, van 
Overwalle and Baetens (2009) summarize the regions and functions of the MNS and 
the mentalizing system. Specifically, the MNS is considered as centering around 
anterior intraparietal sulcus (sometimes referred to as rostral parietal lobule) and PMC 
(equivalent to BA44 and BA6). It responds rapidly, and mainly to observable motor 
actions that serve an obvious goal, matching motor representations in the observer. 
When the MNS fails because there is no appropriate representation of an action, for 
example when the action is abstract or unusual, such as opening the door using one’s 
foot on the door handle, and also requires involvement of attentional focus, high-level 
processing is needed to make sense of the action goals. This is accomplished by the 
mentalizing system, consisting of temporoparietal junction (TPJ) and medial PFC 
(mPFC). While TPJ seems to be responsible for inferring temporary beliefs and 
intentions, mPFC is related to the deduction of stable trait characteristics (Van 
Overwalle, 2009). It is worth mentioning that this definition is not in complete 
agreement with the definition of Satpute and Lieberman (2006) who assumes that at 
least the ventral part of the mPFC contributes to the reflexive system. Critically, several 
studies associate the mentalizing system rather with posterior STS than the adjacent 
TPJ, and additionally include the temporal poles (U. Frith & Frith, 2003). 
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The meta-analysis by van Overwalle and Baetens (2009) also contributes to 
answering a question that has occupied researchers for a long time: What is the 
relationship between mirroring and mentalizing? Evidence suggests that the mirror 
system and the mentalizing system are never simultaneously active or dependent on 
one another, but rather complement each other (Van Overwalle & Baetens, 2009). 
So, while the three two-pathway models are based on different ideas, their 
similarities are obvious, and in addition they complement each other thanks to their 
slightly different focus. For better understanding and as a reference, the brain regions 
associated with the MNS and the mentalizing system, as well as with the x- and the c-
system are summarized in Table 1. Furthermore, the brain regions identified as regions 
of interest for studies 1, 2 and 3 are depicted in Figure 3 to allow the reader to keep 
the focus of my research in mind when reading the next part about the neurobiology of 
social cognition. These regions are IFG, IPL, amygdala, insula, STS and fusiform 
gyrus. The latter was not explicitly mentioned until now, but is part of the inferior 
occipital cortex and introduced in the following section. 
 
Table 1: Overview over brain mechanisms according to the two pathway models with 
associated brain regions and literature references. 
Mechanism Brain Regions Reference 
x-system ventromedial PFC,  
STS,  
temporal poles,  
lateral temporal lobes,  
inferior temporal lobes,  
dorsal ACC  
Satpute & 
Lieberman (2006) 
c-system lateral PFC, 
medial frontal cortex,  
medial temporal lobe,  
posterior parietal cortex,  
ventral ACC, 
basal ganglia, 
amygdala 
Satpute & 
Lieberman (2006) 
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Mirror neuron system anterior intraparietal sulcus (or 
rostral parietal lobule), 
premotor cortex (composed of 
BA44 and BA6) 
van Overwalle & 
Baetens (2009) 
Mentalizing system temporoparietal junction, 
medial PFC 
van Overwalle 
(2009) 
posterior STS, 
temporal poles, 
medial PFC 
Frith & Frith (2003) 
Abbreviations: ACC = anterior cingulate cortex, PFC = prefrontal cortex, STS = 
superior temporal sulcus. 
 
Figure 3: Exemplary illustration of the core regions of the MNS and the mentalizing 
system, providing a basis for the regions of interest in this PhD thesis. FG = Fusiform 
Gyrus. IFG = Inferior Frontal Gyrus. IPL = Inferior Parietal Lobule. Nacc = Nucleus 
Accumbens. PMC = Premotor Cortex. pSTS = posterior Superior Temporal Sulcus. 
1.5 Neurobiology of social-cognitive processes 
In the previous sections, I introduced the MNS with regard to social cognition in 
general and explained how processes of social cognition could be related to automatic 
versus deliberate processing. The next sections will provide more details on the 
neurobiology of the different subprocesses of social cognition. I will present some 
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important study results and discuss how they integrate with the two-pathway models, 
starting with findings on emotion perception, since this process will be central to all my 
studies. 
1.5.1 Perception and expression of emotions 
A vast amount of literature is based on a small set of emotional categories and 
the idea that each emotion is associated with a distinct facial configuration (e.g., Fusar-
Poli et al., 2009). It is commonly assumed, that this association functions reliably and 
bidirectionally, meaning that each emotion has a specific facial configuration, and from 
each, we can infer a specific emotional state. Many studies support this assumption by 
showing that these categories exist in different countries and cultures throughout the 
world and even in infants (P. Ekman et al., 1987; Izard, 1994, but see also the review 
by Barrett et al., 2019), suggesting that they might be innate. The most influential 
categorization is the one by Ekman and colleagues (Paul Ekman, Friesen, & Ellsworth, 
1972) who proposed the so called basic emotions: fear, anger, happiness, disgust, 
sadness and surprise. However, a recent publication (Barrett, Adolphs, Marsella, 
Martinez, & Pollak, 2019) critically points out a lack of evidence confirming that 
emotions are reliably and unambiguously expressed via facial configurations. They 
present studies showing that one emotion can be expressed with different facial 
configurations and that one facial configuration can be used to express different 
emotional states, dependent on the context. Furthermore, they argue, facial 
configurations can be interpreted differently, which is also majorly influenced by culture 
and therefore might be learned instead of innate. For the sake of scientific accuracy, I 
follow the authors’ recommendation and use the term facial configuration instead of 
emotional facial expression throughout this thesis2. Importantly, and in agreement with 
Barrett and colleagues (2019), my studies’ concept of emotions includes that emotions 
can be represented on a continuum of valence, going from negative to positive, and 
                                            
2 Barrett and colleagues (2019) also suggest using the term emotion perception or emotion inference 
instead of emotion recognition. While I agree with their reasoning and suggestion for many cases, in 
particular the natural inference of emotions in everyday situations, I think that emotion recognition can 
accurately be used to describe the act of determining an emotion that was expressed with the intention 
to represent one of the basic emotions. Most importantly, I will leave the disentangling of these terms to 
other studies, and use them interchangeably throughout this work, while being aware that what is 
recognized might not be the true emotion of the observed person, but only the usual categorization into 
an emotion category based on configurational features. 
Introduction 
17 
 
arousal, going from low to high intensity as proposed by the dimensional approach 
(Russell, 1980).  
One brain region, that has been suggested central to the processing of 
emotions, including perception of others’ and own emotions, is the amygdala 
(Costafreda, Brammer, David, & Fu, 2008; Critchley et al., 2000; Fitzgerald, Angstadt, 
Jelsone, Nathan, & Phan, 2006; Fusar-Poli et al., 2009; Gur et al., 2002; Habel et al., 
2007; Sergerie, Chochol, & Armony, 2008). It might in fact be the amygdala’s role in 
salience detection that makes it so central to emotion processing (Cunningham & 
Brosch, 2012; Liberzon, Phan, Decker, & Taylor, 2003; Santos, Mier, Kirsch, & Meyer-
Lindenberg, 2011).  
However, as emotion perception is a complex process, several additional 
regions are involved. Considering specifically the brain activation associated with facial 
stimuli, studies generally find increased activation in regions including the fusiform 
gyrus (FG), inferior occipital gyrus, amygdala, cingulate gyrus, medial frontal gyrus, 
middle frontal gyrus, precentral gyrus and insula for neutral faces (for a review and 
meta-analysis, see Fusar-Poli et al., 2009). In contrast to neutral faces, happy faces 
show even increased activation in amygdala, FG and ACC, sad faces in amygdala and 
lingual gyrus, fearful faces in amygdala, FG and medial frontal gyri, and angry faces in 
insula and inferior occipital gyrus (Fusar-Poli et al., 2009). In addition to the key role of 
the amygdala, these results demonstrate an association of different emotional 
categories with individual activation patterns. Importantly, the FG is associated with 
emotion perception and also essential for face processing (Geday, Gjedde, Boldsen, 
& Kupers, 2003; Haxby & Gobbini, 2011; Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini, 2000), which 
explains its presence in the majority of results from studies using facial stimuli.  
To conclude, emotion perception seems to clearly involve regions of the fast x-
system, as indicated by increased activation of amygdala, FG as part of the temporal 
lobe and medial frontal gyrus. 
1.5.2 Empathy 
As mentioned above, while empathy is investigated using a variety of definitions 
and tasks, one robust agreement among researchers is on the dissociation between 
cognitive and affective empathy, which is also supported by findings from personality 
and developmental disorders. For example, individuals with borderline personality 
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disorder give higher ratings for affective empathy but lower ratings for cognitive 
empathy than healthy individuals (Harari, Shamay-Tsoory, Ravid, & Levkovitz, 2010). 
In contrast, psychopathic traits are associated specifically with decreased affective 
empathy (Wai & Tiliopoulos, 2012). These findings, showing selective impairment in 
only one of the two empathic abilities, support the idea that cognitive and affective 
empathy are based on separate mechanisms and therefore likely involve different 
neural pathways. 
To my knowledge, meta-analyses of fMRI activation during empathy exist only 
for empathy for pain studies, which represent a large subset of all empathy studies. I 
therefore report the results of an empathy for pain meta-analysis to provide an example 
of commonly found activation patterns during empathy. Lamm and colleagues (2011) 
suggested that while anterior insula (AI) and medial cingular cortex act as core regions 
of empathy, there is also paradigm-specific neural activation falling in two networks. 
One set of paradigms, referred to as picture-based, was based on pictures of body 
parts in painful situations. The corresponding network comprising supramarginal gyrus, 
inferior parietal cortex, and BA44, is overlapping with the regions commonly associated 
with the MNS. The other set of paradigms, described as cue-based, involved currently 
experienced pain by the participant or another person next to the participant. In 
contrast to the MNS activation in picture-based paradigms, cue-based paradigms 
activated regions associated with the mentalizing system, i.e. precuneus, medial PFC, 
posterior STS, TPJ, temporal poles. Functional connectivity studies support the 
existence of separate brain networks for cognitive versus affective empathy. While 
affective empathy was associated with stronger connectivity in social-emotional 
networks, centering around amygdala, orbitofrontal cortex, AI, ACC and temporal 
poles, cognitive empathy was related to stronger connectivity in social-cognitive and 
interoceptive networks, including STS, AI, brainstem and cerebellum (Cox et al., 2011).  
Lesion studies reinforce the idea of a double dissociation, with lesions in the IFG 
being associated with deficits in affective empathy, and lesions in the vmPFC being 
related to impaired cognitive empathy (Shamay-Tsoory, Aharon-Peretz, & Perry, 
2009). Another study also indicates that the IFG might be a key region in emotional 
empathy (Jabbi & Keysers, 2008). On top of that, the IFG is not only adjacent to but 
also functionally connected to the region of AI and frontal operculum, linking the IFG 
to the proposed core empathy network (Jabbi & Keysers, 2008).  
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While involvement of the IFG and SMA as part of PMC suggest a link to the 
MNS, involvement of dorsal ACC and vmPFC further suggests a dominant role of the 
x-system. 
1.5.3 Theory of mind 
ToM has been investigated using a wide variety of tasks (for a review, see 
Carrington & Bailey, 2009) which possibly involve different mechanisms, so the results 
of meta-analyses have to be interpreted with care. One meta-analysis on the most 
common ToM tasks, categorized into 6 groups, identified posterior TPJ and mPFC as 
core network over the different groups, in addition to group-specific activation (Schurz, 
Radua, Aichhorn, Richlan, & Perner, 2014). Schaafsma and colleagues (2015) 
emphasize that research should aim at gaining a true understanding of ToM and the 
distinct mental processes involved. They present an overview of tasks used, including 
on the one hand different stimulus types, such as verbal narratives or cartoons, and 
on the other hand different psychological assumptions, such as false belief attribution 
(see Sally-Anne task in section 1.3.2) or reading the mind in the eyes3. The authors 
point out the central question, whether ToM works by intuitively simulating the other 
person’s mental state (embodied simulation) or is based on the construction of a theory 
about the other person’s mind (theory-theory). While embodied simulation would be 
related to the MNS, theory-theory would be associated with the mentalizing system. 
Depending on the specific process at hand, additional cognitive processes needed for 
ToM would be activated, such as executive control processes. Schaafsma and 
colleagues (2015) suggest that we are likely inferring others’ mental states using a 
mixture of these strategies. In particular, the authors highlight the need to define basic 
processes, such as decoupling, recursion, prediction, memory, motivation, and to 
investigate their involvement and associated brain activation in specific ToM tasks.  
Accordingly, Schurz and Perner (2015) evaluated the results of their previous 
meta-analysis on ToM tasks (Schurz et al., 2014) with regard to 9 neurocognitive 
theories, thereby attempting to differentiate domain-general and domain-specific 
mechanisms subserving ToM. While most theories fail to predict results of the 
                                            
3 Pictures of the eye area of individuals are presented, and participants have to select out of four 
adjectives the one best describing the associated mental state, such as joking, insisting, amused and 
relaxed. 
Introduction 
20 
 
respective tasks, I will here summarize two of the theories which are largely in line with 
Schurz and Perner’s (2015) predictions. This helps to better understand not only their 
work but also more generally some of the mechanisms underlying ToM. Please note 
that the suggested brain regions may deviate from the ones identified in the meta-
analysis and also from those suggested by the x-/c-system, because on the one hand, 
the work of the authors of the following studies is older, on the other hand, their focus 
was not to find commonly activated regions, but instead differentiate individual 
mechanisms that are part of ToM. For example, based on the proposal by Perner and 
colleagues (J. Perner & Leekam, 2008; Josef Perner & Roessler, 2010), two proposed 
cognitive mechanisms of ToM, which are goal inference and perspective taking, should 
be associated with activation in posterior STS and the area comprising IPL and dorsal 
TPJ, respectively. Indeed, activation in IPL was increased only for tasks involving 
perspective taking, i.e. false-belief tasks and trait judgements. On the contrary, no 
perspective taking is needed and no IPL activation is found for social animations, 
strategic games, or reading the mind in the eyes task.  
As another example, based on Gobbini and colleagues (2007), Schurz and 
Perner (2015) predict the activation patterns of overt versus covert mental states. Overt 
mental states are those that can be immediately observed, while covert mental states 
need to be inferred, such as the false belief of the true location of a marble. Based on 
the prediction, overt mental states, as present in the mind in the eyes task and social 
animations, should be related to increased activation in ventral posterior STS. In 
contrast, covert mental states, assessed by false belief tasks, strategic games and trait 
judgments, should not lead to increased activation in this area. While the prediction 
was true for most tasks, the rule regarding covert versus overt mental states apparently 
was not, as false belief tasks showed enhanced activation in posterior STS, but as a 
task involving a covert mental state should not have done so (for more details and a 
comprehensive analysis of all theory-task combinations, please refer to Schurz & 
Perner, 2015). The here presented results of the meta-analysis by Schurz and Perner 
(2015) illustrate the need for a better understanding of basic mechanisms, thereby 
supporting the argumentation by Schaafsma and colleagues (2015).  
That different social-cognitive processes are related to each other, has been 
indicated by a study showing that ToM performance is closely related to that of emotion 
perception. Specifically, in a task using facial stimuli, both processes involve an 
overlapping set of brain regions, including STS, IFG reaching into the insula, 
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somatosensory cortex, amygdala and right middle frontal gyrus (Mier, Lis, et al., 2010). 
Indicating higher processing demands with increasing complexity, activation was 
reported to be stronger for ToM than for emotion perception. 
To conclude, as would be expected, the mentalizing network plays an important 
role for ToM tasks, as indicated by the TPJ, STS and mPFC activation (please, see 
Figures 2 and 3). While STS activation is associated with fast, x-system processing, 
IPL as part of the posterior parietal cortex would rather be considered as belonging to 
the c-system. As we can see, even though mentalizing and ToM are associated with 
specific brain regions, they might require a mixture of fast automatic and slow 
deliberate processes. This idea is further supported by the study by Mier and 
colleagues (2010) who used facial stimuli, i.e. stimuli comparable to those of the 
studies in this thesis. In addition to other regions, they report activation in the fast 
responding amygdala, and the MNS key-region IFG. The task by Mier and colleagues 
(2010) however, can be defined as an affective ToM task. Differences in activation 
patterns between cognitive and affective ToM will be discussed in the following. 
1.5.4 Cognitive and affective theory of mind 
As also Schaafsma and colleagues (2015) pointed out, there is a strong need 
to understand the mechanisms underlying ToM, and accordingly several attempts have 
been made to integrate existing studies. In a review on the neuroanatomical bases of 
ToM, Abu-Akel and Shamay-Tsoory (2011) proposed that a “neurobiological model of 
ToM should minimally explain three basic mentalizing processes which include the 
ability to represent cognitive and affective mental states, attribute these mental states 
to self and other, and finally apply (or deploy) these mental states in a manner that 
allows one to correctly understand and predict behavior” (pp. 2971-2972). In their 
model, mental states are first represented in TPJ and then guided through STS or 
precuneus/posterior cingulate complex. For the subsequent processing, the authors 
distinguish the cognitive cold and the affective hot network. While cognitive ToM 
involves dorsal medial and lateral PFC, dorsal ACC, and dorsal striatum / dorsal 
temporal pole, affective ToM includes orbitofrontal cortex / vmPFC, inferolateral frontal 
cortex, ventral ACC and ventral striatum / amygdala / ventral temporal pole (Abu-Akel 
& Shamay-Tsoory, 2011). Their model, including the ACC’s role in directed attention 
and in the representation of self versus other mental states, and the connections with 
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the ventral and dorsal attentional systems, is in line with research finding performance 
in ToM-related tasks dependent on attentional inhibition (Bialystok & Senman, 2004). 
The distinction between cognitive and affective ToM has also been suggested 
from lesion or psychopathology studies. For example, one interesting finding comes 
from Parkinson’s disease, where early stages are associated with dopamine 
dysfunction in the dorsal striatum (Dauer & Przedborski, 2003; Kish, Shannak, & 
Hornykiewicz, 1988; Owen, 2004) and deficits in cognitive ToM (Roca et al., 2010), 
whereas later stages also impair ventral striatum and affective ToM (Bodden et al., 
2010). In addition, inhibitory repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) over 
right DLPFC increased reaction times for cognitive, but not affective ToM, indicating 
selective specificity of the DLPFC for cognitive ToM (Kalbe et al., 2010).  
Above cited results confirm the conclusion from the previous section that ToM 
includes brain regions from both x- and c-system, which might be particularly important 
when distinguishing affective versus cognitive ToM. 
One recent fMRI study with a large sample size of 178 participants was 
designed to further investigate the different neural networks involved in affective versus 
cognitive understanding of others (Kanske et al., 2015). Participants watched videos 
of autobiographic narratives that varied in valence (negative or neutral) and regarding 
ToM related contents (ToM or no-ToM). Afterwards they rated a number of questions, 
including (1) how they felt (on a continuous scale from negative over neutral to positive) 
as a measure of empathy4, (2) which thoughts the previously seen actor might have 
had (multiple choice) as a measure of ToM, or alternatively (3) as a control condition 
about factual knowledge that could be acquired from the video (multiple choice). This 
study’s results indicate that subjective valence ratings were related to activation in 
empathy related brain regions, including dorsal AI, dorsal ACC/mPFC, IFG, 
supramarginal gyrus/dorsal TPJ. Cognitive ToM in contrast was related to stronger 
activation in mentalizing regions, including ventral TPJ, STS, temporal poles, 
precuneus and MPFC. Regarding the self-other distinction required for both tasks, 
Kanske and colleagues (2015) point out that enhanced TPJ activation was located 
more dorsally for affective empathy, but more ventrally for cognitive ToM. Using these 
regions as seeds in resting state functional connectivity analyses, they identified 
distinct networks that resembled the previously reported task-related networks. Taken 
                                            
4 It should be mentioned that according to the definition used for the empathy paradigm of study 1 this 
would not be considered affective empathy, but rather distress. 
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together, the results of that study support the assumption of two pathways for social 
understanding. The authors continue to discuss the resemblance of these two 
networks with other networks. Specifically, the empathy network seems to resemble 
the salience network (also called reactive/externally oriented network, task control 
network, or cingulo-opercular network), which is characterized by fast detection of 
salient stimuli and reactive orienting to them, subserving adequate reaction to the 
other’s emotional state (Kanske et al., 2015). In contrast, the ToM network is 
comparable with the regions of the default mode network and is associated with 
distinguishing internal from external information as well as generating and 
contemplating on thoughts. The divergence of the findings by Kanske and colleagues’ 
(2015) regarding ventral and dorsal networks from the model proposed by Abu-Akel 
and Shamay-Tsoory (2011) might be explained by differences in the definitions and 
tasks used, and consequently by the mechanisms that were targeted by the tasks. 
To summarize, social-cognitive processes can be categorized into cognitive 
versus affective, and also into fast and automatic versus slow and deliberate. While 
the former distinction is man-made, the latter is biological. Some processes, such as 
ToM are complex and seem to be based on a mixture of different systems. Emotion 
perception in contrast, seems to rely on mainly one neural system, the fast and 
automatic one. Against this background, the question arises when the switch happens: 
What are the limits of automatic fast perception and when is more deliberate 
processing required? Study 3 represents one approach to finding the answer to this 
question: When ambiguous facial stimuli are used, automatic processing is not 
sufficient to resolve the conflict, so deliberation comes into play and decision making 
becomes necessary. In the next section (1.6), I will therefore explain some important 
basics of decision making and how this might be involved in resolving ambiguous facial 
configurations. 
1.6 When automaticity and deliberation interact: ambiguous facial configurations 
One task famously used to investigate probabilistic decision making is the so 
called beads task (Huq, Garety, & Hemsley, 1988). In this task, a participant is faced 
with the following problem: There are two jars, one filled with 80% red and 20% blue 
beads, the other one with 20% red and 80% blue beads. Given a sequence of 
presented beads, the participant has to determine out of which jar the beads were 
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taken. The process of gathering evidence and eventually making a decision, as 
exemplified in the beads task as well as its adaptation, the fish-in-the-lake task 
(Woodward, Munz, LeClerc, & Lecomte, 2009), can be divided into two stages: First, 
probabilistic reasoning is applied and the inner probabilistic model is consistently 
updated with the incoming information. At some point, this inner model reaches a point 
of certainty, leading to the final decision, i.e. which jar or lake best fits the evidence. 
While probabilistic reasoning during the task is associated with activation in regions of 
executive function, including DLPFC and parietal regions, the final decision was linked 
to activation in ventral striatum and ventral tegmental area (Esslinger et al., 2013). 
Most interestingly, individuals with delusions (McLean, Mattiske, & Balzan, 2017) seem 
to consider less evidence before coming to a conclusion, which is known as hasty 
decision making or jumping-to-conclusion bias. Regarding brain functioning during 
probabilistic decision making, individuals with schizophrenia showed reduced 
response in ventral striatum and ventral tegmental area (Rausch et al., 2014). The 
abnormal reasoning in patients can be explained by abnormal dopaminergic activity, 
which causes aberrant salience. In fact, aberrant salience might even be causal to the 
emergence of delusions, as otherwise unimportant stimuli come to seem relevant 
(Heinz & Schlagenhauf, 2010; Kapur, 2003). 
The ventral striatum houses the Nacc, which is part of the dopaminergic 
mesolimbic pathway, well-known for its key role for motivation and reward (Kringelbach 
& Berridge, 2010). Social interactions, but also viewing attractive faces, or faces 
perceived as being positive are considered rewarding and have been shown to activate 
the Nacc (Aharon et al., 2001; Hahn & Perrett, 2014; Izuma, Saito, & Sadato, 2008; 
Krach, Paulus, Bodden, & Kircher, 2010; Spreckelmeyer et al., 2009). Importantly, the 
Nacc is also involved in salience attribution (Esslinger et al., 2013; Kapur, Mizrahi, & 
Li, 2005) and final decision making in probabilistic reasoning tasks (Rausch et al., 
2014; Rausch et al., 2015). While the Nacc is part of the fast and automatic x-system, 
associated with salience and final decision making, DLPFC and parietal lobe are 
important regions for the slow and deliberate decision making, linked to the c-system  
I therefore propose that the Nacc with its involvement in salience, reward and 
decision making is also central to social-cognitive decision making as occurring in 
emotion perception. Study 3 of my thesis is focused on the role of the Nacc for social 
cognition. 
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As briefly mentioned before, MN research in humans comes with its own 
challenges. Before presenting the objectives of my studies, I will therefore dedicate the 
next section to the challenges and possible solutions when investigating the MNS.  
1.7 Challenges in the measurement of mirror neurons 
While MN seem a promising substrate of social cognition (Gallese, 2007a; 
Gallese, Keysers, & Rizzolatti, 2004), we cannot measure them in humans due to 
ethical restrictions. Most studies therefore rely on fMRI, which has a good spatial 
resolution. Still, each voxel, the smallest unit of measurement, is commonly around 3 
mm³ in size, therefore containing approximately hundreds of thousands up to millions 
of neurons. Increased activation in a voxel could therefore stem from the same or from 
neighboring neuronal populations within that voxel, which makes a big difference 
regarding mirror neuron interpretations. Gazzola and Keysers (2009) propose the term 
shared voxels (sVx) to refer to voxels that show increased fMRI response during both 
observation and execution of an action. This term is chosen to more accurately 
describe what is measured, without implying mirror neuron activation where there 
might just be activation in neighboring neuronal populations. fMRI analysis usually 
follows standardized protocols which are optimized for the majority of data. However, 
in the case of the MNS, some of these otherwise good techniques might lead to false 
positives: Spatial smoothing might lead to the wrong impression of an overlap in 
activation between two conditions, when in fact the activation would fall in neighboring 
voxels without the smoothing. Likewise, group-level analysis might suggest that on 
average there was increased activation in one area for both conditions, when indeed, 
half of the subjects had increased activation in one condition, and the other half in the 
other condition. 
Gazzola and Keysers (2009) overcome these challenges in their sVx analysis, 
which they base on a publication by Morrison and Downing (2007): (1) data are not 
smoothed (a method to enhance signal-to-noise ratio, but thereby reducing spatial 
specificity) during preprocessing and (2) only voxels, that show activation in all 
conditions within a participant are considered for the group level analysis. Using this 
method, Gazzola and Keysers reported that during the observation and execution of 
motor actions, there are more shared voxels than at chance-level in ventral and dorsal 
premotor, inferior parietal, supplementary motor, middle cingulate, somatosensory, 
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superior parietal and middle temporal cortex and cerebellum (Gazzola & Keysers, 
2009). This method is applied in study 1 of my thesis using social-cognitive paradigms. 
However, this approach allows no conclusions on whether the MNS also 
distinguishes between emotions or their valences, which would provide further 
information on the role of the MNS for social cognition. This question can be elegantly 
addressed using fMRI adaptation, another promising method, which is based on the 
simple biological fact that repeated stimulation of a neuron leads to a decreased 
response of that neuron. If the aspect to which the neuron is sensitive changes, this 
novelty leads to increased response of the specific neuron. Research confirms, that 
this adaptation effect can be seen in fMRI (Grill-Spector, Henson, & Martin, 2006).  
Previous research using fMRI adaptation reported voxels in IFG (de la Rosa, 
Schillinger, Bulthoff, Schultz, & Uludag, 2016; Kilner et al., 2009) or IPL (Chong, 
Cunnington, Williams, Kanwisher, & Mattingley, 2008) that showed adaptation from 
observation to execution conditions and vice versa, which is considered an indicator of 
mirror function. First evidence also indicates that STS, amygdala and IFG show 
adaptation in response to facial configurations intended to express no emotion 
(neutral) or fear (Ishai, Pessoa, Bikle, & Ungerleider, 2004). In study 2 of my thesis, I 
applied fMRI adaptation to investigate whether the mirror system differentiates faces 
based on positive or negative valence.  
1.8 Objective 
The aim of this thesis is to further the understanding of neural mechanisms 
underlying social cognition. The underlying assumption is that social cognition relies 
on fast automatic and slow deliberate processes that are recruited depending on the 
complexity of the social-cognitive process. MN, assumed to build the neuronal basis of 
social cognition by automatic and fast responding to social stimuli however, cannot be 
measured directly in humans. When measuring the MNS indirectly, using fMRI, it is 
critical to adapt the processing routine to the specific requirements underlying the 
assumption of the MNS, including overlapping activation for different processes, not 
only across, but also within participants. In addition, previous studies have mainly 
focused on single social-cognitive processes. Evidence supporting the role of the MNS 
as a common neural basis of social cognition, however, would necessitate evidence 
for an involvement of the MNS in a range of social-cognitive processes.  
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Study 1 was therefore carried out to find a common neural basis of social 
cognition, and determine the role of the MNS, using different social-cognitive tasks and 
an analysis routine aimed at avoiding false positive results. While the results of study 
1 allow conclusions on the similarities in brain activation between tasks, the question 
how exactly the MNS is involved in these processes is left unanswered. The theory of 
embodied simulation proposes that the MNS allows the understanding of another 
person’s emotions (Gallese, 2007b). If this is true, the MNS would not only respond to 
facial dynamics perceived as expressing emotions in general, but also distinguish 
between emotions. As no study so far has investigated this question, study 2 tested 
the differential response of the MNS to facial configurations intended to express fear 
versus happiness. Importantly, study 2 was based on an fMRI adaptation paradigm, a 
method considered a gold standard for MNS research (Fuelscher et al., 2019). 
In case of ambiguous facial configurations, the automatic processing associated 
with the MNS may be supported by additional brain regions contributing to deliberate 
processing. The aim of study 3 was therefore to investigate to role of decision making 
for social cognition. Specifically the question was, whether the findings from non-social 
probabilistic decision making tasks also apply to social cognition. In addition, the 
paradigm allowed to determine whether reward or salience drives decisions on facial 
configurations designed to express ambiguous emotions. 
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2 STUDY 1: IDENTIFICATION OF THE RELEVANCE OF MIRROR AREAS FOR 
DIFFERENT SOCIAL COGNITIVE PROCESSES 
2.1 The human mirror neuron system – a common neural basis for social cognition? 
2.1.1 Abstract 
According to the theory of embodied simulation, mirror neurons (MN) in our 
brain’s motor system are the neuronal basis of all social-cognitive processes. The 
assumption of such a mirroring process in humans can only be supported by results 
showing that within one person the same region is involved in different social cognition 
tasks. 
We conducted an fMRI-study with 75 healthy participants who completed three 
tasks: imitation, empathy, and theory of mind. We analyzed the data using group 
conjunction analyses and individual shared voxel counts. 
Across tasks, across and within participants, we find common activation in 
inferior frontal gyrus, inferior parietal cortex, fusiform gyrus, superior temporal sulcus, 
and amygdala.  
Our results provide evidence for a shared neural basis for different social-
cognitive processes, indicating that interpersonal understanding might occur by 
embodied simulation. 
2.1.2 Introduction 
Mirror neurons (MN) which might enable us to understand others people’s 
emotions and even to infer their intentions (Gallese, 2007a) fascinate scientists and 
non-scientists alike. Could MN help us bond with other people, because we feel and 
know how they feel without them even saying a word? Could MN be a “hidden crystal 
ball” that allows us to see into the near future of social situations, and anticipate 
whether our interaction partner will be hitting or hugging us a few seconds later? Our 
study is the first to approach these questions by providing evidence for a shared neural 
basis for the three fundamental social-cognitive processes imitation, empathy, and 
theory of mind (ToM) both within and across the same participants.  
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A MN mechanism was first presented in 1992 (di Pellegrino et al., 1992) when 
the authors identified neurons in the monkey brain area F5 that fired not only when the 
monkey performed a hand movement but also when it observed the same movement 
performed by the human experimenter. Since then, many studies applying single cell 
recordings have revealed such neurons in the monkey brain (Gallese et al., 1996; 
Rizzolatti & Luppino, 2001). Importantly, it was shown that MN code not only for an 
action, but also for the goal of an action and thus allow prediction (Rizzolatti, Cattaneo, 
Fabbri-Destro, & Rozzi, 2014). The idea how this MN mechanism helps us to 
understand others is called embodied simulation (Gallese, 2007a); i.e. by motor 
resonance we feel how others feel and thus recognize their current state and even 
their intention. fMRI studies showed activity in inferior prefrontal cortex, premotor 
cortex, inferior parietal cortex and superior temporal sulcus (STS) in humans observing 
and imitating actions (Buccino, Binkofski, & Riggio, 2004; de la Rosa et al., 2016; 
Iacoboni, 2009). A meta-analysis of 125 fMRI studies identified several regions 
frequently associated with activity for execution and observation of actions 
(Molenberghs et al., 2012). Among the most frequent regions were inferior (Brodmann 
Area (BA) 44 and BA9) and middle frontal gyrus (BA6), inferior (BA40) and superior 
parietal lobe (BA7), as well as the insula (BA13). In particular the inferior prefrontal 
cortex with adjacent middle frontal gyrus, comprising BA44 and BA6, is considered a 
key region of the human MNS (e.g., Enticott et al., 2012; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). 
Not only because it was found to be a structural homologue of the monkey mirror 
neuron area F5, but also because it is assumed to represent actions, and even the 
intentions and goals of actions (Iacoboni & Dapretto, 2006; Iacoboni et al., 2005). 
Interestingly, Buccino and colleagues showed that the human cortex topographically 
represents actions according to the body region with foot movements represented in 
BA6 and mouth movements rather in BA44 (Buccino et al., 2004), suggesting a 
homunculus of action mapping. 
Beyond the mere representation of emotionally neutral actions, such as 
grasping, or finger tapping, the MNS seems to be involved in the recognition of 
emotions, in empathy and in ToM (Mier, Lis, et al., 2010; Molenberghs et al., 2012; 
Schulte-Rüther et al., 2007). Recognizing emotional facial expressions results in 
activation in the regions of the MNS (Mier, Lis, et al., 2010) as well as in the face 
processing network, including fusiform gyrus, superior temporal sulcus and amygdala 
(Haxby et al., 2000). A comparable pattern was found during imitation of emotional 
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facial expressions (K. R. Leslie, Johnson-Frey, & Grafton, 2004). Studies investigating 
additional social-cognitive processes, such as ToM and empathy, revealed a 
comparable activation pattern with activation in the face processing network and the 
MNS (Carr et al., 2003; Mier, Lis, et al., 2010; Schulte-Rüther et al., 2007). While Mier 
and colleagues (Mier, Sauer, et al., 2010) demonstrated that emotion recognition and 
ToM activate comparable brain regions, they also showed that activation in the MNS 
regions is stronger for ToM than for emotion recognition, suggesting enhanced 
activation in the MNS with increasing demands for social cognition. Thus, an interesting 
question is not only whether there is common activation for different social-cognitive 
processes, but also whether the brain differentiates between these different social-
cognitive processes. 
Despite the long line of research, studying the human MNS still suffers from a 
number of severe methodological problems. First, electrophysiological single-cell 
recordings, which are required for a clear-cut demonstration of MN properties, are not 
feasible in healthy humans (see (Mukamel et al., 2010) for a study in epileptic patients). 
Therefore, the majority of studies approaching MN in humans rely on methods with 
lower spatial or temporal resolution such as fMRI, which is one of the best choices 
when aiming for high spatial resolution, but still an indirect method relying on blood 
oxygenation (BOLD signal) and not directly neuronal activity.  
Second, the validity of results of fMRI-based MN research may be compromised 
by two common steps of data processing: 1) Smoothing of brain activation smudges 
brain activity so that activation in neighboring voxels overlaps and thus becomes less 
discriminable. 2) Group analyses average over participants, so it is not even sure if 
activation of two tasks comes from one and the same person or is just reached by 
averaging over several people. To speak of mirror neuron activity however, it is 
essential for activation to take place in the same neurons within participants. 
Finally, it is currently unclear whether different tasks of social cognition are being 
performed by a common network of brain regions, i.e. whether the MNS provides a 
unified substrate for all facets of social cognition. While fMRI studies showed activity 
in a number of recurring areas during several tasks involving observing and imitating 
actions (Buccino et al., 2004; de la Rosa et al., 2016; Iacoboni, 2009; Molenberghs et 
al., 2012), this provides only indirect evidence, as activity is not only compared 
between different participants, but even between different studies with different 
designs.  
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In this study, we attempt to identify a common network of social cognition in 
humans using fMRI recordings. To overcome the problems outlined above, we 
developed a new set of social-cognitive tasks that use the same stimulus materials (i.e. 
facial expressions) to test three fundamental processes of social cognition: imitation, 
empathy and ToM. Based on previous literature (Carr et al., 2003; Gallese, 2007a; 
Mier, Lis, et al., 2010; Schulte-Rüther et al., 2007), we hypothesize that all three tasks 
activate both the emotional face processing network (amygdala, fusiform gyrus and 
STS) and the MNS (BA44 and IPL). Furthermore, we expect to see differences in the 
amount of activation in these regions between the different tasks, e.g. increased 
activation in the MNS in ToM compared to emotion recognition (Mier, Sauer, et al., 
2010) (Mier et al. 2010). We investigate these hypotheses by first analyzing activation 
within the individual tasks across participants with smoothed data. We then extend this 
approach by investigating shared activation across these tasks by group analyses on 
smoothed data across participants, as well as by analyzing the smoothed and 
unsmoothed data within participants. This last step, which is crucial to identify regions 
with MN properties in humans, is made possible by using the approach of shared 
voxels (sVx), published in a seminal paper by Gazzola and Keysers (Gazzola & 
Keysers, 2009), based on the work of Morrison and Downing (Morrison & Downing, 
2007). The approach allows for comparison of activation from different tasks using the 
very same unaltered spatial position and puts the focus on shared activation within 
participants, thus overcoming the problems introduced by smoothing and group 
analyses. Since we assess different social-cognitive functions, we expect not only 
activation that is common to all of these functions, but also distinct activation patterns 
specific to the individual tasks and conditions within tasks. Thus, we additionally focus 
on differences between the different sub-processes of social cognition by comparing 
activation patterns within tasks.  
2.1.3 Materials and Methods 
2.1.3.1 Participants 
We recruited 80 persons, 5 of which had to be excluded from the final analyses 
due to more than 3 mm translation or 3° rotation (N = 1), anatomical aberrations (N = 
1) or technical issues (N = 3). Final sample for analyses consisted of 42 females and 
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33 males between age 18 and 36 years (mean: 23.45 years, ± 3.83) with higher 
education entrance certification. All participants reported no history of psychiatric or 
neurologic disease and fulfilled the inclusion criteria for MRI measurements.  
2.1.3.2 Study Procedure 
Participants were informed about study procedure and aims, signed written 
informed consent, and practiced all tasks on a laptop. The study was approved by the 
ethics committee of the Medical Faculty Mannheim, University of Heidelberg, and is 
part of a larger project on the human mirror neuron system. Participants joined two 
appointments, the first appointment with a simultaneous EEG-fMRI set-up and the 
second appointment with transcranial magnetic stimulation prior to fMRI scanning. 
Data reported in this manuscript refers to the fMRI-results of the first appointment. 
2.1.3.3 Experimental Design 
We used three experimental paradigms covering different processes of social 
cognition: An imitation task, an empathy task and a theory of mind (ToM) task. For all 
three tasks, we used pictures from the Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces stimulus 
set (Lundqvist, Flykt, & Öhman, 1998) of 5 females and 5 males, as well as control 
stimuli without social information. Task were implemented with Presentation Software 
(Version 18.1; www.neurobs.com) and presented via video goggles. Responses were 
given with a diamond shaped button device (Current Designs, Inc., Philadelphia, PA, 
USA). Task order 1. Imitation, 2. Empathy, 3. ToM was fixed for all participants. 
 
2.1.3.3.1 Imitation 
 
The imitation task (Figure 4-d1) had three experimental conditions: Imitation, 
Execution and Observation, as well as a control condition. At the beginning of each 
block the instruction cue ‘Observe’, ‘Imitate’, or ‘Execute’ was presented. The stimuli 
for the Observation and Imitation block were angry and fearful faces. In the Imitation 
block, participants had to imitate the facial expression as accurately as possible, in the 
Observation block to passively view the facial expression. In the Execution block, 
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participants read the word ‘anger’ or ‘fear’ and had to produce the corresponding facial 
expression. In the control condition participants had to pronounce the German letter 
‘Ä’ or ‘A’ aloud. Ä and A were chosen to roughly resemble the facial expressions during 
anger and fear, respectively. 
Experimental blocks contained 4 stimuli each and were alternated with blocks 
of 2 control stimuli. The instruction cues prior to each block were presented for 2 
seconds, the face stimuli for 5 seconds, control stimuli for 3 seconds. Stimuli within the 
blocks were presented in pseudo-randomized order and were separated by an inter-
stimulus-interval of 1-3 seconds. The instruction cues initiating a new block were 
preceded by an inter-block-interval of 4-6 seconds. Each experimental block was 
presented 5 times, resulting in 20 trials for each experimental condition and 30 trials 
for the control condition. Task duration was 13 minutes. 
 
2.1.3.3.2 Empathy 
 
The empathy task (Figure 4-d2) again consisted of three experimental 
conditions Affective Empathy, Cognitive Empathy and Distress, and one control 
condition. At the beginning of each block the instruction cue ‘How bad do I feel?’ 
(Distress), or ‘How bad does the presented person feel?’ (Cognitive Empathy), or ‘How 
much do I empathize with the presented person?’ (Affective Empathy), or ‘How big is 
the circle?’ (control condition) was shown. Participants were instructed to think about 
the cued question while watching fearful or angry faces. After each stimulus, the 
question was displayed again, together with a continuous visual analog scale from ‘not 
at all’ to ‘very much’ (control condition: ‘small’ to ‘large’) on which participants had to 
indicate their answer.  
Analogous to the imitation task, we chose a design with experimental blocks of 4 stimuli 
alternating with a control block of 2 stimuli. The instruction cues prior to each block 
were presented for 2 seconds, the face and control stimuli for 3 seconds and the visual 
analogue scale for 4 seconds. Stimuli within the blocks were presented in pseudo-
randomized order and were separated by a jittered inter-stimulus-interval of 1-3 
seconds. The instruction cues initiating a new block were preceded by a jittered inter-
block-interval of 4-6 seconds. Each experimental block was presented 5 times and 
each control block 15 times, making 20 trials for each experimental block and 30 total 
control trials. Total duration of the task was 17 minutes. 
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2.1.3.3.3 Theory of Mind (ToM) 
 
The ToM task (Figure 4-d3) also had three experimental conditions Affective 
ToM, Emotion Recognition, Neutral Face Processing, and a control condition. The 
different conditions were implemented by different statements preceding the facial or 
control stimuli. The participants’ task was to indicate by button press whether the 
picture matched the previous statement (yes, or no). Statements were the German 
versions of: “This person is about to bluster” and “This person is about to run away” for 
the Affective ToM condition, “This person is angry”, and “This person is afraid” for the 
Emotion Recognition condition, “This person is female” and “This person is older than 
29 years old” for the Neutral Face Processing condition, and “This is a circle” and “This 
is a triangle” for the control condition. 
The ToM task was presented in an event-related design. Each statement was 
presented for 2 seconds and the subsequent stimulus for an additional 2 seconds. A 
jittered inter-trial interval of 1-3 seconds was applied. All trials were presented in 
pseudo-randomized order, with 20 trials per condition, making a total of 80 trials. All in 
all, this task took about 8 minutes. 
2.1.3.4 fMRI Data Acquisition and Analysis 
fMRI data was acquired using a 12 channel head coil in a 3T Siemens 
Magnetom Trio at the Central Institute of Mental Health in Mannheim, Germany. During 
the tasks, we used echo-planar imaging with 32 descending 3x3x3mm slices with 1mm 
gap, TR = 2000 ms, TE = 30 ms; flip angle = 80°, field of view = 192 mm; matrix = 
64x64 . Prior to functional imaging, a MPRage was acquired of each participant (TR = 
1570 ms, TE = 2.75 ms; flip angle = 15°, field of view = 256 mm; matrix = 256x256; 
voxel size 1x1x1 mm). 
Data was analyzed with Statistical Parametric Mapping 8 (SPM8, 
http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/spm8/). Preprocessing included slice time 
correction, realignment to the mean image, normalization with coregistration to the 
MPRage and resampling with 3 x 3 x 3 mm voxel size. First-level analyses were run 
twice, once with unsmoothed data and once with smoothed data, using an 8 mm 
Gaussian kernel. For all first-level analyses, the face stimuli were modelled as events 
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(folding the HRF with a stick function) as regressors in the general linear model, and 
the according 6 movement parameters derived from realignment were used as 
regressors of no interest. For the Imitation task, we modelled the Imitation, the 
Observation, the Execution and the control condition, as well as the cues. For the 
Empathy task, Affective Empathy, Cognitive Empathy, Distress, as well as the control 
condition and the cues were used as regressors. For the ToM task, affective ToM, 
Emotion Recognition and neutral face processing, as well as the control condition were 
applied in separate regressors.  
Contrast of interest for second level analyses for the Imitation task were: 
Imitation > control, Observation > control, Execution > control, Imitation > Observation, 
Imitation > Execution; for the Empathy task: Affective Empathy > control, Cognitive 
Empathy > control, Distress > control, Affective Empathy > Cognitive Empathy, 
Affective Empathy > Distress, Cognitive Empathy > Distress; and for the ToM task: 
ToM > control, Emotion Recognition > control, neutral face processing > control, ToM 
> neutral face processing, ToM > Emotion Recognition, and [ToM > control]> [Emotion 
Recognition > control] > [neutral face processing > control]. 
Significance threshold was set to p < 0.05 FWE corrected, k = 10 for the 
analyses within tasks. Significance threshold for the group conjunction analyses was 
set to p < 0.001 without a cluster size threshold. The threshold was chosen analogous 
to the threshold for the sVx analyses that is described below. Region of interest 
analyses were conducted for the IPL (left: 870 voxels, right: 868 voxels), BA44 (left: 
252 voxels, right 255 voxels), STS (left 324 voxels, right 161 voxels), fusiform gyrus 
(left 617 voxels, right 627 voxels) and the amygdala (left 47 voxels, right 47 voxels). 
Masks for IPL, BA44 fusiform gyrus and amygdala were taken from WFU_pickatlas. 
Since no STS mask is available in the WFU_pickatlas, it was based on activity in a 
former study with the ToM task (Mier, Lis, et al., 2010) and has been successfully 
applied in further studies with the ToM task (Mier, Haddad, et al., 2014). Significance 
level for the ROIs was set to p < 0.05 small volume corrected (svc) with k = 10 for the 
single experiments, but without setting a cluster size threshold for the conjunction 
analysis. 
Behavioral data was analyzed with IBM SPSS Statistics V20 
(https://www.ibm.com/us-en/marketplace/spss-statistics), applying repeated 
measures ANOVAs, as well as post-hoc t-tests. 
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2.1.3.5 sVx analysis 
We based the sVx analyses on the first level models described above, for 2 sets 
of contrasts: 1) (Imitation > control) & (Affective Empathy > control) & (ToM > control), 
and 2) (Imitation > neutral) & (ToM > neutral). The second set of contrasts was selected 
to account for face processing (the Empathy task is not included in the second set, 
because no social control condition is available). Based on Gazzolla and Keysers 
(2009), the significance threshold for the sVx analyses (with smoothed and with 
unsmoothed data) was set so that the probability to incorrectly define a voxel as sVx 
in a single participant was less than 0.001 (I.e. for each of the 3 contrasts in set 1, we 
set p < 0.05, corresponding to a total probability for the set of 0.05³ = 0.000125, and 
for each of the 2 contrasts in set 2 we set p < 0.01, corresponding to a total set 
probability of 0.01² = 0.001 to incorrectly define a voxel as sVx). Based on Boolean 
maps of the single contrasts, we calculated the logical ‘&’ to obtain the sVx maps 
containing the intersections of voxels over the contrasts. These sVx maps served to 
count the number of sVx in the ROIs as well as the whole brain. For each participant, 
the individual brain/ROI volume was taken as a reference for the required number of 
sVx to surpass chance level. The required number of sVx was based on a cumulative 
binomial distribution function with a voxelwise level of 0.001 and a threshold of p < 0.05 
for finding the returned number of voxels by chance. The number of participants with 
sVx and the number of participants with sVx above chance level is reported. 
2.1.4 Results 
We used three experimental paradigms covering different processes of social 
cognition: An Imitation task, an Empathy task and a Theory of Mind (ToM) task. For all 
three tasks, we used pictures from the Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces stimulus 
set (Lundqvist et al., 1998) of 5 females and 5 males, as well as control stimuli without 
social information. Since by nature, fMRI data is high-dimensional and requires 
correction for multiple testing, in addition to whole brain analyses, we conducted 
analyses limited to predefined ROIs to account for possible type-I-errors. Our regions 
of interest (ROIs) for all three tasks were BA44, IPL, STS, fusiform gyrus and 
amygdala. 
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2.1.4.1 Imitation is linked to activation in the mirror neuron system 
The Imitation task (Figure 4-d1) had three experimental conditions: Observation, 
Imitation and Execution, as well as a control condition. In the Observation and Imitation 
condition, participants were shown angry and fearful faces, which they should observe 
or imitate, respectively. In the Execution condition, participants read the word ‘anger’ 
or ‘fear’ and had to produce the corresponding facial expression. In the control 
condition participants had to pronounce the German letter ‘Ä’ or ‘A’ aloud. Ä and A 
were chosen to roughly resemble the facial expressions during anger and fear, 
respectively. 
Whole brain analyses for the comparison of Imitation with the control condition 
mainly revealed activity in inferior parietal, frontal and temporal regions, in premotor 
cortex and visual cortex, as well as in the basal ganglia. The comparison of Imitation 
with Observation and with Execution revealed similar patterns in both cases. Small-
volume correction for our ROIs confirmed significantly higher activation in all ROIs for 
Imitation than for the other conditions. Comparison of Execution with control mostly 
resulted in activation in cerebellum and inferior temporal lobe. ROI analyses showed 
higher activation for Execution than control in fusiform gyrus and STS bilaterally, as 
well as in left IPL and left BA44. Observation > control revealed mainly activation in 
visual cortex, in orbitofrontal cortex and in parahippocampal gyrus, reaching into the 
amygdala. ROI analyses showed significant activation in bilateral fusiform gyrus, in 
bilateral amygdala and in right STS. The comparison of the experimental conditions 
with the control conditions, including the overlap between conditions, is displayed in 
Figure 4-r1. Detailed results of the Imitation task can be found in supplementary tables 
4 and 5, for whole brain and ROI analyses, respectively.  
2.1.4.2 Empathy is linked to activation in the mirror neuron system 
The Empathy task (Figure 4-d2) consisted of three experimental conditions: 
Affective Empathy, Cognitive Empathy and Distress, and a control condition. After the 
presentation of either an emotional (fearful or angry face, experimental conditions) or 
neutral stimulus (circle, control condition), participants were instructed to answer the 
questions ‘How bad do I feel?’ (Distress), ‘How bad does the presented person feel?’ 
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(Cognitive Empathy), ‘How much do I empathize with the presented person?’ (Affective 
Empathy), or ‘How big is the circle?’ (ontrol condition). 
Whole brain analyses revealed increased activation in several cortical regions 
for Affective Empathy compared to control, including superior temporal sulcus, inferior 
parietal cortex, inferior frontal gyrus and visual cortices, in medial frontal gyrus and 
precuneus, as well as in the amygdala. A comparable picture occurred when 
comparing Cognitive Empathy with control and Distress with control. All empathy 
conditions in comparison to the control condition resulted in enhanced activation in all 
ROIs. Figure 4-r2 displays activity in the experimental conditions in comparison to the 
control condition, including the overlap between conditions. 
Comparison of the empathy conditions showed significantly higher activity for 
Distress than for Affective and Cognitive Empathy in the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) 
bilaterally, as well as in the precuneus. ROI-analyses additionally showed that Distress 
resulted in enhanced activation in BA44 right, IPL left and right, STS left and right 
compared to Cognitive Empathy. ROI-analyses comparing Distress and Affective 
Empathy revealed significantly higher activation during Distress in bilateral fusiform 
gyrus, as well as in bilateral IPL and STS. Affective Empathy was linked to higher 
activation in left TPJ than Cognitive Empathy. Accordingly, ROI-analyses showed 
significantly higher activation in left IPL for Affective Empathy compared to Cognitive 
Empathy. Cognitive Empathy led to stronger activation than Affective Empathy in the 
executive control network, including regions of parietal and frontal cortex. ROI-
analyses for Cognitive compared to Affective Empathy showed significant activity in 
right BA44, left STS and bilateral IPL, but in a more dorsal part of the IPL than for 
Affective compared to Cognitive Empathy. Detailed results of the Empathy task can be 
found in supplementary tables 6 and 7, for whole brain and ROI analyses, respectively.  
2.1.4.3 ToM is linked to activation in the mirror neuron system 
The ToM task (Figure 4-d3) also had three experimental conditions: Affective 
ToM, Emotion Recognition, Neutral Face Processing, and a control condition. The 
different conditions were implemented by different statements preceding the stimuli. 
The participants’ task was to indicate by button press whether the picture matched the 
previous statement (yes, or no). Statements were the German versions of: “This person 
is about to bluster” and “This person is about to run away” for the Affective ToM 
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condition, “This person is angry”, and “This person is afraid” for the Emotion 
Recognition condition, “This person is female” and “This person is older than 29 years 
old” for the Neutral Face Processing condition, and “This is a circle” and “This is a 
triangle” for the control condition. 
Whole brain regression analysis showed that activation in STS and inferior 
frontal gyrus was highest for ToM, medium for Emotion Recognition, and lowest for 
neutral faces. Whole brain analyses of ToM in comparison to control, as well as in 
comparison to neutral faces mainly showed activation in STS, inferior frontal gyrus 
reaching into the insula, visual regions, and premotor cortex. ROI analyses for both 
ToM compared to control and ToM compared to neutral revealed significantly 
increased activation for ToM in all ROIs. Whole brain comparison of ToM to Emotion 
Recognition mainly revealed enhanced activation in the TPJ region. The corresponding 
ROI-analyses comparing ToM with Emotion Recognition showed higher activation for 
ToM in all ROIs, except for BA44. Whole brain analyses for Emotion Recognition 
compared to control and to neutral both revealed a similar pattern as the comparison 
of ToM with these conditions (i.e. inferior frontal gyrus, STS, premotor cortex). The 
corresponding ROI-analyses for Emotion Recognition compared to control and to 
neutral showed activation in all ROIs, except for the IPL in the comparison with control, 
and the amygdala in the comparison with neutral. The comparisons of the experimental 
with the control condition, including overlaps between conditions, are depicted in 
Figure 4-r3. Detailed results of the ToM task can be found in supplementary tables 8 
and 9, for whole brain and ROI analyses, respectively.  
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Figure 4. Task designs and fMRI activation for each of the three paradigms:  
d1: Imitation task: Imitation task flow showing order and lengths of all events, 
exemplarily for two conditions. 
r1: fMRI activation in the Imitation task: fMRI activation of all conditions of the 
Imitation task compared to the non-social control condition, slice coordinate Z=56. 
Red: Imitation > Control. Blue: Action > Control. Green: Observation > Control. Pink: 
overlap of red and blue. Yellow: overlap of red and green. Significance threshold p < 
0.05, FWE-corrected, minimal cluster size k = 10. 
d2: Empathy task: Empathy task flow showing order and lengths of all events, 
exemplarily for one condition. All questions of the instruction and the rating of the four 
conditions are shown in the lower right corner. 
r2: fMRI activation in the Empathy task: fMRI activation of all conditions of the 
Empathy task compared to the non-social control condition, slice coordinate Z=56. 
Red: Affective Empathy > Control. Blue: Distress > Control. Green: Cognitive 
Empathy > Control. Pink: overlap of red and blue. Yellow: overlap of red and green. 
Cyan: overlap of blue and green. White: overlap of all three contrasts. Significance 
threshold p < 0.05, FWE-corrected, minimal cluster size k = 10. 
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d3: ToM task: ToM task flow showing order and lengths of all events. All statements 
of the four conditions are shown in the lower right corner. 
r3: fMRI activation in the ToM task: fMRI activation of all conditions of the ToM task 
compared to the non-social control condition, slice coordinate Z=56. Red: ToM > 
Control. Blue: Emotion Recognition > Control. Green: Neutral > Control. Pink: overlap 
of red and blue. Yellow: overlap of red and green. Cyan: overlap of blue and green. 
White: overlap of all three contrasts. Significance threshold p < 0.05, FWE-corrected, 
minimal cluster size k = 10. 
2.1.4.4 Common activation in the mirror neuron system exists across tasks 
A whole brain conjunction analysis to investigate activation across participants 
and tasks including ToM, Affective Empathy and Imitation, each compared to control 
mainly revealed bilateral activation in amygdala, fusiform gyrus and STS, as well as 
activation in inferior frontal gyrus and premotor cortex (Figure 5 a). ROI-analyses 
confirmed significant activation in all of these regions, except for right BA44. To assure 
that these effects are not merely representing the processing of the faces that were 
used in all conditions, we also conducted a conjunction analysis on ToM compared to 
Neutral and Imitation compared to Observation. This conjunction analysis (comparing 
both task conditions with their social control condition) revealed common activation in 
STS and IPL bilaterally, as well as in bilateral inferior frontal gyrus, and in premotor 
cortex (Figure 5 b). The corresponding ROI-analyses revealed activation in bilateral 
STS and IPL, as well as in left BA44. Detailed results of the conjunction analyses can 
be found in supplementary tables 10 and 11, for whole brain and ROI analyses, 
respectively.  
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Figure 5. fMRI activation of the conjunction analyses: fMRI activation of the 
conjunction analyses. a) of all three tasks ((Imitation > Control) & (Affective Empathy 
> Control) & (ToM > Control), smoothed data), slice coordinate Z=60, b) of the 
Imitation and the ToM task ((Imitation > Observation) & (ToM > Neutral), smoothed 
data), slice coordinate Z=82. Color bar indicating t-values. Significance threshold p < 
0.001, uncorrected, minimal cluster size k = 10. 
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2.1.4.5 Shared voxel counts show activation in the mirror neuron system 
within participants 
To investigate activation within participants across tasks sVx were counted. As 
shown in Table 2, almost all participants had sVx across tasks. For the smoothed data, 
82.7% of participants, and for the unsmoothed data, 92% of participants, had more sVx 
than predicted at chance level (i.e. more than 80-85 voxels, depending on individual 
brain size). We find a significant number of participants with sVx across all three tasks 
in our ROIs, with the highest number of sVx in fusiform gyrus and STS for the sVx 
analysis across all three tasks. For the sVx count of Imitation compared to observation 
and ToM compared to neutral, again sVx were revealed in all of our ROIs (Table 3). 
However, in this case number of sVx was reduced for amygdala and fusiform gyrus. 
For both analyses, more participants with sVx were revealed for the unsmoothed data 
in contrast to the smoothed data. In Figure 6, brain renders and slices overlayed with 
the sVx counts from unsmoothed data over all three tasks compared to control are 
shown. 
 
Table 2. Number of participants with shared voxels (sVx) in the regions of interest. 
Numbers in brackets indicate number of participants with number of sVx greater than 
chance level. Contrasts: (Imitation > Control) & (Affective Empathy > Control) & (ToM 
> Control). Number of sVx at chance level: 1: 80-85 depending on brain size. 2: 0. 3: 1. 
4: 2, 5: 3. Note: BA44: Brodmann Area 44, IPL: inferior parietal lobe, STS: superior 
temporal sulcus, FG: fusiform gyrus. 
  amygdala2 BA443 IPL5 STS3 FG4 brain1 
smoothed 
left 12 (12) 29 (24) 15 (8) 34 (31) 62 (52) 
75 (62) 
right 12 (12) 19 (14) 16 (8) 43 (40) 66 (61) 
unsmoothed 
left 6 (6) 36 (20) 53 (20) 57 (45) 66 (58) 
75 (69) 
right 9 (9) 22 (16) 44 (19) 58 (49) 73 (55) 
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Table 3. Number of participants with shared voxels (sVx) in the regions of interest. 
Numbers in brackets indicate number of participants with number of sVx greater than 
chance level. Contrasts: (Imitation > Observation) & (ToM > Neutral). Number of sVx 
at chance level: 1: 80-85 depending on brain size. 2: 0. 3: 1. 4: 2, 5: 3.  Note: BA44: 
Brodmann Area 44, IPL: inferior parietal lobe, STS: superior temporal sulcus, FG: 
fusiform gyrus. 
  
amygdala
2 BA443 IPL5 STS3 FG4 brain1 
smoothed 
left 2 (2) 25 (24) 22 (17) 33 (29) 17 (9) 
71 (58) 
right 2 (2) 19 (13) 30 (16) 18 (15) 16 (6) 
unsmoothe
d 
left 3 (3) 28 (17) 44 (11) 40 (27) 31 (6) 
75 (58) 
right 1 (1) 33 (17) 43 (19) 27 (8) 31 (5) 
 
 
Figure 6 sVx counts for all three tasks (Imitation > Control) & (Affective Empathy > 
Control) & (ToM > Control): Number of participants with sVx for each voxel, 
unsmoothed data, slice coordinate Z=56. Color bar indicating the number of 
participants. 
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2.1.5 Supplementary Material 
Table 4. Functional brain imaging results for the imitation task (p < 0.05 FWE-
corrected, k = 10). Note: Subcluster peaks are inserted. 
Imitation > Observation    MNI   
Area BA Cluster x y z t-value 
Precentral Gyrus  6 18.871 -45 -13 37  22.76 
   Precentral Gyrus  6   54 -7 37  21.20 
   Precentral Gyrus  6   45 -13 37  20.81 
 
 
Imitation > Control    MNI   
Area BA Cluster x y z t-value 
Middle Occipital Gyrus  18 659 -9 -97 13  15.55 
   Lingual Gyrus  18   0 -85 1  14.65 
   Cuneus  18   9 -94 16  13.14 
Precentral Gyrus  4 1.769 60 -13 37  14.67 
   Inferior Frontal Gyrus  9   54 5 31  10.36 
   Middle Frontal Gyrus  6   33 -4 70  9.82 
Fusiform Gyrus  37 884 42 -46 -14  13.83 
   Inferior Temporal Gyrus     48 -73 -2  10.51 
Postcentral Gyrus  3 932 -54 -22 40  13.11 
   Inferior Frontal Gyrus  9   -51 5 34  9.37 
   Middle Frontal Gyrus  6   -27 -7 52  8.43 
Fusiform Gyrus  37 204 -39 -55 -14  8.75 
   Inferior Temporal Gyrus  37   -42 -46 -17  8.49 
   Fusiform Gyrus  19   -36 -70 -14  5.71 
Amygdala  248 18 -10 -11  8.44 
   Amygdala    -18 -10 -11  7.13 
   Putamen    24 5 7  6.37 
Middle Temporal Gyrus  37 196 -54 -67 7  8.15 
   Middle Occipital Gyrus  19   -45 -82 4  5.96 
Cerebellum  42 -24 -34 -35  6.14 
   Cerebellum     -33 -43 -41  5.88 
   Cerebellum     -42 -37 -29  5.00 
Caudate   19 15 -28 28  6.02 
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Cerebellum   45 -21 -70 -41  5.96 
   Cerebellum     -30 -64 -50  5.85 
Thalamus   14 0 -4 22  5.64 
Parahippocampal Gyrus  28 16 12 -19 -32  5.46 
   Cerebellum    3 -22 -38  5.32 
Putamen   11 -24 2 10  5.41 
 
 
Imitation > Action    MNI   
Area BA Cluster x y z t-value 
Lingual Gyrus  18 2.763 0 -85 1  19.18 
   Cuneus  18   6 -94 13  15.36 
   Fusiform Gyrus  37   39 -52 -14  14.66 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus  9 4.334 45 5 28  11.70 
   Postcentral Gyrus  4   60 -16 34  10.79 
   Postcentral Gyrus  3   -57 -22 40  10.41 
Insula  13 57 -36 -4 16  9.38 
Thalamus   236 9 -16 7  8.95 
   Thalamus     -6 -19 7  7.45 
   Thalamus     9 -28 -5  5.27 
Amygdala  66 -21 -7 -11  6.97 
 
 
Action > Control    MNI   
Area BA Cluster x y z t-value 
Superior Frontal Gyrus  6 113 27 -10 76  8.41 
   Middle Frontal Gyrus  6   36 -4 70  7.70 
   Precentral Gyrus  6   45 -7 64  6.32 
Cerebellum   646 -30 -88 -32  7.27 
   Cerebellum    30 -79 -38  6.64 
   Cerebellum    24 -91 -38  5.96 
Fusiform Gyrus  37 74 -48 -37 -14  7.05 
   Middle Temporal Gyrus  21   -66 -52 -8  5.48 
   Middle Temporal Gyrus  37   -60 -46 -11  5.32 
Middle Frontal Gyrus  10 16 -45 56 -11  6.92 
Caudate   97 18 -37 25  6.49 
   Insula  13   27 -46 19  6.22 
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Cingulate Gyrus  31 59 -18 -40 25  6.49 
Middle Occipital Gyrus  18 13 -9 -100 10  5.77 
Fusiform Gyrus  37 18 48 -40 -17  5.68 
Superior Frontal Gyrus  6 10 -12 11 73  5.51 
Thalamus   11 0 -4 22  5.43 
 
 
Observation > Control    MNI   
Area BA Cluster x y z t-value 
Middle Occipital Gyrus  18 658 -6 -97 10  15.13 
   Cuneus  19   9 -94 19  14.03 
   Lingual Gyrus  18   0 -85 1  13.73 
Fusiform Gyrus  37 405 42 -49 -14  11.10 
   Inferior Temporal Gyrus     48 -73 -2  9.37 
   Inferior Occipital Gyrus  19   42 -79 -8  9.26 
Anterior Cingulate  25 200 0 -1 -8  7.50 
   Middle Frontal Gyrus  11   24 32 -17  7.26 
   Parahippocampal Gyrus  34   -12 -1 -20  6.58 
Fusiform Gyrus  37 29 -36 -46 -14  7.05 
Rectal Gyrus  11 100 -9 35 -20  6.73 
   Orbital Gyrus  11  3 41 -20  6.66 
 
 
Table 5. Functional brain imaging results for the Imitation task, small volume 
corrected for the regions of interest (p < 0.05 small volume corrected, k = 0). Note: 
Subcluster peaks are inserted. 
Imitation > Control   MNI   
Area Hemisphere Cluster x y z t-value 
BA44 left 259 -51 8 25 6.73 
   -54 11 10 5.19 
   -42 -1 13 3.63 
BA44 right 325 54 8 25 9.46 
Amygdala left 22 -21 -10 -11 5.42 
   -18 -7 -14 5.37 
Amygdala right 30 21 -10 -11 7.19 
Study 1: Identification of the relevance of mirror areas for different social cognitive processes 
48 
 
   18 -7 -14 7.11 
   30 -1 -20 4.14 
Fusiform Gyrus left 244 -42 -46 -17 8.49 
   -39 -55 -17 8.41 
   -33 -67 -14 5.43 
Fusiform Gyrus right 275 42 -49 -17 11.90 
   21 -70 -17 4.30 
Superior 
Temporal 
Sulcus left 125 -54 -64 7 7.84 
   -45 -73 16 4.46 
Superior 
Temporal 
Sulcus right 72 54 -61 10 6.70 
   45 -58 16 5.07 
 
Observation  > Control   MNI   
Area Hemisphere Cluster x y z t-value 
Amygdala left 14 -18 -4 -20 4.36 
Amygdala right 6 18 -7 -14 3.14 
Fusiform Gyrus left 76 -36 -46 -14 7.05 
Fusiform Gyrus right 137 42 -49 -17 9.79 
   36 -52 -14 8.89 
Superior 
Temporal 
Sulcus right 112 54 -67 16 4.77 
 
Imitation  > Observation   MNI   
Area Hemisphere Cluster x y z t-value 
BA44 left 488 -57 -1 25 16.74 
BA44 right 578 60 2 22 17.68 
   39 8 4 10.81 
Amygdala left 24 -27 -4 -14 6.92 
   -21 -10 -11 5.95 
Amygdala right 34 27 -4 -14 8.73 
   24 -10 -11 7.27 
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   30 -1 -20 7.17 
Fusiform Gyrus left 256 -21 -64 -17 14.89 
   -36 -58 -20 9.82 
   -42 -37 -29 6.01 
Fusiform Gyrus right 254 21 -64 -17 15.93 
   36 -49 -23 6.80 
   39 -55 -23 6.74 
Superior 
Temporal 
Sulcus left 128 -54 -64 7 7.81 
   -51 -61 10 7.74 
   -45 -73 16 4.44 
Superior 
Temporal 
Sulcus right 30 57 -58 7 5.35 
   51 -58 10 5.30 
 
Action  > Control   MNI   
Area Hemisphere Cluster x y z t-value 
BA44 left 342 -48 5 25 5.83 
   -39 2 13 5.49 
   -42 -4 13 5.12 
BA44 right 558 45 2 25 10.09 
   51 8 25 9.64 
   39 2 13 8.64 
Amygdala left 23 -21 -10 -11 6.32 
   -24 -4 -14 6.29 
Amygdala right 34 24 -4 -14 8.51 
   30 -1 -20 4.65 
Fusiform Gyrus left 198 -39 -58 -17 8.77 
   -36 -55 -14 8.46 
   -33 -61 -14 7.81 
Fusiform Gyrus right 244 39 -49 -17 13.78 
Superior 
Temporal 
Sulcus left 47 -45 -76 19 4.11 
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   -54 -61 1 3.99 
   -54 -64 7 3.95 
Superior 
Temporal 
Sulcus right 49 51 -55 10 3.52 
   45 -58 16 3.21 
 
Action  > Control   MNI   
Area Hemisphere Cluster x y z t-value 
BA44 left 85 -57 17 4 4.01 
Fusiform Gyrus left 29 -30 -91 -26 5.58 
Fusiform Gyrus right 59 48 -40 -17 5.68 
Fusiform Gyrus right 32 27 -91 -26 4.11 
   21 -94 -26 4.03 
Superior 
Temporal 
Sulcus left 107 -63 -46 -8 5.22 
   -63 -61 -2 3.84 
Superior 
Temporal 
Sulcus right 42 51 -61 10 3.60 
   45 -64 16 2.97 
 
Table 6. Functional brain imaging results for the empathy task (p < 0.05 FWE-
corrected, k = 10). Abbreviations: Cognitive = cognitive empathy, affective = affective 
empathy. Note: Subcluster peaks are inserted. 
Distress > Control    MNI   
Area BA Cluster x y z t-value 
Lingual Gyrus  17 3.088 -15 -94 -5  17.21 
   Middle Occipital Gyrus  18   -24 -91 -5  16.54 
   Cuneus  17   21 -91 1  16.18 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus  47 1.318 -45 32 -8  14.03 
   Inferior Frontal Gyrus  47   -42 23 -14  12.46 
   Middle Frontal Gyrus  8   -42 14 46  11.44 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus  47 686 51 29 -5  13.18 
   Amygdala     21 -10 -14  9.16 
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   Inferior Frontal Gyrus  47   36 26 -17  8.95 
Precuneus  7 414 -3 -58 37  12.73 
   Precuneus  31   0 -49 31  12.57 
Supramarginal Gyrus  40 1.175 -45 -58 31  11.74 
   Supramarginal Gyrus  40   -60 -49 28  11.61 
   Middle Temporal Gyrus  22   -60 -43 4  11.05 
Superior Frontal Gyrus  6 1.561 -3 17 64  10.54 
   Superior Frontal Gyrus  10   -6 59 31  10.42 
   Superior Frontal Gyrus  8   -6 26 58  10.11 
Orbital Gyrus  11 186 0 41 -20  10.50 
Superior Temporal Gyrus  39 746 57 -58 25  9.68 
   Superior Temporal Gyrus  22   51 -37 1  9.22 
   Superior Temporal Gyrus  13   60 -49 22  9.12 
Amygdala   52 -18 -10 -14  7.97 
Middle Frontal Gyrus  6 50 48 8 55  6.51 
 
 
Distress > Cognitive    MNI   
Area BA Cluster x y z t-value 
Supramarginal Gyrus  40 123 63 -43 31  7.21 
   Supramarginal Gyrus  40   60 -55 37  6.36 
Supramarginal Gyrus  40 208 -57 -49 31  6.61 
   Inferior Parietal Lobule  40   -51 -55 43  5.84 
   Inferior Parietal Lobule  40   -57 -46 40  5.79 
Precuneus  7 21 -3 -61 43  5.79 
 
 
Cognitive > Control    MNI   
Area BA Cluster x y z t-value 
Cuneus  18 2.875 18 -97 13  18.08 
   Middle Occipital Gyrus  18   24 -94 4  16.98 
   Cuneus  18   -27 -94 -5  15.77 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus  47 1.576 -45 29 -5  13.10 
   Inferior Frontal Gyrus  45   -51 23 13  12.07 
   Superior Temporal Gyrus  22   -54 -43 4  9.07 
Amygdala  192 21 -10 -14  12.19 
   Thalamus     21 -28 -2  6.86 
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Inferior Frontal Gyrus  45 411 57 29 1  11.57 
   Inferior Frontal Gyrus  47   36 29 -17  6.72 
Precuneus  31 260 0 -49 31  11.22 
Parahippocampal Gyrus  28 166 -18 -13 -14  9.78 
   Amygdala    -27 -4 -20  6.69 
   Thalamus     -21 -28 -2  6.42 
Superior Frontal Gyrus  6 692 0 17 70  8.81 
   Superior Frontal Gyrus  9   -9 56 34  8.22 
   Superior Frontal Gyrus  8   -3 17 58  7.55 
Middle Frontal Gyrus  6 160 -42 8 52  8.35 
Superior Temporal Gyrus  22 330 48 -37 4  8.24 
   Superior Temporal Gyrus  39   54 -58 22  8.17 
   Superior Temporal Gyrus  22   42 -52 19  6.24 
Middle Temporal Gyrus  21 76 54 -10 -14  7.88 
Rectal Gyrus  11 87 0 38 -23  6.74 
   Medial Frontal Gyrus  11  0 53 -14  6.74 
 
 
Distress > Affective    MNI   
Area BA Cluster x y z t-value 
Superior Parietal Lobule  7 90 36 -70 49  6.87 
Supramarginal Gyrus  40 119 60 -46 34  6.75 
Precuneus  7 109 -3 -61 49  6.57 
   Superior Parietal Lobule  7   -15 -67 55  5.35 
Angular Gyrus  39 34 -39 -73 25  6.46 
 
 
Affective > Control    MNI   
Area BA Cluster x y z t-value 
Inferior Occipital Gyrus  18 4.844 36 -85 -8  16.33 
   Cuneus  17   21 -94 1  14.90 
   Cuneus  18   15 -100 13  14.36 
Precuneus  31 305 0 -49 31  14.87 
Superior Frontal Gyrus  9 1.049 -9 56 31  10.97 
   Superior Frontal Gyrus  9   -9 50 40  10.26 
   Superior Frontal Gyrus  6   -6 20 70  8.48 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus  47 258 54 29 1  10.41 
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   Inferior Frontal Gyrus  47   36 29 -17  6.75 
Amygdala  124 -21 -13 -14  9.84 
   Amygdala    -30 -7 -17  7.70 
Orbital Gyrus  11 187 0 41 -20  9.70 
Amygdala  111 21 -10 -11  9.42 
   Amygdala    30 -4 -20  7.80 
Superior Frontal Gyrus  8 110 -39 17 55  7.87 
Nodule   15 3 -55 -38  6.63 
Superior Temporal Gyrus  38 19 42 17 -32  5.94 
 
 
Affective > Cognitive    MNI   
Area BA Cluster x y z t-value 
Angular Gyrus  39 32 -54 -64 34  5.65 
 
 
Cognitive > Affective    MNI   
Area BA Cluster x y z t-value 
Superior Parietal Lobule  7 84 33 -58 52  5.71 
   Superior Parietal Lobule  7   36 -67 49  5.57 
   Inferior Parietal Lobule  40   39 -52 58  5.49 
Middle Frontal Gyrus  6 36 27 11 52  5.56 
Superior Parietal Lobule  7 15 -15 -67 55  5.53 
Precentral Gyrus  9 22 39 8 31  5.25 
   Middle Frontal Gyrus  9  51 14 31  5.24 
 
 
Table 7. Functional brain imaging results for the empathy task, small volume corrected 
for the regions of interest (p < 0.05 small volume corrected, k = 0). Abbreviations: 
affective = affective empathy, cognitive = cognitive empathy, Neutral = Neutral face 
processing. Note: Subcluster peaks are inserted. 
Affective  > Control   MNI   
Area Hemisphere Cluster x y z t-value 
BA44 left 136 -48 20 19 10.50 
BA44 right 56 57 20 7 5.49 
   48 20 19 4.16 
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Amygdala left 47 -21 -10 -11 8.11 
   -27 -7 -17 7.03 
   -30 -4 -20 6.52 
Amygdala right 46 21 -10 -11 9.42 
   30 -4 -20 7.80 
Fusiform Gyrus left 191 -36 -46 -17 8.73 
   -39 -61 -17 6.44 
   -27 -88 -26 5.99 
Fusiform Gyrus left 32 -42 -4 -29 6.59 
Fusiform Gyrus left 1 -42 -28 -20 4.15 
Fusiform Gyrus right 224 42 -49 -17 10.69 
   24 -82 -23 7.57 
   27 -88 -26 7.49 
Fusiform Gyrus right 35 60 -4 -29 3.74 
Superior 
Temporal 
Sulcus left 200 -45 -55 22 8.12 
   -54 -61 22 7.82 
   -63 -49 7 6.78 
Superior 
Temporal 
Sulcus right 139 60 -58 22 5.97 
Superior 
Temporal 
Sulcus right  57 -64 13 5.30 
 
 
 
Cognitive  > Control   MNI   
Area Hemisphere Cluster x y z t-value 
BA44 left 145 -48 20 16 11.88 
BA44 right 74 48 20 22 6.92 
   57 20 7 5.86 
Amygdala left 46 -21 -10 -11 8.09 
   -27 -4 -20 6.69 
Amygdala right 47 21 -7 -14 10.74 
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Fusiform Gyrus left 226 -39 -46 -17 9.71 
   -42 -67 -20 7.01 
   -24 -85 -20 6.69 
Fusiform Gyrus right 236 42 -49 -17 10.55 
   42 -67 -20 8.14 
   24 -79 -20 7.00 
Superior 
Temporal 
Sulcus left 212 -45 -58 22 7.50 
   -60 -49 10 7.19 
   -63 -46 -2 4.31 
Superior 
Temporal 
Sulcus right 145 54 -58 22 8.17 
 
Distress  > Control   MNI   
Area Hemisphere Cluster x y z t-value 
BA44 left 143 -48 20 19 9.83 
   -54 20 10 9.74 
BA44 right 87 57 20 4 8.81 
   48 20 19 6.80 
Amygdala left 47 -18 -7 -14 7.16 
   -21 -10 -11 7.11 
Amygdala right 47 21 -10 -11 8.86 
Fusiform Gyrus left 220 -39 -46 -17 9.52 
   -42 -61 -17 8.71 
   -30 -82 -20 8.27 
Fusiform Gyrus left 33 -45 -4 -29 4.50 
Fusiform Gyrus right 230 39 -52 -17 11.62 
   27 -82 -23 11.32 
   42 -70 -20 9.67 
Superior 
Temporal 
Sulcus left 233 -54 -61 22 10.26 
   -63 -49 10 9.38 
   -60 -49 22 8.97 
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Superior 
Temporal 
Sulcus right 148 57 -52 22 8.79 
   54 -58 22 8.77 
 
(Cognitive & Affective) > Distress   MNI   
Area Hemisphere Cluster x y z t-value 
Fusiform Gyrus right 41 33 -43 -17 4.03 
 
Table 8. Functional brain imaging results for the ToM-task (p < 0.05 FWE-corrected, k 
= 10). Abbreviations: ToM = affective Theory of Mind, Emo = Emotion recognition, 
Neutral = Neutral face processing. Note: Subcluster peaks are inserted. 
(ToM > Control)  
> (Emo > Control)  
> (Neutral > Control) 
   MNI   
Area BA Cluster x y z t-value 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus  45 249 -51 32 7  8.02 
   Inferior Frontal Gyrus  45   -48 17 16  5.68 
Superior Temporal Gyrus  22 242 -54 -52 13  7.65 
Superior Temporal Gyrus  22 338 48 -37 4  7.00 
   Superior Temporal Gyrus  22   60 -49 16  6.52 
   Superior Temporal Gyrus  22   54 -10 -11  5.59 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus  45 55 54 29 4  6.40 
Superior Temporal Gyrus  38 18 48 14 -26  5.39 
 
 
ToM > Control    MNI   
Area BA Cluster x y z t-value 
Middle Occipital Gyrus  18 3.222 12 -97 16  18.08 
   Lingual Gyrus  17   12 -91 1  16.96 
   Cuneus  18   -15 -97 7  16.67 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus  45 1.554 -54 26 10  13.64 
   Inferior Frontal Gyrus  47   -42 23 -2  13.34 
   Middle Frontal Gyrus  46   -45 20 25  12.42 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus  45 923 48 20 25  12.87 
   Inferior Frontal Gyrus  46   51 29 16  12.11 
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   Inferior Frontal Gyrus  47   33 23 -2  11.88 
Medial Frontal Gyrus  8 1.030 -3 17 52  11.56 
   Superior Frontal Gyrus  9   -9 56 34  11.54 
   Superior Frontal Gyrus  9   9 56 40  7.34 
Superior Temporal Gyrus  22 400 48 -37 4  10.15 
   Superior Temporal Gyrus  22   51 -58 19  8.65 
   Superior Temporal Gyrus  22   57 -49 13  7.73 
Superior Temporal Gyrus  38 247 45 14 -29  9.88 
   Superior Temporal Gyrus  22   51 -13 -11  9.86 
Nodule   61 0 -55 -32  8.31 
Amygdala  45 18 -10 -14  8.25 
   Amygdala    30 -7 -17  5.45 
Superior Temporal Gyrus  22 319 -60 -49 10  8.16 
   Middle Temporal Gyrus  39   -42 -58 22  5.60 
Orbital Gyrus  11 127 3 41 -20  7.92 
   Rectal Gyrus  11   3 29 -26  7.70 
Amygdala  46 -18 -10 -11  7.51 
Precuneus  7 44 0 -61 37  6.57 
Thalamus   30 9 -31 1  6.08 
   Thalamus     21 -31 1  5.73 
Thalamus   11 -6 -16 7  6.01 
Middle Temporal Gyrus  21 20 36 -1 -35  5.87 
Middle Frontal Gyrus  6 25 51 8 49  5.58 
Caudate   13 12 8 4  5.56 
 
 
ToM > Neutral    MNI   
Area BA Cluster x y z t-value 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus  45 615 -48 32 7  12.96 
   Inferior Frontal Gyrus  45   -48 20 16  8.63 
Superior Temporal Gyrus  22 531 -60 -52 10  10.39 
   Supramarginal Gyrus  40   -54 -49 19  8.70 
   Middle Temporal Gyrus  22   -51 -37 1  7.16 
Superior Temporal Gyrus  22 88 48 -34 4  10.14 
   Superior Temporal Gyrus  22   57 -52 16  9.37 
   Superior Temporal Gyrus  22   57 -43 10  8.91 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus  45 162 57 32 4  9.57 
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Cerebellum  148 24 -76 -32  7.33 
   Cerebellum    9 -82 -26  6.42 
   Cerebellum     15 -79 -32  6.29 
   Cerebellum   55 -21 -79 -32  7.24 
Middle Temporal Gyrus  21 31 -54 -4 -11  6.46 
Superior Frontal Gyrus  6 42 0 11 61  6.23 
   Cingulate Gyrus  32   -6 17 46  5.45 
Precuneus  7 14 -6 -67 40  5.97 
Caudate   10 21 -7 31  5.68 
 
 
ToM > Emo    MNI   
Area BA Cluster x y z t-value 
Superior Temporal Gyrus  22 339 63 -52 19  7.72 
   Superior Temporal Gyrus  22   60 -61 25  7.51 
   Angular Gyrus  39   51 -64 28  7.46 
Middle Temporal Gyrus  39 363 -45 -61 28  7.29 
   Supramarginal Gyrus  40   -54 -49 31  6.35 
Superior Temporal Gyrus  38 64 -45 17 -29  6.85 
   Superior Temporal Gyrus  38   -33 20 -29  6.36 
Middle Temporal Gyrus  21 18 57 -7 -14  5.91 
Superior Temporal Gyrus  38 13 45 14 -32  5.79 
Middle Temporal Gyrus  21 17 -60 -7 -11  5.57 
Superior Frontal Gyrus  9 12 -6 56 31  5.34 
 
 
Neutral > Control    MNI   
Area BA Cluster x y z t-value 
Middle Occipital Gyrus  18 2.757 12 -97 13  18.50 
   Cuneus  17   9 -94 4  16.55 
   Lingual Gyrus  17   -9 -91 -2  15.66 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus  47 330 36 32 -11  12.40 
   Inferior Frontal Gyrus  47   33 23 -2  10.99 
   Middle Frontal Gyrus  11   30 38 -23  7.20 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus  46 542 45 32 16  12.02 
   Middle Frontal Gyrus  9   45 14 28  10.90 
   Middle Frontal Gyrus  9   57 26 34  8.46 
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Rectal Gyrus  11 394 3 38 -20  11.69 
   Medial Frontal Gyrus  11   0 50 -17  9.78 
   Rectal Gyrus  11   3 14 -26  7.52 
Superior Frontal Gyrus  9 1.027 -6 59 34  10.49 
   Medial Frontal Gyrus  8   0 29 46  10.25 
   Medial Frontal Gyrus  8   3 20 49  10.25 
Middle Frontal Gyrus  9 225 -42 11 31  9.39 
   Middle Frontal Gyrus  46   -45 20 25  9.04 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus  47 472 -39 23 -17  9.22 
   Inferior Frontal Gyrus  47   -30 20 -5  9.21 
   Inferior Frontal Gyrus  47   -39 23 -5  9.08 
Amygdala   37 18 -10 -14  8.64 
Uncus  28 38 30 -7 -32  8.06 
Nodule   21 0 -55 -32  7.31 
Precuneus  31 44 0 -52 28  6.80 
Inferior Temporal Gyrus  21 21 63 -10 -20  6.74 
Cerebellum   10 -33 -70 -44  6.58 
Angular Gyrus  39 12 48 -61 28  6.48 
Cerebellum   11 -9 -79 -32  6.44 
Amygdala  15 -18 -10 -14  6.31 
Middle Frontal Gyrus  6 33 36 14 61  6.24 
Mammillary Body  10 0 -13 -8  6.21 
Middle Temporal Gyrus  21 15 -63 -16 -14  5.86 
 
 
Emo > Neutral    MNI   
Area BA Cluster x y z t-value 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus  45 403 -51 32 4  10.39 
   Inferior Frontal Gyrus  45   -48 20 16  6.70 
Superior Temporal Gyrus  22 218 -51 -52 10  9.60 
Superior Temporal Gyrus  41 163 45 -40 10  6.79 
   Superior Temporal Gyrus  39   48 -52 10  6.62 
   Superior Temporal Gyrus  22   54 -40 10  6.41 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus  45 80 54 29 4  6.67 
   Inferior Frontal Gyrus  47   48 26 -2  6.59 
Cerebellum  15 27 -76 -38  5.81 
Cingulate Gyrus  32 20 -6 17 46  5.76 
Study 1: Identification of the relevance of mirror areas for different social cognitive processes 
60 
 
   Superior Frontal Gyrus  6  -3 11 58  5.69 
 
 
Emo > Control    MNI   
Area BA Cluster x y z t-value 
Middle Occipital Gyrus  18 2.831 12 -97 16  18.10 
   Lingual Gyrus  17   -21 -91 -8  15.93 
   Lingual Gyrus  17   12 -91 1  15.52 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus  47 918 33 23 -2  13.25 
   Middle Frontal Gyrus  46   54 32 16  11.37 
   Inferior Frontal Gyrus  45   48 17 25  11.34 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus  47 1.121 -45 23 -2  12.37 
   Inferior Frontal Gyrus  47   -54 23 4  11.14 
   Inferior Frontal Gyrus  45   -45 23 19  11.11 
Cingulate Gyrus  32 538 -3 20 46  11.50 
   Superior Frontal Gyrus  6   -6 20 70  6.63 
   Superior Frontal Gyrus  8   -9 41 58  6.06 
Nodule   28 0 -55 -32  8.04 
Middle Temporal Gyrus  22 88 -48 -40 4  7.65 
   Superior Temporal Gyrus  22   -60 -49 13  5.95 
Superior Frontal Gyrus  9 35 -9 59 34  6.69 
Amygdala  14 18 -10 -14  6.38 
Thalamus    9 -13 7  6.33 
Superior Temporal Gyrus  22 25 48 -58 16  6.31 
Superior Temporal Gyrus  22 19 48 -16 -11  6.23 
Cerebellum    -15 -79 -35  6.12 
Superior Temporal Gyrus  22 28 51 -40 10  6.05 
Rectal Gyrus  11 28 -3 38 -23  6.00 
   Rectal Gyrus  11   3 29 -29  5.55 
 
 
Table 9. Functional brain imaging results for the ToM task, small volume corrected for 
the regions of interest (p < 0.05 small volume corrected, k = 0). Abbreviations: ToM = 
affective Theory of Mind, Emo = Emotion Recognition, Neutral = Neutral face 
processing. Note: Subcluster peaks are inserted. 
Neutral  > Control   MNI   
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Area Hemisphere Cluster x y z t-value 
BA44 left 94 -48 20 22 7.54 
   -45 20 4 5.66 
BA44 right 110 48 20 22 8.80 
   51 14 25 6.95 
   39 20 4 4.63 
Amygdala left 37 -21 -10 -11 5.56 
   -18 -7 -14 5.21 
   -27 2 -20 3.47 
Amygdala right 38 18 -7 -14 8.25 
   30 -1 -20 3.41 
Fusiform Gyrus left 167 -36 -46 -17 9.26 
   -36 -55 -14 8.11 
   -27 -82 -20 5.59 
Fusiform Gyrus right 212 39 -49 -17 12.90 
   33 -70 -14 6.98 
   42 -28 -20 4.50 
Superior 
Temporal 
Sulcus right 52 51 -61 22 4.91 
 
ToM  > Emo   MNI   
Area Hemisphere Cluster x y z t-value 
Amygdala left 35 -18 -7 -14 3.68 
   -21 -10 -11 3.45 
Amygdala right 25 18 -7 -14 2.81 
   27 -7 -14 2.75 
   24 -10 -11 2.73 
Fusiform Gyrus right 25 54 -4 -29 3.70 
Superior 
Temporal 
Sulcus left 290 -45 -58 22 6.09 
   -54 -58 22 6.06 
   -57 -49 1 5.14 
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Superior 
Temporal 
Sulcus right 158 63 -52 19 7.72 
   57 -61 22 6.86 
   45 -52 22 6.08 
 
Emo  > Neutral   MNI   
Area Hemisphere Cluster x y z t-value 
BA44 left 261 -48 20 16 6.70 
   -54 17 4 6.36 
BA44 right 130 57 20 4 4.63 
   51 20 19 4.08 
Fusiform Gyrus left 22 -42 -40 -17 4.14 
Fusiform Gyrus right 17 42 -46 -17 3.69 
Superior 
Temporal 
Sulcus left 203 -51 -55 10 9.34 
Superior 
Temporal 
Sulcus right 98 51 -52 10 6.01 
 
ToM  > Neutral   MNI   
Area Hemisphere Cluster x y z t-value 
BA44 left 271 -48 20 16 8.63 
   -51 20 4 7.68 
BA44 right 149 57 20 4 5.21 
   51 20 19 5.02 
Amygdala left 21 -30 -4 -20 3.02 
   -27 -7 -14 2.98 
Amygdala right 16 27 -7 -14 3.29 
   30 -4 -20 3.19 
Fusiform Gyrus left 44 -42 -43 -17 4.56 
Fusiform Gyrus left 34 -27 -82 -23 3.88 
Fusiform Gyrus right 51 21 -82 -23 4.71 
   27 -82 -23 4.69 
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Superior 
Temporal 
Sulcus left 267 -60 -52 10 10.39 
   -54 -49 19 8.70 
Superior 
Temporal 
Sulcus right 154 57 -52 16 9.38 
 
 
Emo  > Control   MNI   
Area Hemisphere Cluster x y z t-value 
BA44 left 184 -48 20 19 10.38 
   -48 20 4 10.06 
BA44 right 145 48 20 22 10.62 
   39 20 4 6.57 
   57 20 4 6.14 
Amygdala left 30 -27 -1 -23 4.13 
   -21 -10 -11 3.85 
   -18 -7 -14 3.11 
Amygdala right 32 21 -10 -11 5.63 
   18 -7 -14 5.34 
   30 -1 -23 3.83 
Fusiform Gyrus left 163 -39 -46 -17 10.93 
   -27 -82 -20 5.90 
   -33 -70 -14 4.27 
Fusiform Gyrus right 212 39 -49 -17 14.90 
   39 -58 -17 14.11 
   33 -64 -14 6.46 
   24 -82 -20 4.39 
Superior 
Temporal 
Sulcus left 121 -60 -49 13 5.95 
Superior 
Temporal 
Sulcus right 128 48 -58 16 6.31 
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ToM  > Control   MNI   
Area Hemisphere Cluster x y z t-value 
BA44 left 179 -48 20 22 11.91 
   -51 20 10 11.33 
BA44 right 141 48 20 22 12.42 
   54 20 4 6.09 
   39 20 4 5.21 
Amygdala left 46 -21 -10 -11 6.72 
   -18 -7 -14 6.65 
   -27 -4 -23 4.65 
Amygdala right 41 21 -10 -11 7.95 
   18 -7 -14 7.59 
   30 -4 -20 4.67 
Fusiform Gyrus left 188 -39 -46 -17 11.25 
   -24 -85 -20 7.65 
   -33 -70 -14 5.89 
Fusiform Gyrus left 22 -39 -10 -29 4.23 
Fusiform Gyrus right 234 39 -49 -17 15.67 
   33 -70 -14 6.78 
   24 -82 -20 6.32 
Fusiform Gyrus right 28 39 -10 -32 4.37 
Superior 
Temporal 
Sulcus left 216 -60 -49 10 8.16 
   -42 -58 22 5.60 
Superior 
Temporal 
Sulcus right 151 51 -58 19 8.65 
   57 -58 19 8.57 
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Table 10. Functional brain imaging results for the conjunction analyses (p < 0.05 FWE-
corrected, k = 0). Abbreviations: ToM = affective Theory of Mind, affective = affective 
empathy, Neutral = Neutral face processing. Note: Subcluster peaks are inserted. 
Imitation (>Observation)  
& ToM (>Neutral) 
[smoothed data] 
   MNI   
Area BA Cluster x y z t-value 
Superior Temporal Gyrus 22 305 48 -34 4 7.03 
   Superior Temporal Gyrus 39  48 -52 10 5.28 
   Superior Temporal Gyrus 22  48 -22 -5 4.78 
   Superior Temporal Gyrus 39 121 -51 -55 10 6.58 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus 47 226 -42 26 -2 6.04 
 
Imitation(>Control) 
& Affective (> Control) 
& ToM (> Control) 
[smoothed data] 
   MNI   
Area BA Cluster x y z t-value 
Inferior Occipital Gyrus  19 571 39 -79 -8  10.36 
Fusiform Gyrus  37   39 -49 -14  10.30 
Cuneus  18 858 -15 -100 13  8.55 
Fusiform Gyrus  37   -39 -46 -14  8.01 
Middle Occipital Gyrus  18   12 -97 16  7.91 
Amygdala  46 -18 -10 -11  6.00 
Amygdala  61 18 -10 -14  5.64 
Superior Frontal Gyrus  8 91 -6 17 55  5.43 
Superior Frontal Gyrus  6   -6 14 73  4.87 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus  45 148 -54 17 4  5.16 
Middle Frontal Gyrus  46   -42 23 22  5.10 
Superior Temporal Gyrus 22 30 57 -61 13  4.72 
 
 
Table 11. Functional brain imaging results for the conjunction analyses, small volume 
corrected for the regions of interest (p < 0.05 small volume corrected, k = 0). 
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Abbreviations: ToM = affective Theory of Mind, affective = affective empathy, Neutral 
= Neutral face processing. Note: Subcluster peaks are inserted. 
Imitation (>Observation)  
& ToM (>Neutral) 
[unsmoothed data] 
  MNI   
Area Hemisphere Cluster x y z t-value 
BA44 left 384 -36 5 4 65.99 
   -42 8 4 60.72 
   -57 -4 25 55.39 
BA44 right 388 63 2 22 59.72 
   57 -4 25 57.68 
   63 8 22 52.34 
Amygdala left 13 -27 -4 -17 21.29 
Amygdala right 21 27 -7 -20 23.26 
   27 -1 -23 17.67 
Fusiform Gyrus left 19 -21 -67 -17 70.50 
   -30 -70 -14 12.46 
  2 -39 -55 -23 20.72 
Fusiform Gyrus right 7 21 -64 -17 92.12 
Superior 
Temporal 
Sulcus left 118 -57 -61 13 30.20 
   -60 -58 10 28.35 
   -48 -64 16 27.83 
Superior 
Temporal 
Sulcus right 30 54 -55 10 32.08 
   60 -55 10 24.42 
   57 -61 10 20.42 
 
 
Imitation(>Control) 
& Affective (> Control) 
& ToM (> Control) 
[smoothed data] 
  MNI   
Area Hemisphere Cluster x y z t-value 
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BA44 left 138 -54 20 22 46.05 
   -57 17 16 37.80 
   -48 20 22 29.87 
BA44 right 13 51 -7 4 36.75 
  50 48 20 22 27.96 
   60 17 10 18.87 
Amygdala left 21 -18 -7 -14 31.84 
   -27 -4 -17 23.94 
Amygdala right 26 18 -7 -14 59.33 
   30 -4 -20 27.72 
Fusiform Gyrus left 18 -39 -49 -17 65.33 
Fusiform Gyrus right 9 36 -52 -14 58.37 
  1 36 -49 -23 16.27 
  3 27 -79 -20 12.32 
Superior 
Temporal 
Sulcus left 132 -54 -61 19 27.89 
   -45 -61 19 27.63 
   -42 -55 16 27.31 
Superior 
Temporal 
Sulcus right 93 57 -64 13 44.74 
   57 -58 10 38.47 
   45 -58 16 30.91 
 
2.1.6 Discussion 
Using a combination of three social-cognitive tasks (Imitation, Empathy, and 
ToM) based on emotional facial expressions and three different methods of analysis 
(analysis of individual tasks, conjunction analysis and sVx counts), we found 
converging evidence for a common network of brain regions underlying the different 
social-cognitive processes. Importantly, the combination of different analyses allowed 
us to confirm that common activation was present both across and within participants 
(Gazzola & Keysers, 2009), a result which has not been presented so far for processes 
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of social cognition. While the present study does not proof the existence of mirror 
neurons in the human brain, it strongly emphasizes both the existence of MN and their 
central involvement in social cognition (Molenberghs et al., 2012; Mukamel et al., 
2010). Furthermore, we were able to show that activation in the network differentiates 
between different social-cognitive processes, in particular in the TPJ region. 
2.1.6.1 Common activation across tasks 
Analyses of the single tasks revealed activation in BA44 and IPL, as well as in 
fusiform gyrus, STS and amygdala. These results are in agreement with earlier studies 
showing an involvement of the emotional face processing network, as well as the MNS 
in different aspects of social cognition (Carr et al., 2003; Mier, Lis, et al., 2010).  
This pattern of common activation from the single task analyses was statistically 
confirmed by the conjunction analyses that revealed shared activation across tasks in 
all regions of interest, except right BA44, strongly suggesting a common neural basis 
for different social cognitive-processes. Importantly, when restricting the analyses to 
ToM and Imitation (that each allowed contrasting with a social control condition), only 
MNS regions were revealed as regions with common activation, further emphasizing 
the importance of the MNS for social cognition. This analysis also suggests that in 
contrast to the common activation in regions for emotional face processing, namely 
fusiform gyrus and amygdala, the MNS effects were not merely driven by the 
processing of the facial stimuli, but are specific for social-cognitive processing. Both 
BA44 and IPL are homologues to monkey brain areas containing motor neurons 
(Rizzolatti, Luppino, & Matelli, 1998) and have been reported to show a pattern of 
activation in humans (Kilner et al., 2009; Molenberghs et al., 2012; Rizzolatti & 
Craighero, 2004; Rizzolatti et al., 1998; Thomas, De Sanctis, Gazzola, & Keysers, 
2018) that has been described from monkey research on MN. In contrast, the STS is 
not thought to have motor neurons (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). It is however a key 
region for processing variable aspects of the face, to process biological motion and 
has been shown to be substantial for intention recognition (Carr et al., 2003; Liu, Harris, 
& Kanwisher, 2010). A meta-analysis by van Overwalle (Van Overwalle, 2009) pointed 
out involvement of the STS in forwarding visual input to the MNS. Thus the STS can 
not only be attributed to the extended face processing system (Haxby et al., 2000), but 
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also provides visual input to the MNS, and seems to have an important role in social 
cognition that exceeds mere face processing. 
In line with the study of Keysers and Gazzola (2009), the conjunction analyses 
were supported by the sVx analyses that revealed sVx within participants in each of 
our regions of interest. This was true when analyzing sVx across all three tasks with 
non-social stimuli as control condition. When analyzing activation across those two 
tasks with a facial expression as control condition (Imitation compared to observation 
and ToM compared to neutral face processing) sVx also occurred in all ROIs, but the 
number of sVx in amygdala and fusiform gyrus was reduced, again supporting a 
special role of the MNS for social cognition. Those analyses with unsmoothed data 
resulted in a higher number of sVx, reflecting the obvious fact that a better spatial 
resolution of the signal is beneficial for detecting sVx. Interestingly, in the conjunction 
analysis with smoothed data, no common activation was found in right BA44 - one of 
the core regions of the MNS. Thus, the sVx analysis seems to be a valuable and maybe 
even necessary additional step to account for interindividual variance in the MNS. 
2.1.6.2 Differences between the task conditions 
While all tasks lead to activation in the face processing network and in the MNS, 
there were also differences between different conditions of the tasks. For the Imitation 
task, the Execution condition led to activation in regions with motor neurons, while the 
observation condition resulted in activation in amygdala and fusiform gyrus. The 
activation in the Execution task can be explained by the motor performance of the 
participants. The lack of activation in regions of the MNS for the observation condition, 
however, is in contrast to previous studies on the observation and imitation of 
emotional facial expressions (van der Gaag, Minderaa, & Keysers, 2007) and 
contradicts the major assumption of the simulation theory: the notion that motor 
simulation occurs automatically without cognitive influence (Gallese, 2003b; Gallese & 
Goldman, 1998). This lack of significant activation in regions of the MNS during 
observation is discussed in the limitations and perspectives section. 
In the Empathy task, differences between conditions were found in several 
ROIs, suggesting a differential involvement of the regions of the emotional face 
processing network and the MNS in these aspects of empathy. Possibly most 
importantly, Distress resulted in higher activity in comparison to Cognitive and Affective 
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Empathy in the precuneus and also the TPJ bilaterally which links posterior superior 
temporal with inferior parietal regions. Affective Empathy was also linked to higher left 
TPJ activation than Cognitive Empathy. TPJ and precuneus are key regions of the 
default mode network (Greicius, Krasnow, Reiss, & Menon, 2003) that has been linked 
to self-referential processing. While distress (“how bad do I feel”) is focused on the self, 
Affective Empathy (“how much do I feel for the person”) demands focus on both the 
self and the other person, and cognitive empathy (“how bad does the other person 
feel”) puts the focus completely on the other person. Since the default mode network 
highly overlaps with our regions of interest that are involved in social cognition (Mars 
et al., 2012) it is plausible that the Affective Empathy and the Distress conditions elicit 
strong TPJ activation. In particular, the left TPJ seems to play an important role for 
self-reference during social cognition.  
In agreement with earlier studies using the same ToM task, activation in the 
MNS regions is highest during ToM, followed by Emotion Recognition (Mier et al., 
2016; Mier, Haddad, et al., 2014; Mier, Lis, et al., 2010; Mier, Sauer, et al., 2010), 
suggesting that social-cognitive demands are reflected in the height of activation. The 
result of higher activation for distress than Cognitive Empathy in the Empathy task in 
the TPJ region suggests that further regions can be integrated to the social-cognitive 
process, depending on the social-cognitive demands. Thus, the “social brain” seems 
to differentiate between different social-cognitive processes by strength of activation 
within certain regions, as well as by integrating further regions. 
To summarize, whereas all tasks have common activation in MNS and face 
processing networks, single task conditions can be characterized by distinct features. 
While the Distress condition of the Empathy task involves DMN activation, reflective of 
self-referential processing, the Emotion Recognition and ToM conditions of the ToM 
task mainly differ in their strength of MNS activation. 
2.1.6.3 Limitations and perspectives 
By combining different tasks and different methods of analysis within the same 
study, we were able to overcome some of the methodological problems that are 
inherent in fMRI research. However, it has to be clearly acknowledged that we still rely 
on a measure that assesses mass signals of neurons converted to changes in blood 
flow and oxygen saturation. Thus, all our results are still indirect and rather coarse-
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grained. Facing these limitations, it becomes an urgent matter to enhance the 
theoretical understanding of the neuronal response underlying the BOLD signal. In 
particular, local, spiking network models of individual brain regions (Hass, Hertag, & 
Durstewitz, 2016)  could allow for such a deepened understanding, when constrained 
by data from human fMRI. The development of such models is an integral aspect of 
our ongoing project to understand the human MNS. 
The methodological limitations outlined above may also provide explanations 
for some of the unexpected results. In particular, we did not find significantly increased 
MNS activity during the Observation of emotional faces, which challenges the idea of 
embodied simulation. Such a null result in fMRI does not necessarily imply the lack of 
such activation – it could also mean that activity of MN was too short or too weak to 
elicit the compensatory blood flow that generates a detectable BOLD signal. Another 
interesting interpretation is opened by a study by the group around Keysers and 
Gazolla testing the influence of the participants’ levels of responsibility on their 
empathy for pain (Cui, Abdelgabar, Keysers, & Gazzola, 2015). Interestingly, the 
empathic brain response was reduced when participants were not responsible for the 
observed pain. These results suggest that MNS activation can be reduced depending 
on the context. In our tasks, the Observation condition was the only condition in which 
the participant had no further task than to observe a facial expression. Similar to the 
pain study summarized above, neural activation might be reduced if no active 
involvement is required. Or framed differently, it has been shown that activation in the 
MNS is stronger when intentionality comes into play. This is especially evident in 
studies showing that MNS activation is higher for meaningful actions than for 
meaningless actions (Iacoboni et al., 2005; Koski et al., 2002; Rizzolatti et al., 2014) 
and in studies showing that MNS activation can be modified by motivation (Cheng, 
Meltzoff, & Decety, 2006).  
The sVx analysis, although in best support of a common ground of social 
cognition, also suffers from methodological problems that need discussion. In 
particular, it needs to be emphasized that a voxel of 3mm3 contains, depending on the 
specific region and calculation, several hundreds of thousands up to more than a 
million neurons. Consequently, to be counted as a sVx of the MNS, a voxel needs to 
contain many thousands MN. The method is thus too coarse to prove the influence of 
a subset of neurons within a region. This limitation may be the reason why, albeit 
significant, only part of the participants and only few voxels within of the MNS regions 
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had sVx properties. Furthermore, the tasks are not the strongest to elicit activation in 
motor neurons, because movement is neither observed, nor expressed (except in the 
imitation task). However, our aim was to probe social-cognitive skills, and commonly 
facial expressions are very subtle in comparison to large body movements. Thus, tasks 
that rely on rather large-scale motions (e.g. finger tapping, or hand movements) might 
more easily find more sVx. In addition, there is evidence that the MNS differentiates 
between different actions, meaning that different actions are represented in different 
parts of the MNS (Buccino et al., 2004). Thus, another option is that we found fewer 
shared voxels due to a more fine-grained response in the MNS that also differs 
between different emotions and social-cognitive processes. Future studies might use 
experimental designs that target MNS processing of different emotions, or that use 
repetition suppression designs to investigate the human MNS (Fuelscher et al., 2019). 
2.1.7 Conclusions 
This is the first study investigating a variety of social-cognitive processes within 
the same participants, allowing the assessment of a shared neural response to social 
stimuli. Conjunction, as well as sVx analyses revealed common neural activation in 
amygdala, superior temporal sulcus, fusiform gyrus, IPL and BA44 across tasks, 
suggesting an involvement of the emotional face processing network and the MNS for 
social cognition. Our findings support the assumption that the MNS is at the heart of 
our interpersonal understanding. To conclude, we propose that the answer to the 
question we raised in the introduction whether MN could be our “hidden crystal ball” 
that allows us to see into the near future of social situations, and to anticipate whether 
our interaction partner intends on hitting or hugging us, is a tentative yes.  
 
2.2 Summary 
According to the theory of embodied simulation, we understand other persons’ 
mental states, because they are represented in our brain in the same way as when we 
ourselves experience the mental state. Using pictures of facial configurations intended 
to express emotions and including a large sample (n=75), the results of study 1 showed 
that the different social-cognitive processes imitation, affective empathy, and affective 
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ToM all show individual patterns of activation, and also shared neural correlates, both 
within and across participants.  
The data allowed two types of comparison: (1) Imitation, affective empathy and 
ToM could be compared to a non-social control condition, (2) for imitation and ToM, 
there was additionally a facial control condition. The main result is that a significant 
number of participants presented a significant number of sVx in the ROIs, indicating 
that the sVx analysis might be a good approach for future MNS studies, considering its 
increased spatial accuracy.  
Interestingly, for the two-task analysis that used a face as a control condition, the 
number of participants with a significant number of sVx was considerably reduced for 
regions associated with emotional face processing, but not in the core MNS regions, 
as I present in Table 12 for easier comparability. 
 
Table 12. Percentage of participants with a significant number of shared voxels for 
the two-task analysis relative to the three-task analysis. Tables with exact results for 
each analysis are presented in study 1. 
  amygdala BA44 IPL STS FG 
smoothed left 17% 100% 213% 94% 17% 
 right 17% 93% 200% 38% 10% 
unsmoothed left 50% 85% 55% 60% 10% 
 right 11% 106% 100% 16% 9% 
 
 
Even though the numbers are significant, they might not be in full support of the 
assumption of MN as a basic mechanism involved in understanding others, simply 
because a majority of participants present no or only a limited number of sVx. While 
there are many physiological explanations possible, such as voxels being composed 
of different types of neurons and MN not reaching the required threshold or canceling 
each other out, the challenge of accurately measuring MN in humans remains. 
Overall however, these results suggest that processing of facial configurations 
intended to express fear or anger is related to activation in a shared set of regions that 
are commonly activated during the processing of facial configurations, mirroring and 
mentalizing tasks, including STS, IFG and IPL. Considering that participants were not 
simply looking at the faces, but explicitly instructed to perform specific social-cognitive 
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tasks while looking at the faces, it seems reasonable that the results show activation 
in regions associated with the fast mirroring processes and also the slower mentalizing 
network. 
The findings from study 1 mainly point to common regions for social cognition. 
However, study 1 did not address whether the MNS is also involved in differentiating 
between social information.  
In study 2, I implemented an fMRI adaptation design, again using facial stimuli 
to investigate whether regions of the MNS are sensitive to emotional valence which 
would suggest a role of the MNS in the differentiation between emotions.  
The task that was applied in study 2 should mainly evoke automatic processing, 
and therefore activate the MNS and regions of facial-affective processing. To examine 
whether the MNS distinguishes the valence of facial affect, an adaptation design was 
applied: When two stimuli are presented sequentially, neurons will fire similarly strong 
for both stimuli only if the feature to which they are specific changes. For example, 
when a red apple follows a green apple, neurons recognizing it as apple will not be 
excited upon the repetition, so their signal will be weaker for the second compared to 
the first apple. In contrast, neurons responsible to detect the color, will respond equally 
strong to both stimuli, since they perceive the novelty of the feature to which they are 
specific. The same effect could be expected for facial configurations intended to 
express emotions and will be subject of study 2. 
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3 STUDY 2: INVESTIGATING WHETHER MIRROR AREAS DISTINGUISH 
EMOTIONAL VALENCE 
3.1 fMRI adaptation reveals: The human mirror neuron system discriminates 
emotional valence 
3.1.1 Abstract 
Our ability to infer other individuals’ emotions is central for successful social 
interactions. Based on the theory of embodied simulation, our mirror neuron system 
(MNS) provides the essential link between the observed facial configuration of another 
individual and our inference of that emotion by means of common neuronal activation. 
However, so far it is unknown, whether the MNS differentiates the valence of facial 
configurations.  
To increase the precision of our fMRI measurement, we used an adaptation 
design, which allows insights into whether the same neuronal population is active for 
subsequent stimuli of facial configurations. 76 participants were shown congruent, or 
incongruent consecutive pairs of facial configurations expressing fear or happiness. 
Significant activation for changes in emotional valence from adaptor to target 
was revealed in fusiform gyrus, superior temporal sulcus, amygdala, insula, inferior 
parietal lobe and Brodmann area 44. In addition, activation change was higher in 
superior temporal sulcus, insula and inferior frontal gyrus for a switch from happiness 
to fear than for fear to happiness. 
Our results suggest an involvement of the MNS in valence discrimination, and 
a higher sensitivity of the MNS to negative than positive valence. These findings point 
to a role of the MNS that goes beyond the mere coding of a motor state. 
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3.1.2 Introduction 
Three girls standing on a stage, anxious expressions on their faces, their eyes 
opened wide with fear. You turned on your TV just to accidentally witness Heidi Klum’s 
decision on which of the girls is going to make it into the next round of Germany’s next 
top model. Suddenly, one of the girl’s fearful expressions turns into a wide smile. You 
can see, even feel, her relief, her joy. After a second-long fight to hide her sadness, 
another girl breaks into tears. You do not need to hear Heidi’s words to know what she 
just said.  
Facial emotional expressions / facial configurations5 are an important means of 
communication, carrying information about the individual’s current state, intentions, 
evaluation of the situation, and relationship to other individuals On a neural level, the 
amygdala plays a central role, as it is involved in the processing and perception of 
different emotions (Costafreda et al., 2008; Fitzgerald et al., 2006; Sergerie et al., 
2008) and also in the discrimination of emotions (Critchley et al., 2000; Gur et al., 2002; 
Habel et al., 2007). Emotional stimuli, in particular when they have negative valence, 
are considered salient for us humans as social beings (Kret, Sinke, & de Gelder, 2011; 
Santos et al., 2011), suggesting the amygdala’s strong involvement in emotion 
processing might be explained as indicative of salience (Liberzon et al., 2003; Santos 
et al., 2011). A meta-analysis of 105 fMRI studies confirmed the role of the amygdala 
for emotion perception, and also highlights the importance of further areas: the insula 
for disgust and anger, and the fusiform gyrus (FFG) for joy and fear (Fusar-Poli et al., 
2009). Most interestingly, the neural processing of observed facial configurations is not 
only restricted to brain areas associated with emotional processing and face 
processing, but it additionally seems to include a network known as the MNS (Keysers 
& Gazzola, 2009). Whereas a few studies demonstrated the involvement of the MNS 
in emotion perception (Enticott et al., 2008; Mier, Lis, et al., 2010), so far, it is unknown, 
whether the MNS also differentiates between emotions. 
Mirror neurons (MN) were first described in macaque monkeys, in which some 
neurons responded both when they performed a specific movement and when they 
                                            
5 For a very recent publication on the scientific validity of studies investigating facial emotion expression 
and perception, please refer to (Barrett et al., 2019). Following their suggestions, we use the expression 
“facial configurations” when referring to what are commonly called “facial emotional expressions”, and 
substitute “recognition” by “perception”. Furthermore, we will discuss our findings with regard to their 
objections and suggestions. 
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observed the same movement being performed by the experimenter (di Pellegrino et 
al., 1992). Due to the limited possibility to perform single-cell recordings in humans, so 
far only one study confirmed the existence of mirror neurons in humans (Mukamel et 
al., 2010). However, several studies have investigated mirror properties in humans 
using fMRI. Based on these studies, the human MNS has been proposed to be 
composed of three central areas, (1) the superior temporal sulcus (STS) which 
processes incoming visual information, (2) the inferior parietal lobe (IPL) which holds 
a motor representation of the specific movement, and (3) the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) 
reaching into the premotor cortex, which is associated with the goal-directedness of a 
movement (Iacoboni & Dapretto, 2006). Based on these findings, Gallese proposed 
the theory of embodied simulation (Gallese, 2003a, 2007a): During social interaction, 
an individual mirrors the emotional state of their counterpart, so that on a neural level, 
the same brain regions become activated upon observation of a specific expression as 
to one’s own experience of the same emotion. This process occurs automatically and 
allows one to understand the other person’s actions, expressions and intentions 
(Gallese, 2003b). Indeed, fMRI studies provide evidence for the theory of embodied 
simulation, confirming that the MNS is involved in the processing of own, as well as 
observed emotions (Bastiaansen, Thioux, & Keysers, 2009). However, whether the 
MNS differentiates between different emotions is still unclear. 
In a previous study using facial configurations commonly associated with 
happiness and fear, we showed that regions of the MNS are involved in social-cognitive 
processes of different complexity, and that across and within participants, there are 
shared voxels for different social-cognitive processes (Schmidt et al., unpublished 
results). Now, we aim to extend these findings by investigating whether the MNS is not 
only involved in social cognition in general, but also sensitive to the valence of facial 
configurations. Actual measurement of MN would necessitate single-cell recordings 
and firing of the same neurons under different conditions. As this remains impossible 
using fMRI, we aim at achieving high accuracy of our results by applying a neuronal 
adaptation design. Usual fMRI analysis has coarse spatial resolution, so the activity of 
one voxel could be based on firing of the same or of neighboring neuronal populations. 
fMRI adaptation is considered one means to allow greater accuracy with regard to 
spatial conclusions: Neurons fire upon detection of a novel stimulus to which they are 
specific. Repeated presentation of the same stimulus leads to adaptation, i.e. reduced 
firing of that neuron. If several neurons respond with adaptation, this is reflected by 
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decline of the BOLD response (Grill-Spector et al., 2006). In other words, the neuron 
will only show a consistently increased response if the aspect to which it is specific, 
changes and therefore remains novel. Otherwise other neuronal populations that are 
responsive to the changed aspect will show increased firing. As only the global firing 
rate modulates the fMRI-BOLD response, changing of the stimulus leads to an 
increased activation if there are neuronal populations sensitive for different stimulus 
aspects within that region. Thus, if regions of the MNS show reduced adaptation to 
changes in facial configurations chosen to reflect positive or negative valence in 
comparison to the same valence presented after each other, it can be concluded that 
different neuronal populations within the MNS respond to different valences.  
So far, few studies successfully applied fMRI adaptation designs to MNS 
investigations. Clear support of MN would be cross-modal adaptation, i.e. adaptation 
of MN regions from execution to observation and vice versa. Using such observation / 
execution tasks, de la Rosa and colleagues (de la Rosa et al., 2016) and Kilner and 
colleagues (Kilner et al., 2009) identified voxels in IFG that showed cross-modal 
adaptation, and Chong and colleagues (Chong et al., 2008) identified cross-modal 
adaptation in the right IPL. Whereas these three studies support MN mechanisms in 
humans, a study by Lingnau and colleagues (Lingnau, Gesierich, & Caramazza, 2009) 
did not find cross-modal adaptation. Finally, an adaptation study on facial 
configurations by Ishai and colleagues showed neural adaptation in inferior occipital 
gyrus, lateral FFG, STS, amygdala, IFG and insula in response to facial configurations 
expressing neutral and fearful emotional states (Ishai et al., 2004). The authors 
conclude that emotional valence and relevance of the task are crucial for the adaptation 
response. However, whether regions of the MNS show adaptation in response to 
different emotional valences is currently an open question. 
We hypothesize that amygdala and STS are sensitive to the emotional valence 
inferred from a facial configuration and thus show greater activation when perceiving 
different valences in consecutive facial configurations compared to the repetition of the 
same facial configuration. An open question is whether IFG and IPL also respond to 
specific valences or show adaptation. An additional exploratory question is whether 
the MNS reacts differently to negative versus positive valence; i.e. whether regions in 
the MNS respond more strongly to a switch from a facial configuration expressing 
happiness to one expressing fear rather than vice versa. 
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3.1.3 Methods 
3.1.3.1 Procedure 
Data were collected as part of a larger project on the mirror neuron system. 
Participants were invited to two appointments: During the first appointment, they were 
extensively informed about goals and procedure of the study in oral and written form 
and gave written informed consent. They also filled in a set of questionnaires and gave 
a saliva sample. At the second appointment, we explained the tasks to the participants 
in detail and let them practice the tasks. Afterwards, participants spent about one hour 
in the MRI. At first, we performed a T1-weighted anatomical scan, lasting about 5 
minutes, followed by the functional measurements. The here presented emotion 
adaptation paradigm came second after an about 8-minute long imitation task, and 
preceded two more tasks. For their participation, participants received 15€ for each of 
the two appointments, or student credits. In a reward paradigm at the end of the second 
appointment, all participants could additionally win up to 20€. 
The study was conducted in agreement with the declaration of Helsinki and 
approved by the ethics committee of the medical faculty of the University of Heidelberg 
(Germany). 
3.1.3.2 Sample 
We invited 81 participants between age 18 and 35 years to our study. 2 had to 
be excluded because of brain anatomical aberrations, 3 because of high scores in the 
depression questionnaire (BDI) – despite a prior telephone screening to exclude 
mental disorders, 1 because of major genetic anomalies, and 1 because s/he did not 
complete the study. Our final sample includes 74 right-handed (45 women, mean age 
22.4 years; 30 men, mean age 23.2 years), German participants with higher education 
entrance qualification and no self-reported history of neurological or mental disorder 
participated in the study. All participants fulfilled the general requirements for MR 
measurements.  
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3.1.3.3 Stimulus Set 
The pictures of 3 women and 3 men, showing facial configurations intended to 
express fear or happiness, were taken from the Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces 
(KDEF) Stimulus Set (Lundqvist et al., 1998), and are validated for valence and arousal 
(Adolph & Alpers, 2010). Using GNU Image Manipulation Program (GIMP, Version 
2.8.22, 2017), we removed the hair and neck from the pictures, converted the color 
space to grey-scale, resized the faces to a uniform size within the stimulus set, cut the 
total picture to uniform size, and corrected luminance levels, with separation of 
background and foreground pixels, using the MATLAB toolbox SHINE (Willenbockel et 
al., 2010). These steps were taken to avoid possible adaptation effects to physical 
features irrelevant to our task. 
3.1.3.4 Emotion Adaptation Paradigm 
In the paradigm, each trial consisted of two consecutive pictures of faces of the 
same identity. There were six possible combinations of first and second stimulus 
(please also see Table 13). Each of the six trial types was presented 12 times, leading 
to 72 trials in total, presented in pseudo-randomized order. For the first stimulus, also 
known as adaptor, a facial configuration associated with fear or happiness was 
presented for 3 seconds. After an inter-stimulus-interval (ISI) of 500-1000 milliseconds, 
the second stimulus, known as target, was presented for 1 second and 25% larger than 
the adaptor to control for low-level visual adaptation effects. The target was again a 
facial configuration associated with fear or a happiness, resulting in congruent (adaptor 
and target show same emotional expression) and incongruent (adaptor and target 
show different emotional expressions) conditions. In one third of cases, the target face 
was inverted, i.e. upside-down, and participants had to respond as quickly as possible 
with a button press. This control target therefore served to maintain participants’ 
attention (Mohamed, Neumann, & Schweinberger, 2011), and is not considered as a 
target of interest. Between all trials, there was an inter-trial-interval (ITI) of 8 to 12 
seconds. For the duration of the ISI and ITI, a white fixation cross was presented on a 
black background. Our choice of stimulus presentation time, ISI, ITI and different size 
of the stimuli was based on different publications, especially those by Schweinsteiger 
and colleagues (e.g., (Herzmann, Schweinberger, Sommer, & Jentzsch, 2004; Kaiser, 
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Walther, Schweinberger, & Kovacs, 2013)). We programmed and presented the 
paradigm using the software Presentation (Version 18.1, Neurobehavioral Systems 
Inc.). 
 
Table 13 shows the six trial types and durations of the individual trial segments. Each 
trial type was presented 12 times, making 72 trials in total, presented in pseudo-
randomized order. Between each adaptor and target stimulus, there was a fixation 
cross presented for 500-1000 ms as inter-stimulus interval, and before a new trial, 
there was a fixation cross presented for 8-12 seconds as inter-trial interval. For better 
readability, we here shorten the expression “facial configuration inteded to express a 
[specific emotion] state” to “[emotion] face”. Note HH: happy adaptor face, happy target 
face; HF: happy adaptor face, fearful target face; HI: happy adaptor face, inverted 
happy target face; FF: fearful adaptor face, fearful target face; FH: fearful adaptor face, 
happy target face; FI: fearful adaptor face, inverted fearful target face. 
Condition Adaptor (3s) Target (1s) 
Congruent_HH Happy face Happy face 
Incongruent_HF Happy face Fearful face 
Control_HI Happy face Inverted happy face 
Congruent_FF Fearful face Happy face 
Incongruent_FH Fearful face Fearful face 
Control_FI Fearful face Inverted fearful face 
3.1.3.5 fMRI data acquisition  
We recorded the fMRI data using a 3T Siemens Magnetom Trio (Siemens Inc., 
Erlangen, Germany). For the anatomical measurement, we first recorded a T1-
weighted MPRage with TR = 2300 ms, TE = 3.03 ms, flip angle α = 9°, field of view = 
192x192 mm, 192 layers and 1x1x1 mm voxel size. For the functional data, we used a 
T2*-weighted echo-planar-imaging (EPI) sequence with TR = 2000, TE = 28 ms, flip 
angle α = 80°, field of view = 192x192 mm, 33 layers and a voxel size of 3x3x3 mm 
with 1 mm gap. For the emotion adaptation paradigm, 277 scans were recorded for 
each participant. 
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Button presses were registered using a 4-button diamond Current Design 
response pad (Current Design Inc., Philadelphia, USA). A MR-compatible face cam 
(MRC Systems GmbH, Heidelberg, Germany) together with the software IC-Capture 
(Version 2.3.394.1917, The Imaging Source LLC), was used to ensure that participants 
do not fall asleep during the tasks and to verify that they followed the task instructions 
in the other paradigms that required facial imitation. 
3.1.3.6 fMRI data processing 
Data were processed using the MATLAB toolbox Statistical Parametric 
Programming (SPM12, The FIL Methods Group). For the preprocessing, we performed 
slice time correction, realignment to the mean image, coregistration to the MPRage, 
normalization to a standard brain with resampling to a voxel size of 3x3x3 mm and 
smoothing with an isotropic Gaussian kernel of 8x8x8mm using a full-width at half-
maximum (FWHM) filter. For the general linear model of the first-level analyses, using 
an event-related design (folding the HRF with a stick function), we set the 6 movement 
parameters from the realignment as regressors of no interest, and as regressors of 
interest we set one regressor to each stimulus type (stimulus types and abbreviations 
are described in Table 13).  
To test our hypotheses, we created three contrasts for second-level analyses, 
always using the target face event: 
1. Incongruent > Congruent (Incongruent_HF and Incongruent_FH trials minus 
Congruent_FF and Congruent_HH). 
2. (Incongruent_FH > Congruent_HH) > (Incongruent_HF > Congruent_FF) 
3. (Incongruent_HF > Congruent_FF) > (Incongruent_FH > Congruent_HH) 
 
Significance threshold at the whole-brain level was set to p<0.05, FWE-
corrected, minimal cluster size k>=10. For small volume correction, the whole-brain 
threshold was set to p<0.05 uncorrected, k>=10 and a peak-level threshold of p<0.05, 
FWE-corrected. 
Regions of interest were BA44, STS, IPL, amygdala and insula. The masks for 
all regions except the STS were taken from the WFU PickAtlas tool (Maldjian, Laurienti, 
& Burdette, 2004; Maldjian, Laurienti, Kraft, & Burdette, 2003). As WFU PickAtlas does 
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not provide an STS-mask, this mask was based on activity in a former study using a 
theory of mind task (Mier, Lis, et al., 2010). 
3.1.4 Results 
3.1.4.1 Adaptation effects in the MNS 
Contrasting all incongruent target faces with all congruent target faces, whole-
brain analyses showed significantly higher activation in fusiform gyrus (please see 
Figure 7 and Table 14). Small-volume correction for the regions of interest confirmed 
increased activation in bilateral fusiform gyrus, and additionally in left IPL, bilateral 
BA44, right amygdala and bilateral insula (please see Table 15a). 
 
 
 
Figure 7. fMRI activation of the adaptation effects. Incongruent > Congruent, slice 
coordinate Z=67. Significance threshold for illustration purposes p<0.005, uncorrected, 
minimal cluster size k=10. 
3.1.4.2 Adaptation effects depending on emotional valence 
Whole brain corrected analyses revealed no significant effects. Small-volume 
correction however showed that activation was stronger for a switch from positive to 
negative valence than from negative to positive valence in right BA44, STS and insula 
(please see Table 15b).  
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Table 14. Functional brain imaging results for incongruent>congruent, FWE-
corrected at whole-brain level, with p < 0.05 FWE-corrected, k = 10.  
Incongruent > congruent   MNI   
Area Cluster 
size 
x y z t-value 
Fusiform gyrus (right) 122 42 -49 -19 6.49 
  45   -
70 
-10 6.31 
  42 -82 -10 6.17 
Fusiform gyrus (left) 13 -39 -49 -22 5.78 
 
 
Table 15. Functional brain imaging results for the different contrasts, small-volume 
corrected for the regions of interest with p < 0.05 small-volume corrected, k = 10. Note: 
BA44 = Brodmann Area 44, STS = Superior temporal sulcus 
a) 
(incongruent_HF>congruent_FF) 
-
(incongruent_FH>congruent_HH) 
  MNI   
Area Cluster size x y z t-value 
BA44   (right) 123 39 11 8 3.858 
Insula  (right) 97 39 11 8 3.858 
STS   (right) 36 60 -64 20 3.108 
 
b) 
incongruent>congruent   MNI   
Area Cluster size x y z t-value 
BA44  (left) 139 -
45 
11 11 3.830 
  -
42 
20 5 3.796 
  -
48 
20 5 3.753 
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BA44  (right) 163 48 20 20 4.614 
  51 20 5 4.124 
Amygdala (right) 32 21 -10 -13 3.930 
  30 -1 -19 3.517 
  24 -4 -16 3.456 
Inferior parietal lobe (left) 403 -
45 
-37 44 4.177 
  -
36 
-55 56 4.088 
  -
33 
-61 47 4.058 
Fusiform gyrus  (left) 343 -
39 
-49 -22 5.777 
  -
39 
-58 -16 5.280 
  -
45 
-61 -22 5.187 
Fusiform gyrus  (right) 341 42 -49 -19 6.491 
  30 -85 -22 4.925 
  36 -82 -22 4.837 
Insula  (left) 120 -
33 
14 -4 4.792 
  -
45 
11 11 3.830 
Insula  (right) 112 36 14 -4 3.768 
 
3.1.5 Discussion 
Mirror neurons provide an intriguing explanation how we understand others. 
Using an adaptation design, our study provides evidence that the MNS is sensitive to 
the valence of emotions, and that MNS regions respond more strongly to a change 
from positive to negative than from negative to positive valence of facial configurations. 
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Almost 30 years of MN research brought us a deeper understanding of MN. It 
was conclusively shown that monkeys have neurons with mirror properties that are 
involved in action understanding and even allow predictions. While ethical restrictions 
prevent MN research in humans, the regions that are supposed to contain MN can be 
investigated non-invasively, showing that activation in the MNS goes beyond mere 
action understanding, but is also involved in social cognition, such as emotion 
recognition and theory of mind (Mier, Lis, et al., 2010). MNS activation during emotion 
perception, or during imitation of facial configurations goes in concert with activation in 
amygdala and insula. It is assumed that the MNS conveys information on the motor 
state of another person via insula to the amygdala which adds the emotional meaning 
(Carr et al., 2003). In agreement with our hypotheses, amygdala and insula responses 
were enhanced when adaptor and target were of different valences than when of the 
same valence / emotion, indicating adaptation effects. In addition, our results point to 
an influence of emotional valence on MNS activation, suggesting that the MNS is not 
merely representing a motor state, but might also be involved in coding the valence 
thereof. Adding to this assumption, MNS regions responded more strongly to a change 
from positive to negative than from negative to positive, which further suggests a higher 
sensitivity of MNS regions to negative emotions. Furthermore, a study by Cheng and 
colleagues (Cheng et al., 2006) reported a modulation of MNS response by motivation, 
and Enticott and colleagues (Enticott, Kennedy, Bradshaw, Rinehart, & Fitzgerald, 
2010) found activation in the MNS only for meaningful, but not meaningless gestures. 
Considering these findings together, it can be assumed that a common feature 
influencing the MNS response is the salience of a stimulus.  
We found higher activation for facial configurations expressing fear following 
ones intended to express happiness than vice versa, however not in all of our ROIs, 
but restricted to BA44, insula and STS. With regard to these effects, or partial lack 
thereof, there are several aspects to consider: While the IFG, including BA44, is 
thought to be involved in the prediction of an action, and mainly coding the goal of an 
action, rather than the explicit motor state (El-Sourani, Wurm, Trempler, Fink, & 
Schubotz, 2018; Iacoboni et al., 2005; Johnson-Frey et al., 2003; Newman-Norlund, 
van Schie, van Hoek, Cuijpers, & Bekkering, 2010; Nicholson, Roser, & Bach, 2017; 
Wurm, Hrkac, Morikawa, & Schubotz, 2014), the IPL seems to represent the explicit 
motor state (Fogassi et al., 2005; Fogassi & Luppino, 2005). It might be possible that 
this pure motor representation is not sensitive to valences. While the amygdala is 
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mainly linked to negative emotions, several studies showed amygdala activation for 
positive emotions, too, suggesting a broader role in emotion processing (Adolphs, 
2010; Habel et al., 2007; Sergerie et al., 2008). Taken together, our results indicate 
that regions of the MNS, as well as amygdala and insula are sensitive to emotional 
valence. Additionally, BA44, STS and insula seem to react preferentially to a change 
from positive to negative valence. Another interesting result is the sensitivity of the 
fusiform gyrus to valence. It is well-known and also confirmed by adaptation designs 
that the fusiform gyrus responds to the identity of a person (Axelrod & Yovel, 2015; 
Grill-Spector, Knouf, & Kanwisher, 2004; Haxby et al., 2000; Winston, Henson, Fine-
Goulden, & Dolan, 2004). Our results are in line with research reporting participation 
of the fusiform gyrus in emotion perception (Kawasaki et al., 2012; Monroe et al., 
2013), suggesting that it is also involved in coding emotional valence. In the meta-
analysis by Fusar-Poli and colleagues (Fusar-Poli et al., 2009), the fusiform gyrus was 
linked to both, happiness and fear.  
A limitation is that results based on the fMRI BOLD technique cannot distinguish 
the responses of closely neighboring neuronal populations as these populations are 
smaller than voxel size, as each voxel contains the signal of several hundred thousand 
to millions of neurons. This might not only explain the absence of a differential 
response in fusiform gyrus, but might have confounded our results in general. Even 
though the adaptation design allows targeting different neuronal populations within a 
brain region, resulting in higher spatial precision, it is possible that adjacent neuronal 
populations responded to the different valences, one population only to fear, the other 
only to happiness, resulting in activation within the same voxels. Consequently, higher 
activation in MNS regions to a switch from positive to negative might be caused by 
more neuronal populations responding to fear (or negative emotions in general) than 
to happiness. Thus, albeit the adaptation approach is highly promising, it does not 
solve the spatial resolution deficits of fMRI. Related to this aspect, we want to mention 
that we only investigated regions assumed to contain MN – current fMRI techniques, 
no matter how advanced experimental designs or analysis methods are, allow no direct 
conclusions about neurons, but only about oxygen consumption in brain regions. 
Nevertheless, future studies might use facial configurations intended to express 
different negative emotions (e.g. anger and fear) to investigate the sensitivity of MNS 
regions not only to valence, but to differences in emotions. While valence is considered 
a central aspect differentiating emotions, our findings can only support a sensitivity to 
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valence, not to a specific emotion. Furthermore, Barrett and colleagues (Barrett et al., 
2019) point out that specific emotional states can be associated with diverse facial 
expressions, and that perception of facial configurations varies widely between 
individuals, usually going beyond the set of basic emotions that underlie most scientific 
studies. In addition, the authors argue that while people learn to associate stereotypical 
facial configurations with certain emotions, previous studies could more convincingly 
provide evidence for our reliable expertise at discriminating positive from negative 
valence in facial configurations. Therefore, our focus on valence might have been more 
robust and in better agreement with current literature than when focusing on different 
types of emotions. When referring to the recent review by Barrett and colleagues 
(2019) another objection could be that we cannot be sure that our participants 
perceived smiling faces as expressing happiness, or wide-eyed faces as expressing 
fear. However, a possible categorization different from the one intended by us, would 
have led to smaller neuronal adaptation effects.  
3.1.6 Conclusions 
Our fMRI adaptation study shows that regions of the MNS are sensitive to the 
valence of facial configurations, in particular to the switch from positive to negative 
emotions, rather than vice versa. These results further support the role of the MNS in 
concert with amygdala and insula in social cognition and encourage the use of fMRI 
adaptation designs. Together, our findings suggest that regions of the MNS not only 
represent the observed motor state, but might process the affective meaning of the 
state, helping us to differentiate between emotions. The philosopher Gallagher 
suggests that we might have a direct understanding of others without any deeper, 
cognitive processing (Gallagher, 2008). The MNS might be essentially involved in such 
a direct understanding. 
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3.2 Summary 
In study 2, an fMRI adaptation design was used to investigate whether the MNS 
is sensitive to the emotional valence of facial configurations. In an independent sample 
of 76 participants, changes in emotional valence were reflected in several regions, 
including amygdala, fusiform gyrus, insula, IFG, STS, and IPL. Interestingly, when a 
happy face preceded a fearful face, activation was even stronger in IFG, insula and 
STS than for the reverse contrast. Thus, all areas of the MNS seem to be sensitive to 
the emotional valence of faces. In addition, the other regions that were involved in the 
task support the assumption of the task requiring automatic, fast or implicit processing, 
by being directly part of the MNS or associated with the x-system. If the MNS is indeed 
sensitive to emotional valence, how will the decision on an emotion be made in case 
of ambiguous stimuli, presenting more than one emotion?  
While studies 1 and 2 focused on the MNS, the focus is broadened for study 3, 
because in addition to the automatic processing of the affective facial information, 
probably slower and more deliberate cognitive processes come into play when facial 
configurations are ambiguous. In study 3, I investigated the role of probabilistic 
reasoning regions, such as DLPFC and parietal cortex, as well as of amygdala and 
Nacc for decision making regarding ambiguous facial stimuli. By again using facial 
configuration intended to express fear or happiness, additional insight can be gained 
into whether salience or reward drives the final decision.  
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4 STUDY 3: DEFINING THE ROLE OF DECISION MAKING FOR SOCIAL-
COGNITIVE PROCESSES 
4.1 Nucleus accumbens activation is linked to salience in social decision making 
4.1.1 Abstract 
Objective: Aberrant salience may explain hasty decision making and psychotic 
symptoms in schizophrenia. In healthy individuals, final decisions in probabilistic 
reasoning tasks are related to Nucleus accumbens (Nacc) activation. However, 
research investigating the Nacc in social decision making is missing. Our study aimed 
at investigating the role of the Nacc for social decision making and its link to (aberrant) 
salience attribution. 
Methods: 47 healthy individuals completed a novel social jumping-to-conclusion 
(JTC) fMRI-paradigm, showing morphed faces simultaneously expressing fear and 
happiness. Participants decided on the ‘current’ emotion after each picture, and on the 
‘general’ emotion of series of faces.  
Results: Nacc activation was stronger during final decisions than in previous 
trials without a decision, particularly in fear rather than happiness series. A JTC bias 
was associated with higher Nacc activation for last fearful, but not last happy faces.  
Conclusions: Apparently, mechanisms underlying probabilistic reasoning are 
also relevant for social decision making. The pattern of Nacc activation suggests 
salience, not reward, drives the final decision. Based on these findings, we hypothesize 
that aberrant salience might also explain social-cognitive deficits in schizophrenia. 
4.1.2 Introduction 
Daily, we are faced with the task to recognize other people’s emotions. Whereas 
sometimes, the emotion is very clear and easy to recognize, at other times the facial 
expression is more subtle or ambiguous, requiring an active decision about the 
perceived emotion. While this can present a challenge even for people without mental 
disorders, it is especially difficult for patients with schizophrenia who have impairments 
in emotion recognition (Kohler et al., 2003; Kohler, Walker, Martin, Healey, & Moberg, 
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2010) and decision making (Heerey, Bell-Warren, & Gold, 2008; Moritz & Woodward, 
2005). Based on the dopamine hypothesis of schizophrenia (Howes & Kapur, 2009), 
we hypothesize that decision making for emotions can be disturbed by aberrant 
Nucleus accumbens (Nacc) activity. To test this assumption we developed a new 
experimental paradigm that combines emotion recognition with decision making and 
applied it to a group of healthy participants.  
Nacc and the fronto-parietal network, including parietal cortex and dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) are key regions for decision making (Matthews, Simmons, 
Lane, & Paulus, 2004; Philiastides, Auksztulewicz, Heekeren, & Blankenburg, 2011; 
St Onge, Ahn, Phillips, & Floresco, 2012; Zalocusky et al., 2016). Final decisions during 
probabilistic reasoning tasks are related to increased activation in ventral tegmental 
area (VTA) and Nacc in healthy participants, whereas schizophrenia patients (SZ) 
have reduced activation in these areas (Rausch et al., 2015). The Nacc, which is a part 
of the ventral striatum, has a high density of dopamine receptors and is a central region 
for motivation, reward and pleasure (Kringelbach & Berridge, 2010) with a major role 
for reward anticipation (Kringelbach & Berridge, 2010; Sabatinelli, Bradley, Lang, 
Costa, & Versace, 2007) and salience attribution (Berridge, 2006; Esslinger et al., 
2013; Kapur et al., 2005). Dysfunction of the dopaminergic system appears to build the 
foundation of deficits characteristic for SZ which led to the “dopamine hypothesis of 
schizophrenia” (Howes & Kapur, 2009). In particular chaotic dopaminergic signaling in 
the Nacc has been proposed to be causal to the aberrant salience attribution in SZ, 
and hypersalience, i.e. enhanced salience attribution to seemingly neutral objects, has 
been assumed to cause delusions (Kapur et al., 2005).  
Hasty decision making is known to occur in schizophrenia (Moritz & Woodward, 
2005). A recent meta-analysis confirmed that people with psychosis decide based on 
significantly less evidence than healthy, as well as clinical populations without 
psychosis. Importantly, it was shown that a JTC bias is specifically linked to delusions 
(Dudley, Taylor, Wickham, & Hutton, 2016). In decision making, hypersalience may 
put too much weight on current information, leading to insufficient data gathering and 
thus hasty decisions, also called jumping-to-conclusion (JTC) bias (Speechley, 
Whitman, & Woodward, 2010). While hypersalience may cause the JTC bias in (non-
social) decision making tasks, it may lead to wrong attributions of emotions and mental 
states to others in emotion recognition (Blackwood, Howard, Bentall, & Murray, 2001), 
which again may support the emergence of delusions (Mier & Kirsch, 2017). 
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Interestingly, there is evidence that the deficit in emotion recognition in SZ is most 
pronounced for ambiguous or neutral facial expressions (Kohler et al., 2010; Mier, Lis, 
et al., 2014). Ambiguous facial expressions are defined by the existence of more than 
one emotion, making a decision process for emotion recognition necessary. Since 
neutral facial expressions are defined by the absence of any emotion, false emotion 
recognition always implies the false perception of an emotion; i.e. a false positive 
decision for the existence of an emotion. Thus, hasty decision making and 
hypersalience might have a special role for biases in the recognition of ambiguous and 
neutral facial expressions, possibly suggesting an interaction of disturbed decision 
making and emotion recognition.  
Aberrations in Nacc activity in SZ have not only been shown for decision making 
(Rausch et al., 2014), but present a stable finding for reward anticipation in SZ (Juckel 
et al., 2006; Morris et al., 2012). Thus, it is an interesting question whether reward or 
salience is the mechanism causing enhanced Nacc activity during final decision 
making, and consequently aberrant Nacc activity in SZ. Esslinger and colleagues 
found no differences in Nacc activation between rewarded and unrewarded final 
decisions, and concluded that Nacc activity reflects salience rather than the rewarding 
impact of the last stimulus (Esslinger et al., 2013). However, more studies directly 
investigating factors influencing Nacc activity during the final decision are necessary. 
Additionally, our knowledge on Nacc activation in decision making is based on “non-
social” decision making tasks, leaving the question of the role of the Nacc for decision 
making during emotion recognition, i.e. in social decision making. Usually, emotion 
recognition has been associated with activation in the amygdala (Sergerie et al., 2008), 
best known for its role in fear processing, including recognition of fearful faces 
(Gläscher, Tüscher, Weiller, & Büchel, 2004; Hariri, Tessitore, Mattay, Fera, & 
Weinberger, 2002; Öhman, 2005). Moreover, the amygdala can reflect the salience of 
facial expressions (Santos et al., 2011). To a lesser extent than in fear, the amygdala 
is also activated in other negative and even positive emotions, including happiness 
(Phan, Wager, Taylor, & Liberzon, 2002). The anticipation of reward is linked to Nacc 
activation, for both monetary and social reinforcers (Izuma et al., 2008; Spreckelmeyer 
et al., 2009). Watching happy and attractive faces is considered rewarding, and 
activates the Nacc (Aharon et al., 2001; Hahn & Perrett, 2014; Phan et al., 2002). 
Facial expressions with a negative valence (e.g. fear, anger) however are not 
considered rewarding, but instead indicating threat and thus aversive conditions 
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(Anderson et al., 2007; Bishop, Duncan, & Lawrence, 2004). They are detected more 
quickly and accurately than happy faces in face-in-the-crowd tasks, suggesting higher 
salience for negative than positive facial expressions (LoBue, 2009; Pinkham, Griffin, 
Baron, Sasson, & Gur, 2010). Importantly, the Nacc maintains connections to the 
amygdala (Jackson & Moghaddam, 2001), suggesting interactions of amygdala and 
Nacc that might also be relevant for emotion recognition. Thus, both fear and 
happiness can be salient, but evidence suggests that fear is more salient than 
happiness and usually fear is not rewarding. We apply the knowledge of tasks using 
emotional stimuli to our task with the following logic: If increased Nacc activity during 
final decision making is associated with reward rather than salience, we expect it to be 
more prominent in the case of happy than fearful final stimuli.  
Taken together, findings on final decision making in schizophrenia suggest 
reduced activation in the Nacc (Rausch et al., 2014), while based on the dopamine 
hypothesis (Kapur, 2003) enhanced Nacc activation would be predicted. Further, until 
now it is not clear whether this reduced Nacc activation during final decision making in 
SZ is based on aberrant salience, or aberrant reward anticipation. Since patients with 
SZ show impaired decision making (Dudley et al., 2016), as well as deficits in social 
cognition (Savla, Vella, Armstrong, Penn, & Twamley, 2012), investigating the 
interaction of these processes seems highly warranted. In our fMRI study, we include 
healthy participants to investigate whether findings from non-social JTC tasks can be 
replicated in a novel social JTC paradigm, which requires emotion recognition in mixed 
(morphed) facial expressions. We hypothesize that probabilistic decision making for 
emotion recognition leads to activation in the fronto-parietal network and that the final 
decision of a probabilistic reasoning process is linked to Nacc activation. By using 
faces showing fear and happiness in varying degrees, we want to explore whether 
salience or reward is linked to Nacc-activity during final decision making. If Nacc 
activation is related to reward rather than salience, Nacc activation should be stronger 
for happiness than fear. To get first evidence of the link between schizophrenia 
pathology and activation in the Nacc during final decision making in this social decision 
making task, we a) assess personality traits (schizotypy), and measures of social 
functioning (social network size and diversity), and b) compare participants according 
to their decision behavior. 
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4.1.3 Materials and Methods 
4.1.3.1 Participants 
47 healthy, right-handed Caucasian individuals with a general qualification for 
university entrance (29 women, 18 men; mean age 23.4 years (± 3.6), range 18-33 
years) underwent functional magnetic resonance imaging in a Siemens Magnetom Trio 
3T (Central Institute of Mental Health in Mannheim, Germany). Exclusion criteria were 
all assessed based on self-report and comprise a history of neurologic or psychiatric 
disease and presence of other diseases which require constant medication, as well as 
the general exclusion criteria for fMRI. 
4.1.3.2 Study Procedure 
The experiment was conducted as part of a study that was approved by the 
ethics committee of the University of Heidelberg and in agreement with the declaration 
of Helsinki. Participants were informed about study aims and procedures, signed 
written informed consent, received oral and written instruction on the paradigm, and 
completed a battery of questionnaires. Before the MR session, each participant 
practiced the paradigm until it was familiar and clear. Practice runs entailed the same 
identities as those used in the experiment. In contrast to experimental stimuli, which 
were based on fearful and happy facial expressions, practice stimuli were morphs 
between angry and happy, or between disgusted and happy faces. In the MR scanner, 
participants held a Current Designs 4-button diamond device in their right hand and 
watched the paradigm via video goggles. Prior to the experimental task and 
measurement, an MPRage anatomical measurement was performed, during which a 
nature movie was shown, so participants could get acquainted to the MR environment. 
Participants were reimbursed with 15€. 
4.1.3.3 Experimental Design 
In the style of the classical beads task (Huq et al., 1988) and the modified JTC 
task (Esslinger et al., 2013; Woodward et al., 2009), we developed a social JTC 
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paradigm (“Jemo”), which combines recognizing emotions in emotionally ambiguous 
faces with decision making. The happy and fearful facial expressions of 6 Caucasians 
(3 women, 3 men) of the NimStim Face Stimulus Set 
(http://www.macbrain.org/resources.htm, Tottenham et al., 2009) were selected, and 
for each individual, the happy and fearful face were morphed in 5 % steps, ranging 
from 0% (0% fearful, 100% happy) to 100% (100% fearful, 0% happy). The morphed 
pictures were taken from Matzke and colleagues (2014). In a pilot study, 25 healthy 
students judged which of the two emotions was predominant in each picture. Based 
on these ratings, we determined 7 morphs per stimulus person with the 4th morph being 
close to a 50/50 rating across participants, and the other 6 morphs having an 
increasing percentage of fear (3) or happiness (3) (see Figure 8 for examples). 
In the Jemo paradigm, the most ambiguous 4th morph is presented as the first 
stimulus in a series of maximum 5 pictures. Each of the following morphs is less 
ambiguous, either more happy or more fearful. Every series of 5 stimuli has one 
incongruent stimulus, in which the recessive emotion prevails. On average, the 
incongruent morph consists to 77% (range: 61-92%) of the recessive emotion. The 
incongruent trial appears in 2nd, 3rd, or 4th position. The task of the participants is to 
identify a) the emotion of each stimulus (referred to as current emotion), and b) the 
predominant emotion in a series (referred to as general emotion) as soon as possible. 
If the participant correctly identifies the incongruent stimulus, the current emotion is 
correct. However, if the participant wrongly determines the incongruent stimulus to 
reflect the prevailing emotion within the series, this is considered an incorrect decision 
on the general emotion. Each picture is presented for 2 seconds, after which 
participants have 2 seconds to decide on the emotion displayed in this picture (current 
emotion), indicate their certainty about the decision within 4 seconds, and decide within 
2.5 seconds whether they want to see another picture or already know the general 
emotion; in the latter case, they subsequently have 2 seconds to decide on the general 
emotion. Stimuli within a trial are presented with a jittered inter-stimulus-interval of 
1s±0.5s, distinct series are separated by a jittered inter-trial-interval of 2s±1s. A fixation 
cross is presented during the inter-stimulus/trial-intervals. There are 24 trials in total (6 
identities with 2 emotional directions, all presented twice). Duration of the experiment 
was dependent on the number of stimuli participants needed for a decision. They were 
told however, that the experiment takes around 15 minutes and were not aware that 
taking fewer stimuli to decide would reduce experimental time. 
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Figure 8. Example of stimuli: left: most happy picture, middle: 50/50 morph fearful-
happy, right: most fearful picture, increments in between. 
4.1.3.4 Questionnaires 
Participants completed questionnaires assessing schizotypy (Schizotypal 
Personality Questionnaire, SPQ (Raine, 1991)) and social network behavior (Social 
Network Index, SNI (Cohen, Doyle, Skoner, Rabin, & Gwaltney, 1997)). Schizotypy 
refers to a combination of personality traits that largely overlap with symptoms of 
schizophrenia, both behaviorally and neurobiologically (Ettinger et al., 2015). The SPQ 
consists of 9 subscales, and includes the central aspects of schizoptypy such as 
constricted affect, unusual perceptual experiences and suspiciousness. The SNI 
assesses social ties in the private and professional environment, and is evaluated 
regarding three subscales: 1. Network Diversity, which reflects the number of social 
roles, in which the individual has regular contact, e.g. parent, child, spouse, employee, 
neighbor. 2. People, which counts the total number of people an individual is in regular 
contact with. 3. Roles, which reflects the number of different network domains in which 
an individual is active, which is based on the number of high-contact people in each 
network, e.g. family, work, neighbors. Previous studies suggest reduced social 
networks already in people with subclinical psychotic experiences (Gayer-Anderson & 
Morgan, 2013). 
4.1.3.5 fMRI Data Acquisition and Analysis 
fMRI data was acquired using a 12 channel head coil in a 3 T Siemens 
Magnetom Trio at the Central Institute of Mental Health in Mannheim, Germany. During 
the tasks, we used echo-planar imaging with 32 descending 3x3x4 mm slices including 
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1 mm gap, TR=2000 ms, TE=30ms, flip angle=80°, field of view=192mm, 
matrix=64x64. 
Data were analyzed using SPM8 (www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/spm8/), 
with preprocessing including slice time correction, realignment, normalization to MNI 
space with resampling to 3x3x3mm voxels, and spatial smoothing with a 8mm full-
width half-maximum Gaussian filter. We used a high pass filter of 512 seconds. First-
level analysis included 7 regressors (last-fearful-face, last-happy-face, previous-
fearful-faces, previous-happy-faces, happy-block, fearful-block, key presses) in a 
hybrid design modelling tonic (i.e. blocks of probabilistic reasoning) and phasic activity 
(i.e. events of final decision making and events without a final decision), according to 
our earlier publications with a non-social decision making paradigm (Esslinger et al., 
2013; Rausch et al., 2014). The purpose of this hybrid design was two-fold: a) it allows 
analyzing phasic as well as tonic responses occurring in the experiment, and b) 
activation revealed with event-modulation is attributable to phasic effects under control 
of tonic effects, while the opposite is true for block-modulation. The contrasts for 
probabilistic reasoning were blocks with faces increasing in happiness and blocks with 
faces increasing in fear (> baseline fixation cross; block modulation). The contrast for 
final decision making was the difference in activation between the last face and all 
previous faces (event modulation). We also analyzed the interaction of brain activation 
during fearful last versus previous stimuli in comparison to happy last versus previous 
stimuli (event modulation).  
In second-level random-effects group analyses, we applied t-tests to the 
contrasts of interest. Our regions of interest (ROI) included BA40 and BA7 (parietal 
cortex), BA46 and BA9 (DLPFC) for probabilistic reasoning, and Nacc and amygdala 
for final decision making. The masks were taken from the wakeforest university 
pickatlas (WFU Pickatlas, http://fmri.wfubmc.edu/software/PickAtlas). The Nacc mask 
was drawn according to an anatomic atlas and has already been successfully applied 
in our earlier studies with a JTC design (Esslinger et al., 2012). The significance 
threshold for whole-brain analyses was set to p<0.05, corrected for multiple testing 
using family-wise error (FWE), and a minimal cluster size of k=5 voxels. ROI 
significance was set to p<0.001, uncorrected, k=5 with p<0.05 small volume correction 
(svc) of the peak voxel. The Nacc mask had a size of 128 voxels on the left, and 93 
voxels on the right side. 
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Questionnaires were analyzed with IBM SPSS Statistics 22 (Chicago, IL, US). 
Correlations of brain activation with questionnaires and behavior were calculated 
based on contrast estimates extracted from the Nacc ROI for the contrast all last faces 
> all previous faces (to assure the same number of voxels for eigenvariate extraction 
across participants, no significance threshold was set; i.e. p=1). In addition, behavioral 
subgroups of participants were compared with regard to their Nacc contrast estimates. 
Behavioral data were analyzed by repeated measures ANOVAs and t-tests. 
4.1.4 Results 
4.1.4.1 Behavior 
Both, in blocks with increasingly happy and in blocks with increasingly fearful 
faces, subjects watched on average 3 pictures (happy: mean=3.02, SD=0.94; fearful: 
mean=2.97, SD=1.01; t(46)=1.04, p=0.306, d=0.05). There was no significant 
difference in performance between recognizing the current emotion in happy or fearful 
faces (happy: mean=62.74%, SD=22.92; fearful: mean=64.81%, SD=21.31; 
t(46)=0.37, p=0.71, d=0.09). Also, correctness of the decision on the general emotion 
within a block was not significantly different between the two emotion conditions 
(happy: mean=54.34%, SD=30.80; fearful: mean=60.72%, SD=30.91; t(46)=0.96, 
p=0.34, d=0.21). As illustrated in Figure 9, both accuracy and certainty of decisions 
increased with the number of stimuli considered. We performed a repeated measures 
general linear model to test the main effect number of stimuli on accuracy and certainty 
in fear and happiness blocks. There was a significant effect of stimulus number within 
a series on correct decisions in happiness blocks: F(4, 116)=32.27, p<0.001, ηp2=0.53; 
on correct decisions in fear blocks: F(4, 124)=58.48, p<0.001, ηp2=0.65; on certainty in 
happiness blocks: F(2.77, 80.39)=55.08, p<0.001, ηp2=0.66; on certainty in fear blocks: 
F(3.25, 100.69)=21.40, p<0.001, ηp2=0.41. Reaction times were not significantly 
different in the happy and fearful series (happy: mean=733ms, SD=142. fearful: 
mean=724ms, SD=127. t(46)=0.68, p=0.500, d=0.07). Experimental duration varied 
between participants depending on the number of stimuli they considered, and was on 
average 12.76 minutes (SD=3.84). The number of draws-to-decision (DTD) correlated 
significantly with the accuracy of decisions for the current (happiness block: r=0.512, 
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p<0.001; fear block:  r=0.312; p=0.033) and for the general emotion (happiness block: 
r=0.481, p<0.001; fear block:  r=0.453; p=0.0014). 
 
 
Figure 9. Mean percentages of correctly recognized emotions as bars with standard 
deviation; mean certainty as lines. 
 
Exploratorily, we additionally analyzed whether the incongruent faces within 
each trial affected the decision process. On average, participants saw incongruent 
faces in 73.3% of trials (SD=23.4s). When participants decided on the general emotion 
immediately after the presentation of an incongruent face, performance was below 
chance level (25.4% correct responses, SD=32.2) with happiness as the dominant 
emotion within a series, and 34.8% correct responses (SD=35.9) with fear as the 
dominant emotion within a series. However, a decision on the general emotion of a 
series was only made after presentation of an incongruent face in 25.7% of series 
(SD=14.4). 
4.1.4.2 Brain activation 
 
Whole brain analyses revealed activation in the visual association cortex, and 
in parietal (BA7) and frontal (BA6 and BA44) lobe for fear blocks. During the happiness 
block, there was also enhanced activation in visual association cortex, parietal (BA7) 
and frontal (BA6) lobe. ROI analyses confirmed these results from the whole-brain 
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analyses . In both the fear block and the happiness block, there was activity in the 
DLPFC, and parietal cortex ROIs.  
During all last faces compared to all previous faces, activation was increased in 
the bilateral putamen, with the cluster reaching into Nacc, and the anterior cingulate 
cortex (ACC; Figure 10). ROI-analyses confirmed enhanced Nacc activity for the last 
faces in comparison to all previous faces. This activation pattern was mainly driven by 
the fearful series comparing last to previous faces, but not by the contrast happy last 
versus happy previous. The interaction contrast (Figure 11) comparing the last fear 
face to all previous fear faces in comparison to the last happy face to all previous happy 
faces, revealed no significance at the whole brain corrected threshold, but ROI 
analyses showed stronger Nacc activation for fearful rather than happy last stimuli. 
None of the contrasts showed significant activation differences in the amygdala. 
Results of the whole brain analyses are presented in Table 16, ROI-analyses in Table 
17. 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Whole brain activation for all last > all previous faces, p < 0.05, FWE-
corrected, k = 5, at coordinates: x, y, z = 2, 14, -11. A) Nucleus accumbens, B) Anterior 
Cingulate Cortex. 
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Figure 11. Interaction between last fearful and last happy face. A) Interaction (last 
fearful face greater than previous fearful faces compared to last happy face greater 
than previous happy faces), p < 0.001 uncorrected for display purposes., k = 5, (x, y, 
z = -9, 8, -8). B) Bars showing mean left and right Nacc activation for each of the 
conditions. 
4.1.4.3 Brain-Behavior Associations 
Our sample included an extreme group of 5 participants, who on average looked 
at less than 2 faces before deciding on the general emotion (1.45±0.37) which is 
Study 3: Defining the role of decision making for social-cognitive processes 
102 
 
considered as JTC bias (Dudley et al., 2016; Rausch et al., 2015). We compared them 
to the other 42 participants (3.18±0.83; difference between groups: t(10.1)=8.30, 
p<0.001, d=2.70). We refer to the group with an average number of less than 2 faces 
as “L2” and the group with more than 2 faces as “M2”. 
Even though L2 looked at fewer faces than M2 (happy: L2: 1.51 (±0.35), M2: 
3.20 (±0.82),  t(10.2)=8.33, p<0.001, d=2.68. fear: L2: 1.38 (±0.39), M2: 3.16 (±0.89),  
t(9.9)=7.90, p<0.001, d=2.59), they did not perform significantly worse in the decision 
on the general emotion within a series (happy: L2: 46.20% (±42.49), M2: 55.31% 
(±29.65); t(45)=0.62, p=0.538, d=0.25. fear: L2: 51.80% (±43.12), M2: 61.79% 
(±29.66), t(45)=0.68, p=0.501, d=0.27). However, comparing contrast estimates of L2 
to M2 revealed higher activity during the last fearful face compared to the previous 
fearful faces in left Nacc (L2: 1.19 ± 0.55, M2: 0.24 ± 0.36, t(45)=5.22, p<0.001, d=2.04, 
see Figure 12), but not for the last happy face in comparison to the previous happy 
faces (L2: 0.10 ± 0.55, M2: 0.03 ± 0.37, t(45)=0.38, p=0.71, d=0.15). 
 
 
Figure 12. Bars showing mean left Nacc activation during the last fearful compared to 
all previous fearful faces and last happy compared to all previous happy faces for the 
extreme groups L2 (n = 5) and M2 (n = 42). Lines indicate standard deviation. 
Study 3: Defining the role of decision making for social-cognitive processes 
103 
 
 
Exploratorily, to allow a correlation approach, instead of using the extreme 
group, we performed a median split of the whole group. Here, we excluded one outlier, 
who did not affect the fMRI results across the whole sample, but who drove many of 
the brain-behavior correlations that were no longer significant after excluding the 
person. With the median split, 23 persons had looked at less than 2.825 faces per 
block (L3), and 23 persons had considered more (M3). Analogous to L2 and M2, we 
refer to the groups as “L3” and “M3”. 
As illustrated in Figure 13, the groups showed opposing correlations between 
Nacc activity for the last compared to all previous faces and the number of faces to 
reach a decision with a negative correlation in L3 (left: r=-0.48, p=0.02, right: r=-0.40, 
p=0.06) and a tendency for a positive correlation in M3 (left: r=0.35, p=0.10; difference 
of correlation strength to L3: z=-2.81, p=0.005, right: r=0.41, p=0.05, difference of 
correlation strength to L3: z=-2.7, p=0.003). 
 
 
Figure 13. Correlation of Nacc activation during the last compared to the previous faces 
with the mean number of faces considered per block. Left: left Nacc. Right: right Nacc. 
Blue: subjects looking at less than 2.825 pictures per average block (L3), red: subjects 
looking at more than 2.825 faces per average block (M3). 
4.1.4.4 Correlations of brain activity with questionnaires 
Nacc activation during all last compared to all previous faces was negatively correlated 
with the number of social roles, assessed with the SNI (left: r=-0.42, p=0.004. right: 
r=-0.37, p=0.012), with the number of people one is in contact with (left: r=-0.27, 
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p=0.066, right: r=-0.31, p=0.034), and with the SPQ constricted affect scale (r=-0.32; 
p=0.029). No other correlations between Nacc activation for all last faces > all previous 
faces were significant. For the sake of comprehensiveness, it should be mentioned 
that no significant correlation between Nacc activation and schizotypy occurred when 
a four factor solution (Stefanis et al., 2004), instead of the nine factor solution of the 
SPQ was applied. 
4.1.5 Supplementary Material 
Table 16. Areas with significant activation during our contrasts of interest at whole-
brain level, p < 0.05 FWE-corrected, k = 5. Note: The comparison of the last happy 
faces with all previous happy faces revealed no differences in brain activation at the 
given significance threshold and is thus not listed. 
Contrast Area 
Brodmann 
area 
Cluster 
size k 
MNI-
coordinates 
x         y        z 
t-value 
All 
last > previous 
Putamen left 
 
41 -21 14 -11 7.23 
Putamen right 45 15 11 -11 6.74 
Anterior cingulate 
cortex 
BA32 28 0 41 16 5.21 
Fear 
last > previous 
Anterior cingulate 
cortex 
BA32 45 6 41 16 6.79 
Putamen left 
 
27 -15 8 -11 6.58 
Putamen right 21 12 11 -8 6.09 
Fear block 
Visual 
Association 
Cortex, Occipital 
Lobe 
BA18 176 12 -73 -5 10.29 
Pre-Motor and 
Supplementary 
Motor Cortex, 
Frontal Lobe 
BA6 
427 -21 -1 61 8.79 
125 27 -1 58 8.37 
Somatosensory 
Association 
Cortex, Parietal 
Lobe 
BA7 21 -9 -61 58 6.21 
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Inferior Frontal 
Gyrus, Frontal 
Lobe 
BA44 5 -54 5 19 5.89 
Somatosensory 
Association 
Cortex, Parietal 
Lobe 
BA7 8 15 -64 58 5.75 
Happiness 
block 
Visual 
Association 
Cortex, Occipital 
Lobe 
BA18 157 12 -73 -5 10.24 
Pre-Motor and 
Supplementary 
Motor Cortex, 
Frontal Lobe 
BA6 
109 27 -1 58 8.29 
304 -21 -4 58 8.22 
Somatosensory 
Association 
Cortex, Parietal 
Lobe 
BA7 
10 -12 -64 55 5.76 
8 12 -61 58 5.58 
 
Table 17. All significant ROI results for the examined contrasts, p < 0.001, k = 5, 
peak-level p<0.05 svc.  
1 (Last fearful > previous fearful) > (Last happy > previous happy). 
Contrast Area Hemisphere Cluster 
size k 
MNI-coordinates 
x          y           z 
t-value 
All 
last>previous 
Nacc left 75 -21 14 -11 7.23 
right 76 15 11 -11 6.74 
Fear 
last>previous 
Nacc left 96 -15 8 -11 6.58 
right 80 12 11 -8 6.09 
Happiness 
last>previous 
Nacc left 10 -21 17 -8 3.96 
right 12 18 14 -11 4.23 
Interaction 
pos1 
Nacc left 14 -9 8 -8 3.75 
right 9 6 8 -5 3.94 
Fear block BA7 and BA40 left 147 -9 -61 58 6.21 
62 -42 -34 43 5.70 
right 81 15 -64 58 5.75 
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39 48 -31 46 4.34 
DLPFC left 21 -57 5 31 4.91 
4 -39 32 31 4.16 
right 14 36 35 34 4.37 
Happiness 
block 
BA7 and BA40 left 123 -12 -64 55 5.76 
 41 -42 -34 46 5.76 
right 68 12 -61 58 5.58 
 36 48 -31 46 4.12 
DLPFC left 18 -57 8 28 4.73 
 2 -39 32 31 4.13 
right 9 36 35 34 4.14 
 
4.1.6 Discussion 
Our study aimed to investigate the neural correlates of social decision making 
and its link to (aberrant) salience attribution. Further, we planned on gaining evidence 
whether salience or reward is the driving factor for Nacc activation during final decision 
making. To this end, we used an emotion recognition task with morphed pictures, 
simultaneously expressing fear and happiness to varying degrees.  
Our results successfully replicate the findings from previous studies using non-
social stimuli. In line with Esslinger et al. (Esslinger et al., 2013), we found activity in 
the fronto-parietal network during probabilistic reasoning, as well as activity in the Nacc 
during final decision making. Interestingly, the enhanced activation of the Nacc was 
accompanied by activation in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). The ACC was shown 
to be involved in reward processing (P. Kirsch et al., 2003), emotional conflict 
resolution (Amit Etkin, Tobias Egner, Daniel M. Peraza, Eric R. Kandel, & Joy Hirsch, 
2006), guiding voluntary choices (Kennerley, Walton, Behrens, Buckley, & Rushworth, 
2006), decision making (Rogers et al., 2004), and has a general role in regulating 
emotional and cognitive processing (Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000). Thus in our emotion 
recognition task, the ACC response might reflect the conflict resolution and according 
decision for one of the emotions displayed in the morphed facial expressions.  
Regarding Nacc activity, we were not only interested in the question whether 
we can replicate previous findings from JTC tasks without social stimuli, but also 
whether reward or salience is the driving factor during final decision making. Esslinger 
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and colleagues (Esslinger et al., 2013) concluded from the comparison of rewarded 
and unrewarded final decisions that salience, but not reward, results in Nacc activity 
during final decision making, whereas Sabatinelli et al. (Sabatinelli et al., 2007) found 
activation in Nacc and medial prefrontal cortex to be positively related to pleasantness 
and reward-value of pictures, but not to unpleasant pictures, salience or arousal. The 
interaction contrast, i.e. the activation during the last fearful face compared to the 
previous fearful faces in contrast to the last happy versus previous happy faces, 
revealed bilaterally enhanced Nacc activation. Hence, in support with the conclusion 
of Esslinger and colleagues (Esslinger et al., 2013), we assume salience, but not 
reward, to be the driving factor for final decision making. Interestingly, the ACC has 
also been shown to be involved in salience detection (Davis et al., 2005), strengthening 
this interpretation.  
As schizophrenia (SZ) is associated with aberrant salience (Grace, 1991; Kapur, 
2003), persons with SZ would be expected to have increased Nacc activity during final 
decision making. Accordingly, healthy participants who showed a JTC bias in our study 
indeed had enhanced Nacc activity during final decisions in fearful series. Additionally, 
analyses of the median-split groups hint toward a possible opposite pattern of Nacc 
activation between those with and without a JTC bias tendency, suggesting that fear 
is more salient to individuals looking at fewer pictures. Further, we revealed a positive 
association between DTD and performance across participants, linking impaired 
emotion recognition with hasty decision making. Thus, our results from healthy 
participants give first evidence that the aberrant salience hypothesis might be extended 
to explain biased emotion recognition.  
Referring to the model of persecutory delusions by Freeman and colleagues 
(Freeman, Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, & Bebbington, 2002), it can be assumed that 
anomalous experiences and arousal are at the heart of the emergence of delusions. 
The authors define persecutory delusion as a threat belief that results from the interplay 
of various factors, such as emotions and beliefs, and general cognitive biases with 
these anomalous experiences / arousal. In our present study we demonstrate a link 
between aberrant salience (as reflected by enhanced Nacc activation) and a JTC-bias 
in emotion perception in healthy participants. We assume that a hasty decision about 
another person’s emotion can lead to wrong attributions during emotion recognition. 
The correlation between DTDs and accuracy supports this assumption, albeit not 
causally, but only on an associative level. While we are aware of evidence for a 
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negative bias during emotion recognition in SZ (Mier, Lis, et al., 2014), but not of 
evidence for a positive bias, we propose that aberrant salience does not have to lead 
to biased negative perceptions, but could also result in biased positive perceptions of 
emotions. Therefore, aberrant salience could result in anomalous experiences and 
arousal which would influence the interpretation of an emotion as positive or negative, 
dependent on the own current emotion and general biases. Since negative emotions, 
and in particular social and general anxiety, play a huge role in SZ (Achim et al., 2009), 
the probability for a false negative perception (i.e. a negative bias) is high, and with 
this the vulnerability for delusions with negative content, such as persecutory 
delusions, is increased. Thus, further studies are needed to show whether aberrant 
salience underlies the specific form of biased emotion recognition that occurs as 
negative bias for neutral facial expressions in schizophrenia (Mier, Lis, et al., 2014), or 
causes a general emotion bias.   
Persons with SZ are known to have reduced social networks (Gayer-Anderson 
& Morgan, 2013). In agreement, correlational analyses with the questionnaires 
revealed a negative association between the diversity of social roles (spouse, 
neighbor, close friend, child, coworker, etc.), as well as the network size of individuals 
and their Nacc activation during the final decision. The additional negative association 
with constricted affect, as assessed with the SPQ, however, seems at first glance 
contradictory. Constricted affect belongs to the negative syndrome of schizotypy, and 
researchers assume opposing effects of negative and positive pathology on social 
cognition  (C. D. Frith & Corcoran, 1996). Importantly, aberrant salience attribution and 
enhanced Nacc activity is linked to positive pathology, and in particular delusions 
(Kapur, 2003), while negative pathology has been found to go along with reduced Nacc 
activity (Wacker, Dillon, & Pizzagalli, 2009). However, since a reduced network size 
might also reflect social withdrawal and negative pathology, the correlational results 
should be interpreted carefully and warrant replication, especially, because the 
reported correlations are not corrected for multiple testing. 
Several further questions should be addressed in future studies. We found 
differential activation of the amygdala neither for all last in comparison to all previous 
faces, nor for the last fearful faces in comparison to the last happy faces, suggesting a 
reduced role of the amygdala for final decision making. However, since the amygdala 
is an important brain region for emotion recognition (Mier, Lis, et al., 2010; Sergerie et 
al., 2008) and has been shown to be involved in salience processing (Santos et al., 
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2011), further studies are needed to investigate the specific role of the amygdala in 
social decision making. In addition, to investigate the importance of different brain 
regions in social decision making more comprehensively, the presented social JTC-
task might be analyzed with regard to the right temporoparietal junction and particularly 
its functional connectivity with the left hippocampus, which recently has been shown to 
be important for social decision making and social learning in the context of an iterated 
prisoner’s dilemma game (Bitsch, Berger, Nagels, Falkenberg, & Straube, 2018).  
To learn more about brain activation and networks involved in and relevant to 
the task, it is a necessary next step to invite persons with diagnosed schizotypy or SZ 
to complete the task; also, inviting healthy participants depending on their self-reported 
positive schizotypy symptoms, as well as comparing SZ patients with and without 
delusions would be of high interest. It is noteworthy that patients with SZ did not show 
Nacc hyperactivation in earlier studies with a non-social JTC task, but Nacc 
hypoactivation (Rausch et al., 2014). If patients also respond with reduced Nacc 
activation in the social JTC-task, it would be intriguing to find the tipping point in the 
course of the disease, or within the SZ spectrum, which separates increased from 
reduced Nacc activation and associated behavioral measures. However, since in our 
earlier studies we found hypoactivation in our non-social JTC task, not only for patients 
with SZ (Rausch et al., 2014), but also for individuals in an at-risk-mental state (Rausch 
et al., 2015), it can be rather assumed that the pattern of hypo- versus hyperactivity is 
stable across the course of the disease. This is an especially interesting and indeed 
controversial finding, because in the dopamine hypothesis of SZ, aberrant salience is 
clearly linked to enhanced subcortical dopamine responding and hyperfunctioning of 
the Nacc (Kapur et al., 2005; Maia & Frank, 2017). In agreement with an integrative 
framework of dopamine functioning for SZ (Maia & Frank, 2017), one explanation could 
be that positive pathology and in particular delusions are characterized by aberrant 
salience in the form of hypersalience and enhanced Nacc activation which would be 
linked to hasty decision making. On the contrary, aberrant salience in the form of 
hyposalience and diminished Nacc responding could be linked to slow decision making 
and negative pathology, such as apathy. Further, it should be mentioned that Nacc 
hypoactivity has not only been found during final decision making in SZ (Rausch et al., 
2014), but is also a highly stable finding for reward anticipation in SZ that has been 
linked to deficient salience processing (Esslinger et al., 2012; Nielsen et al., 2012), 
reduced prediction error (Juckel et al., 2006), and the intake of typical antipsychotics 
Study 3: Defining the role of decision making for social-cognitive processes 
110 
 
(P Kirsch, Ronshausen, Mier, & Gallhofer, 2007). Thus, our findings from the healthy 
sample are in agreement with predictions of the dopamine hypothesis and the 
theoretical framework of hasty decision making and hypersalience in SZ (Dudley et al., 
2016; Kapur et al., 2005; Speechley et al., 2010), while the findings from SZ patients 
are not. Future studies should examine whether the proposed association between 
hasty decision making and delusions that has been confirmed on the behavioral level 
(Dudley et al., 2016) is also evident in studies investigating Nacc activation during final 
decision making for social stimuli in SZ. 
A limitation is that we did not include a non-social control task, so we cannot 
directly compare social and non-social probabilistic decision making. Future studies 
including patients with SZ should test both, social and non-social decision making to 
examine the possibility of divergent activation patterns. Further, based on the 
observation that antipsychotic medication fails to normalize social cognition and 
emotion recognition abilities in patients (Kucharska-Pietura & Mortimer, 2013), it would 
be interesting to compare brain activity during the task in medicated vs. non-medicated 
patients. This might provide new insights into the specific effects of the medication with 
respect to social cognition, and hint towards requirements for drug improvement. In 
addition, future studies with a focus on the association between delusions and hasty 
social decision making, might use the emotions happiness and anger, instead of 
happiness and fear, because anger might be more suitable to cover the perceived 
threat in paranoid psychosis than fear. A further possible drawback is the usage of 
stimuli displaying disgust or anger and happiness for the practice trials. We aimed to 
avoid presenting stimuli that are used in the experiment. This however, might have led 
to higher salience for fear than happiness. Still, this neither explains the enhanced 
activation for the last versus previous fear faces, nor the interaction effect with the 
emotion (since lower salience should not only occur for the last happy face, but also 
for all previous happy faces for which we controlled when comparing the last fear with 
the last happy face). Finally, there was a large variability in block lengths within and 
between subjects, lasting from almost 20s to over 70s depending on the number of 
stimuli considered before deciding on the general emotion. Also, as the block number 
was fixed, the duration of the experiment depended on the number of stimuli 
considered. However, participants did not know they could influence the duration of 
the experiment with their choices. Thus, the measured Nacc-signal in the group with a 
JTC-bias might be more noisy (due to less trials for averaging the response to the 
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previous faces, or due to inferior model fit), but should not reflect aberrations in task 
motivation. In addition, there is evidence suggesting that activation in the Nacc is 
positively linked with the willingness for task effort (Green, Horan, Barch, & Gold, 2015; 
Schmidt, Lebreton, Cléry-Melin, Daunizeau, & Pessiglione, 2012) what is in 
disagreement with the assumption of reduced motivation causing the higher activation 
in Nacc and ACC in response to the last face in comparison to all previous faces. Still, 
we cannot rule out the possibility of reduced motivation influencing the perseverance 
during each block, and therefore block- and task-length, as well as brain activation.  
4.1.7 Conclusions 
We presented results from a social JTC paradigm that allows investigating the 
neural correlates of social decision making. We show for final decisions during emotion 
recognition that the Nacc a) together with the ACC shows strong differential activation, 
b) has higher activity in fear than in happiness series and c) has higher activity in fear 
series in participants with a JTC bias. Based on this first evidence from healthy 
participants, we suggest that the aberrant salience hypothesis of schizophrenia may 
be extended to explain biased social cognition. Future studies focusing on the impact 
of dopamine and salience attribution on social cognition in schizophrenia are highly 
warranted. 
 
4.2 Summary 
Study 3 was conducted to investigate the neural mechanisms involved in deciding 
on emotions in ambiguous facial configurations. Automatic processing associated with 
embodied simulation might not be sufficient to resolve the conflict of facial 
configurations with inconsistent emotions, so I expected that also brain regions 
associated with deliberate reasoning would be involved. 47 participants completed the 
social-cognitive JTC paradigm, which was an adaptation of the fish-in-the-lake task 
that had previously shown an involvement of fronto-parietal regions during probabilistic 
decision making and an importance of the ventral striatum for the final decision 
(Esslinger et al., 2012). Remarkably, patients with schizophrenia had reduced 
activation in the ventral striatum during reward anticipation which might be due to 
aberrant salience (Rausch et al., 2014).  
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Study 3 with ambiguous facial configurations, replicated the relevance of fronto-
parietal regions during probabilistic decision making. Also in line with previous studies 
(Esslinger et al., 2013; Rausch et al., 2014), the final decision was associated with 
striatal activation in putamen reaching into Nacc. Importantly, activation in Nacc was 
stronger for fearful than for happy final faces, supporting the role of salience for Nacc 
activation in decision making. 
These results, as well as the results from the other two studies, will be discussed 
in detail in the general discussion. 
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5 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
In the present thesis, I aimed at deepening the understanding of neurobiological 
mechanisms underlying social cognition. Social cognition research gets its 
attractiveness not only from the fact that the topic is so central to our everyday lives 
and our evolution as a species, but also with regard to mental disorders that are often 
associated with complications in social interactions. Understanding the mechanisms 
therefore helps to better understand central functions of the brain, and might also build 
the foundation for therapy-oriented research. 
In the three presented fMRI studies using pictures of facial configurations 
intended to express emotions, the focus was on the fast automatic processing which 
seems to be at least partially represented in the MNS. The greatest challenge is that 
we cannot measure MN in humans, but have to rely on indirect non-invasive methods 
instead. In study 1, I implemented a sVx analysis, which is considered more accurate 
than standard fMRI processing routines for application on the MNS (Gazzola & 
Keysers, 2009). The goal of the study was to determine whether imitation, affective 
empathy and theory of mind share a common neural basis and whether this basis is 
indeed located in the regions of the MNS. The results show activation in sVx in regions 
of the MNS over the three processes, suggesting a common neural basis for social 
cognition. To determine whether the regions of the MNS are also sensitive to the 
different valences in facial configurations, I implemented an fMRI adaptation design 
(de la Rosa et al., 2016; Winston et al., 2004) for study 2. The results indicate that 
regions associated with the MNS indeed differentiate between emotional valences. In 
real life, facial configurations are often ambiguous. The purpose of study 3 was to 
investigate which additional neurobiological mechanisms are involved in the 
processing of ambiguous facial configurations. Here, the focus was on the role of the 
Nacc, which is associated with directing salience (Berridge, 2006; Esslinger et al., 
2013; Kapur et al., 2005), and the experience of reward (Knutson, Adams, Fong, & 
Hommer, 2001; Kringelbach & Berridge, 2010). Based on these results, we conclude 
that salience is a determining factor when deciding on the emotional content of a facial 
configuration.  
The discussion section in publications is often limited due to restrictions on word 
count, so I will summarize and discuss the results of studies 1 – 3 adding further 
implications and conclusions in the following sections (5.1 to 5.3). In addition, I will 
integrate the results of my studies in two models, depicting the relationships between 
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social-cognitive processes and associated brain regions (5.4), discuss the implications 
for future research (5.5) and present final conclusions (5.6). 
5.1 Shared voxels in MNS regions are involved in different social-cognitive 
processes 
Extending on the results from previous studies, Gazzola and Keysers (2009) 
showed that the observation and execution of hand movements was related not only 
to activation in the same brain regions over all participants, but even within voxels and 
within participants. These sVx for hand actions were located in diverse regions, 
including ventral premotor (BA6/BA44), inferior parietal, middle temporal and 
somatosensory cortex.  
I performed such a sVx analysis using facial stimuli intended to express anger 
or fear, which were presented in tasks requiring participants to perform imitation, 
affective empathy or theory of mind. So while the stimuli were the same for all 
conditions, the instructions and therefore the mental processes of the participants 
differed and led to differences in brain activation. While there are distinct activation 
patterns for each condition, there are also overlaps with sVx in several regions. In the 
next subsection, I will focus on the main findings of study 1, which concern the common 
neural basis of social cognition. Afterwards, I will discuss the additional findings from 
these tasks, which provide interesting insights, and build a foundation for future studies 
on the role of the MNS for social cognition. 
5.1.1 A common neural basis of imitation, affective empathy and theory of mind 
As my goal was to identify a common neural basis to social cognition, I 
considered it important to cover a wide spectrum of social-cognitive processes. While 
the tasks included even more processes, for the sVx and conjunction analyses I 
decided to select a mixture of processes of different levels of complexity. Specifically, 
these were imitation, affective empathy and ToM. Imitation, which can be considered 
a signature condition of MNS research (Molenberghs, Cunnington, & Mattingley, 
2009), is thought to build the basis for other social-cognitive processes (Andrew N 
Meltzoff, 2002; Santiesteban, White, et al., 2012), and I expected MNS activation, 
because participants were simultaneously observing an emotional face and bringing 
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their own face into the same configuration. Affective empathy requires a shared 
affective state of observer and observed person (Decety & Jackson, 2006), and is 
therefore a hot emotional process (Abu-Akel & Shamay-Tsoory, 2011). Evidence 
indicates that affective empathy leads to even stronger MNS activation than cognitive 
empathy (Nummenmaa, Hirvonen, Parkkola, & Hietanen, 2008). ToM is considered a 
high-level social-cognitive skill (Santiesteban, White, et al., 2012) and can also be 
considered an affective process in our paradigm (Mier, Lis, et al., 2010). One important 
distinction between the empathy and ToM paradigms of study 1 is that to empathy, felt 
emotions are central, while to ToM, perspective taking is more crucial. 
In line with Gazzola and Keysers (2009) for the execution and observation of 
actions, all three social-cognitive processes compared to a non-social control have a 
significant number of sVx in BA44 and IPL, which are commonly considered key 
regions of the MNS (Cattaneo & Rizzolatti, 2009; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; Van 
Overwalle & Baetens, 2009). This supports the assumption that the MNS builds a basis 
for social cognition. Furthermore, the data revealed increased bilateral activation also 
in all other ROIs, namely amygdala, FG and STS. Amygdala and FG are thought to 
belong to the emotional face processing network (Haxby & Gobbini, 2011; Haxby et 
al., 2000), and the STS is assumed to be a crucial region of the mentalizing network 
(Carrington & Bailey, 2009; U. Frith & Frith, 2003), and also of the emotional face 
processing network (Haxby & Gobbini, 2011). In addition, amygdala, fusiform gyrus 
and STS are part of the fast and automatic x-system, proposed by Satpute and 
Lieberman (2006). 
To confirm the findings of a shared neural basis using standard fMRI analysis 
methods, I performed a conjunction analysis, which is in agreement with the findings 
from the sVx analyses and further shows activation in regions adjacent to the ROIs, 
such as inferior occipital gyrus, which is also involved in face processing (Haxby & 
Gobbini, 2011; Pitcher, Walsh, & Duchaine, 2011). Interestingly, the occipital lobe is 
not considered in the model of the x- and c-system. Due to its role in face processing, 
I assume, that the inferior occipital gyrus would be part of the automatic x-system, as 
is also the fusiform gyrus. 
The analysis against non-social control stimuli allows valuable insights. Still, it 
is crucial to analyze which of the shared activation goes beyond the processing of facial 
configurations perceived as emotional. Since two of the tasks in study 1 additionally 
contained a facial control, I also performed sVx and conjunction analyses for imitation 
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and ToM in contrast to the respective facial control condition. Again, for all ROIs, a 
significant number of participants shows a significant number of sVx. Remarkably, 
while the number of participants with sVx in bilateral BA44 and right IPL (in the 
smoothed analysis also left STS) is almost the same as for the three-task analysis, the 
numbers in amygdala and FG (for unsmoothed data also in STS) are considerably 
reduced (see p.73, Table 12). Conjunction analyses are in line with the sVx results and 
confirm increased activation in the area of BA44 and STS.  
These results allow several conclusions regarding both the methodological and 
the neurobiological level. With regard to the method, the results from the sVx analysis 
demonstrate the impact of smoothing of fMRI data. Since not merely the same region, 
but the same voxel needs to be involved in all tasks within participants, smoothing can 
have a strong effect on voxel counts. This becomes obvious when looking at the results 
for IPL and STS, which yield almost twice the number of participants with sVx in the 
smoothed analysis compared to the unsmoothed data. Therefore, I would rather rely 
on the more conservative results of the unsmoothed sVx data as a basis for 
interpretation and would recommend researchers to base sVx analyses on 
unsmoothed data, too. With regard to the neurobiological implications, the reduced 
number of participants with sVx in FG in the comparison of the three-task with the two-
task analysis can be explained by the fact that we controlled for face processing in the 
two-task analysis, and therefore both conditions contained face stimuli and differed 
only in the social-cognitive task applied to the face. The remaining percentage of 
participants with sVx might be explained by the finding that FG is also involved in the 
processing of emotions (Fusar-Poli et al., 2009; Geday et al., 2003), which likely also 
explains the remaining percentage in amygdala (Costafreda et al., 2008; Fitzgerald et 
al., 2006; Fusar-Poli et al., 2009; Habel et al., 2007; Sergerie et al., 2008). Interestingly, 
right IPL seems to be equally important for the two-task analysis as for the three task 
analysis, and left STS seems to contain more sVx than right STS. While I should refrain 
from overinterpreting these results, right IPL has  been suggested to be particularly 
important for the MNS (Chong et al., 2008). Further research indicates a role of the 
right, but not the left IPL for self-other discrimination (Uddin, Molnar-Szakacs, Zaidel, 
& Iacoboni, 2006), an important element of social cognition. Regarding STS, I need to 
mention that the masks were based on the activations of a previous study. In these 
masks, the left STS contained almost twice the number of voxels than the right STS, 
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therefore offering greater opportunity for sVx, so I will not interpret the hemispheric 
differences for this ROI. 
Overall, a larger number of participants having sVx in IPL and BA44 than in 
other ROIs, also when controlling for face processing, indicates that the intention with 
which individuals observe a face, i.e. the intention to imitate or to infer the displayed 
person’s intentions, might be the decisive factor underlying involvement of these two 
regions.  
While several regions involved in social-cognitive processing can be considered 
part of the automatic x-system, there is a need for further studies to disentangle the 
automaticity of single processes, and consequently the role of central regions, such as 
IFG. 
To sum up, in line with previous studies (Carr et al., 2003; Mier, Lis, et al., 2010), 
the different social-cognitive tasks showed common activation in all ROIs which are 
associated with the processing of facial configurations perceived as expressing 
emotions (amygdala, FG), the MNS (BA44, IPL) and mentalizing system (here mostly 
represented by STS). These results were substantiated also with the sVx analysis, 
emphasizing that common activation patterns can not only be observed across but also 
within participants. The results therefore confirm those by Gazzola and Keysers (2009) 
and add to the applicability of the theory of embodied simulation to the social 
information perceived from faces.  
5.1.2 Findings from individual task conditions 
During imitation compared to social and non-social control, whole-brain 
analyses revealed that activation was also increased in BA 6, which includes PMC and 
supplementary motor cortex and lies adjacent to BA44. The activation pattern is line 
with a previous study on facial imitation (K. R. Leslie et al., 2004). Furthermore, a meta-
analysis suggested, that the MNS is not restricted to BA44, but also includes BA6, 
combining them to the PMC region of the MNS (Van Overwalle & Baetens, 2009). 
Challenging the idea of embodied simulation is the lack of activation in the MNS 
during the observation of facial configurations intended to express emotions compared 
to a non-social control task. In theory, the MNS would automatically activate upon 
detection of an emotional facial configuration in order to allow embodied simulation 
and therefore understanding of the other’s mental state (Gallese et al., 2004). 
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However, the MNS key region BA44 shows no increased activation for observation 
compared to control. One possible explanation could be that the observation condition 
might have felt like “doing nothing” compared to the other conditions in the imitation 
task, which all involved moving one’s own face. Therefore, in comparison, the MNS 
might have been less activated. Especially, in the control condition, participants had to 
move their face (saying aloud German letters “A” or “Ä”), thereby naturally involving 
activation in the motor areas of the brain, which are overlapping with the MNS. So even 
if the observation of a face had actually relied upon the MNS, it might just not be visible 
in the applied contrasts due to lack of a suitable control condition for this question. 
Another possible interpretation for this lack of BA44 activation could be that the MNS 
is modulated by motivation and social relevance. As participants simply had to watch 
these pictures of faces, they might not have felt this situation socially relevant and were 
not motivated to infer mental states. This question was addressed in a follow-up study, 
designed to investigate the impact of motivation and intention on activation in the MNS. 
Analyses of this study are ongoing.  
Another interesting finding was that of increased activation in the area of 
supramarginal gyrus, TPJ, and precuneus in distress compared to cognitive and 
affective empathy. Both, TPJ and precuneus are associated with self-referential 
processing and are part of the default-mode-network (Greicius et al., 2003). Indeed, 
the distress condition is the only empathy condition requiring subjects to explicitly shift 
their focus only to themselves, so it is expected that self-referential processing and 
associated brain activation is highest. The TPJ is also known for its role in self-other 
distinction (e.g., Kanske et al., 2015), and is involved in perspective taking (Costa, 
Torriero, Oliveri, & Caltagirone, 2008). Again, this might serve as an explanation for its 
involvement in the distress condition, as participants had to look at the facial 
configuration intended to express negative emotions of another individual while judging 
the strength of their own negative feelings. Dissolving this discrepancy can be 
considered highly demanding and might have strongly relied on the self-other 
distinguishing role of the TPJ. Interestingly, our findings regarding distress are in line 
with the proposal by Satpute and Lieberman (2006), who reviewed that self-focused 
processing was associated with activation in posterior parietal regions, possibly relying 
on symbolic representation to allow self-other distinction, and consequently part of the 
deliberative c-system. 
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Remarkably, and confirming previous results by Mier and colleagues (2010) 
who first developed the ToM paradigm, the results of study 1 revealed a stepwise 
increase of brain activation in STS and IFG from non-social control, over social control, 
emotion perception, to ToM. The fact that both regions differentiate between the 
experimental conditions and also in comparison to the control condition, indicate that 
solving the task might have relied on a combined process of mirroring and mentalizing. 
Possibly, IFG was spontaneously activated by the social-cognitive demands of the 
conditions. As participants had to explicitly decide whether or not the picture matched 
a previously shown sentence, there might have additionally been increased activation 
in STS. STS activation might have been strongest in the ToM condition, because 
participants should indicate the intention of the presented individual, which is likely to 
involve perspective taking. While the higher-order processes associated with ToM and 
STS would suggest a categorization of the STS in the slow c-system, it has previously 
been shown to respond very rapidly within 200ms, and therefore suggested to be part 
of the reflexive x-system (Satpute & Lieberman, 2006). One possible solution to this 
seeming contradiction would be that the STS is involved in both early and late 
processing, with different stages being linked to different social-cognitive mechanisms. 
So, for example, while gaze may be quickly processed in the STS, higher-order 
intention inference might occur at a later stage. 
5.1.3 Implications from study 1 for future research 
Overall, the sVx analysis presents a valuable approach in the context of MNS 
studies and I would recommend future studies with a special focus on common 
activations in the MNS basing their conclusions on comparably accurate methods. The 
tasks that were applied are thought to require different levels of social cognition, going 
from low-level imitation, thought to rely mainly on the MNS (Molenberghs et al., 2009), 
to high-level ToM, which is associated with the mentalizing system (U. Frith & Frith, 
2003; Santiesteban, White, et al., 2012). Importantly, the study results indicate that 
different social-cognitive processes going beyond the mere processing of faces indeed 
rely on the same or at least closely neighboring neuronal populations. In addition, there 
are condition-specific differentiations between the activation of diverse empathic 
processes, observation of neutral faces, emotion perception and ToM. While most or 
all of the ROIs show increased activation in all conditions, the exact extent of the 
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activated area differs between conditions, and these differences in neighboring areas 
seem to represent important differentiations between the specific processes. 
In a follow-up study, it might be interesting to be able to compare all social-
cognitive conditions with each other to gain even more insights with regard to activation 
differences between processes. One study that comes close to this idea included 
emotion perception and ToM (Mier, Lis, et al., 2010), and already provided valuable 
insights into the relationship between these two processes. For example, and in line 
with the findings for a modification of the task that was used in study 1, reaction times 
were longer, and activation in regions including STS, IFG reaching into the insula, 
somatosensory cortex, amygdala and right middle frontal gyrus was stronger in ToM 
compared to emotion perception. Another study investigated empathy and ToM using 
a promising novel task design, called EmpaTom (Kanske et al., 2015) which uses video 
sequences of persons narrating emotional autobiographic events, the contents of 
which can be evaluated with regard to empathy or ToM elements. However, as 
mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, there exists a wide variety of definitions, 
tasks, and stimuli used for social-cognitive tasks, in particular empathy and ToM. So, 
future studies could for example aim to investigate an adaptation of the EmpaTom task, 
including even more social-cognitive concepts, such as the differentiation of affective 
and cognitive empathy, in addition to ToM. While study 1 included all these social 
cognitive processes, the design did not allow direct comparisons between some 
processes within one task, for example between empathy and ToM. In a future 
adaptation of the study, one might consider adopting a design which would additionally 
allow, for example, contrasting imitation with ToM, and thereby substantiating the 
assumed differences with regard to their social-cognitive complexity, or allowing the 
comparison of the empathy conditions with neutral faces or with ToM. Such as design 
could use sessions for the different tasks, including null events to statistically control 
for differences in session means. Obviously, each paradigm provides advantages, as 
does each type of stimulus. So possibly, to achieve a true understanding of social 
cognition, indeed a multitude of high quality studies, as the ones by Mier and 
colleagues (2010), Kanske and colleagues (2015) and study 1 of my PhD thesis 
(Schmidt et al, submitted) may be required, with the results complementing each other. 
In order to better investigate the differences between the tasks and conditions, 
MVPA would also be a promising approach that I therefore plan to implement on the 
current data, as well as in future studies. MVPA has been famously applied in memory 
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research, where neural network classifiers were able to determine whether participants 
looked at pictures of faces, objects or locations, based on their fMRI activation 
(Norman, Polyn, Detre, & Haxby, 2006). With regard to social cognition, one study 
using MVPA showed that different emotion categories show individual multivoxel 
activation patterns in medial PFC and STS, regardless of expressing modality (face, 
body, voice) (Peelen, Atkinson, & Vuilleumier, 2010). MVPA could help specify 
distinctive activation patterns between social-cognitive processes, thereby furthering 
the understanding of mechanisms of social cognition. In addition, a major field of 
application would be in research on patient groups with social-cognitive deficits. It 
might be imaginable, that MVPA not only allows predicting whether an activation was 
recorded during cognitive or affective empathy, but also whether the individual had 
schizophrenia or another mental disorder. 
One limitation that is common to imaging studies is that they allow no conclusions 
on whether activated regions are causal to the functioning of processes. In the 
introduction, I included results from lesion studies, which allow better understanding of 
the importance of lesioned regions. For example, while lesions in the IFG were 
associated with deficits in affective empathy, lesions in vmPFC were observed with 
impaired cognitive empathy (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2009). Since patients with lesions 
are rare and researchers have no influence on the lesion, simulated lesions using 
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) or transcranial direct-current stimulation 
(tDCS), which can transiently enhance or inhibit specific cortical regions, provide an 
elegant solution. For example, tDCS was used to confirm a role of the TPJ in self-other 
processing (Santiesteban, Banissy, Catmur, & Bird, 2012). And indeed, in the project 
around study 1, I also used inhibitory TMS over right IFG to determine its suggested 
role as a key region of the MNS for social cognition (Schmidt*, Popova* et al., in 
preparation).  
To add to the existing literature, future studies could investigate the modulating 
effects of several individual factors. For example, in a sample with a greater age range, 
or even in a longitudinal study, researchers could investigate whether the common 
neural basis is stable over life time, or how activation patterns of individual tasks 
change. It would be particularly interesting to assess children and determine the age 
at which this common neural basis of social cognition is developed. While imitation can 
be observed in infants already a few days after their birth (Field, Woodson, Greenberg, 
& Cohen, 1982; A. N. Meltzoff & Moore, 1977), ToM ability is known to develop during 
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childhood (U. Frith & Frith, 2003). In general, one could assume that our social-
cognitive skills are enhanced throughout our whole lives or dependent on the 
frequency and intensity of our social interactions. Indeed, it has been suggested that 
one reason for poor social functioning in individuals with autism might also be social 
isolation and therefore less exposure to learning opportunities regarding social 
cognition (Chevallier, Kohls, Troiani, Brodkin, & Schultz, 2012). To account for these 
individual factors in my study, participants completed a comprehensive set of 
questionnaires, including social network index, autism quotient, and schizotypy 
personality questionnaire. For example, analyses of this data revealed that activation 
of posterior STS to neutral faces in our healthy participant sample was related to 
aspects of schizotypy and also to a genetic variant associated with schizophrenia, 
indicating an important role of posterior STS functioning for clinical considerations (Yan 
& Schmidt et al., submitted). Future analyses of this dataset will also include 
hypotheses regarding these connections. However, they are limited to a cross-
sectional approach. As another example, gender and sexual orientation have been 
proposed to influence empathy ratings and brain activation (Perry, Walder, Hendler, & 
Shamay-Tsoory, 2013), and might therefore influence the results. It might therefore be 
valuable to control for these variables. Several other factors have also been proposed 
to influence empathy. Genetic variations explain over one third of variance, and are 
further modulated by environmental factors (Knafo et al., 2009; Knafo, Zahn-Waxler, 
Van Hulle, Robinson, & Rhee, 2008). In addition, in humans as well as in other animals, 
empathy is enhanced by familiarity, similarity, past experience, learning and salience 
(Preston & de Waal, 2002). The role of familiarity becomes especially obvious when 
considering different cultures, which was the subject of another study, I was involved 
in that revealed differences in social-cognitive processing between Chinese and 
German participants (Yan, Schmidt, et al., submitted). 
Furthermore, all tasks in study 1 used anger and fear as emotions. On the one 
hand, it would be interesting to further differentiate the activation patterns for the 
emotions separately, on the other hand, it would be interesting to include different 
valences, and also investigate whether our findings could be replicated using positive 
instead of negative emotions. 
As a first step to answer the question whether activation in the MNS 
distinguishes emotions, I conducted study 2, which I will summarize and discuss in the 
next section. 
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5.2 The MNS distinguishes emotional valence 
In study 2, sequential pairs of facial configurations were presented in an fMRI 
adaptation paradigm to investigate whether the MNS can distinguish between 
emotional valences of facial configurations intended to express happiness and fear. 
Some scientists even consider fMRI adaptation or repetition suppression as the gold 
standard of MNS investigations (Fuelscher et al., 2019).  
Before discussing the results of the MNS regions, it is important to mention that 
whole-brain analyses of the data show increased activation in FG when the valence 
within a facial pair changed, in comparison to when the same emotion was repeated. 
Also previous publications have suggested that emotional valence may modulate 
activation in the fusiform area (Geday et al., 2003). While in study 2, FG always showed 
higher activation when the emotion of the stimulus changed, it did not seem to be 
sensitive to the emotional direction. Possibly, this general response to a changing and 
therefore novel stimulus might be explained by attention; this explanation is supported 
by the results from a previous study, suggesting attention as a modulator of FG 
functioning (Vuilleumier, Armony, Driver, & Dolan, 2001).  
ROI-analyses revealed increased activation for incongruent versus congruent 
valences in bilateral FG, in regions of the MNS; i.e. bilateral BA44, left IPL, and 
additional areas previously identified for the processing of facial configurations 
perceived as expressing emotions; i.e. bilateral insula, and right amygdala. Both, 
amygdala and insula are well known for their roles in emotion processing (Heinzel et 
al., 2005; Sergerie et al., 2008; Viinikainen et al., 2010). Most importantly, the results 
of study 2 provide first evidence that the MNS, represented by BA44 and IPL, is also 
involved in the discrimination of emotional valences. This indicates, that the MNS might 
not only represent the basis for a shared representation, but might indeed help humans 
understand this representation and therefore the emotion of the observed person. 
Additionally, a negative valence following a positive one was related to stronger 
activation in right BA44, STS and insula than a switch from negative to positive 
valence. At first glance it seems unexpected that neither amygdala nor FG are part of 
the brain regions that show a stronger response for this contrast. First, the amygdala 
is particularly known for its involvement in the processing of fearful stimuli (Adolphs, 
2008; Costafreda et al., 2008; Öhman, 2005). Second, FG maintains connections to 
amygdala (Frank, Costa, Averbeck, & Sabatinelli, 2019; Herrington, Taylor, Grupe, 
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Curby, & Schultz, 2011), and has been shown to have greater activation for fearful 
stimuli than for neutral ones (Vuilleumier et al., 2001). The discrepancy between these 
and my results however could be explained by the fact that study 2 did not contrast 
fearful and neutral but fearful and smiling facial configurations, and these regions 
respond more strongly to emotional stimuli than neutral ones.  
The stronger effect for fear than for happiness in BA44 reaching into insula could 
be explained by greater salience. So possibly, salience is the driving factor not only for 
the Nacc, which also showed an increased response for fear than happiness in study 
3, but also for the MNS. A possible connection between both phenomena could be the 
neurotransmitter dopamine. Nacc is a key region of the dopaminergic system (Salgado 
& Kaplitt, 2015), and dopamine plays an important role for motor functions (Ayano, 
2016). Motor areas of the brain, in turn, build the core of the MNS (Cattaneo & 
Rizzolatti, 2009; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). In addition, studies confirm that striatal 
dopamine is involved in the processing of emotions (Badgaiyan, 2010). As studies 1 
and 2 were part of projects which entailed genetic analyses of all participants, a future 
publication will be devoted to the effects of genetic variations regarding the 
dopaminergic system and their influence on the MNS.  
The possible importance of dopamine for the MNS also becomes obvious when 
considering its role for motivation and reward-seeking behavior (Ayano, 2016; 
Bromberg-Martin, Matsumoto, & Hikosaka, 2010; Hamid et al., 2016), together with the 
modulating effect of motivation on the MNS. For example, one study found that the 
motivation to eat was associated with increased activation to eating related stimuli in 
regions of the MNS and mentalizing system, namely IFG, STS and superior parietal 
cortex (Cheng et al., 2006). Lacking motivation in participants might also explain why 
the results of study 1 show no increased MNS activation for the observation of faces, 
but only for more engaging experimental conditions. To determine the role of 
motivation for MNS activation during the processing of emotional faces, I implemented 
a novel reward paradigm, which allows identification of the role of monetary motivation 
and social intention. This paradigm was part of study 2 using fMRI, and additionally 
presented to an independent sample of 80 participants using EEG. The analyses are 
still ongoing and will be part of a future publication. 
To summarize, the results of this fMRI adaptation paradigm on emotional 
valences confirm that the MNS distinguishes positive and negative valence, thereby 
providing further evidence for the assumption of embodied simulation as a mechanism 
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to understand the emotions of our interaction partner. In addition, and in agreement 
with the proposed role of dopamine for MNS functioning, as well as with studies 
showing an influence of motivation on MNS activation, the results of study 2 suggest 
salience as modulating factor of MNS activation. 
5.2.1 Implications from study 2 for future research 
Study 2 was restricted to the observation of only two emotions, because even 
with this simplicity, the task took about 10 minutes to complete and was tiresome for 
participants due to the cognitively unchallenging nature of the task. Adding only one 
more emotion to the task and adding stimulus pairs for this emotion with fear and 
happiness, would have increased the number of conditions and consequently 
experiment time to at least 20 minutes. Future studies should investigate whether MNS 
regions are sensitive not only to the valence of a facial stimulus, but also to the specific 
emotion. For example, stimuli could include facial configurations intended to express 
anger, fear or sadness. Based on the theory of embodied simulation and the results of 
study 2, I would expect that the MNS can indeed distinguish all so called basic 
emotions, and possibly even many more common facial configurations, such as those 
associated with contempt, guilt or embarrassment, that have been proposed in more 
recent accounts of emotion classification, including a publication by Ekman (P. Ekman 
& Cordaro, 2011) who had previously put forward the concept of the six basic emotions. 
In addition, the task in study 2 was not designed to identify MNS regions involved 
in perceiving and expressing emotion. Instead, my analysis was based on known MNS 
regions and required participants to simply observe the pictures, so emotion perception 
occurred implicitly, if at all; since participants neither explicitly performed facial 
movements themselves nor were asked to focus on their emotions, I can draw no 
conclusions on this side of the mirroring process. However, several studies (Enticott et 
al., 2008; Mier, Lis, et al., 2010; Schulte-Rüther et al., 2007; van der Gaag et al., 2007), 
including study 1 have established activation in the core MNS regions, also for facial 
stimuli. In addition, the project around study 2 contained another paradigm which 
included both observation and imitation in an fMRI adaptation design. If MNS response 
is suppressed even though the modality changes, i.e. from observation to imitation or 
vice versa (crossmodal), this supports the assumption of the mirror mechanism. The 
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results of that study will be subject of a future publication, because analyses are still 
ongoing. 
Importantly, and in line with the recommendations of a very recent publication 
(Fuelscher et al., 2019), I am planning on implementing MVPA also for our crossmodal 
fMRI adaptation paradigm in addition to our regular analysis, as it has been suggested 
to be more sensitive to MNS activity. Applying MVPA to a motor-execution/-
observation fMRI adaptation paradigm, Fuelscher and colleagues (2019) identified 
voxels in the area of anterior intraparietal sulcus which satisfied all criteria for mirror 
neuron involvement. Specifically, these criteria included increased activation during 
both observation (O) and execution (E), and both within and across modalities (O-O, 
E-E, O-E, E-O) characteristic patterns are shared for the repetition of the same 
stimulus (adaptation condition), but not when different stimuli were used (control 
condition). However, their study, as many studies in the field, had small sample size of 
only 12 participants, and MVPA results were significant, but only moderately above 
chance level, and not surviving correction for multiple testing, so their conclusions need 
to be confirmed in larger studies, as could be accomplished by the data set which 
includes the same participants as study 2. 
Finally, while single-cell recordings are undoubtedly the most accurate method 
and the only way to measure MN, research can also benefit from exploiting existing 
methods. Other than applying specific analysis methods, as I did in studies 1 and 2, 
one can also combine different measurement techniques. For example, simultaneous 
EEG-fMRI combines good temporal with good spatial resolution and has provided 
interesting insights in other domains. For example, low-frequency EEG oscillations in 
the theta and alpha band, associated with recollection, are correlated with the 
connectivity of hippocampus with PFC and striatum, which are related to retrieval 
success, so the authors concluded that the EEG-recorded oscillations may represent 
a binding mechanism for these brain regions (Herweg et al., 2016). Remarkably, to 
date I know of no studies that used simultaneous EEG-fMRI to investigate the mirror 
neuron system or social cognition, besides our own (Schmidt et al., in preparation). 
However, during the preparation of the manuscript, challenges with data preprocessing 
occurred which I am currently aiming to solve, including replicating the results with an 
independent sample of 30 participants that had an EEG-measurement without 
simultaneous fMRI. 
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For some questions, more advanced methods help find the answers. For other 
questions, the paradigm alone seems sufficient to provide new insights. Study 3, 
discussed in the following section sheds light on the brain processes involved in 
perceiving an emotion based on ambiguous facial configurations. 
5.3 Nucleus accumbens helps resolve ambiguous facial configurations 
The assumption that emotion perception is a social-cognitive skill which is 
accomplished via embodied simulation with the automatic response of the MNS 
(Gallese, 2007a, 2007b; Gallese & Goldman, 1998; Gallese et al., 2004) is central to 
my PhD thesis. However, as the MNS preferentially processes familiar movements 
(Calvo-Merino, Glaser, Grèzes, Passingham, & Haggard, 2005; Calvo-Merino, Grèzes, 
Glaser, Passingham, & Haggard, 2006), one might expect that the same is true for 
facial configurations. Consequently, ambiguous facial configurations that involve more 
than one emotion and thus might be less familiar could rely on more than automatic 
MNS processing. In real life situations, one might take the context into account, which 
has been shown to strongly influence the evaluation of facial configurations (Carroll & 
Russell, 1996). However, also without additional information, one should be able to 
resolve the conflict of ambiguous facial features.  
One interesting approach to investigate how ambiguous facial features are 
processed and how a decision on one emotion is achieved, is adopted from research 
on decision making in schizophrenia, a mental disorder associated with abnormal 
dopaminergic signaling (Howes & Kapur, 2009) and difficulties in social interaction 
(Kohler et al., 2010; Mier & Kirsch, 2016). Previous non-social tasks had shown 
increased activation in DLPFC and parietal regions during probabilistic decision 
making, as required when deciding to which of two lakes with fixed color ratios a 
sequence of colored fish belongs (Rausch et al., 2014). While in healthy individuals, 
the final decision was associated with increased activation in VTA and Nacc, activation 
was comparably lower in patients with schizophrenia (Rausch et al., 2014). The Nacc 
is a key region of the dopaminergic system, involved in salience, reward and motivation 
(Kringelbach & Berridge, 2010; Sabatinelli et al., 2007; Salgado & Kaplitt, 2015). 
Interestingly, salience, not reward, seemed to be responsible for increased Nacc 
activation during decision making (Esslinger et al., 2012).  
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Study 3 replicated these findings using ambiguous emotional faces. Series of 
faces were presented, in which the first face was perceived as showing equal 
percentages of fear and happiness. The subsequent faces were less ambiguous. 
Participants had to decide for each stimulus, whether the currently dominant emotion 
was fear or happiness; as soon as they were certain, they should make a decision on 
the emotion dominant in the current series of pictures. In line with the fish-in-the-lake 
studies (Rausch et al., 2014), study 3 revealed increased activation in parietal and 
frontal lobe during the probabilistic reasoning process. During the final decision, 
activation was increased in putamen reaching into Nacc, as well as in ACC. In the 
following, I will first discuss the impact of the different frontal and parietal regions, 
afterwards the results regarding the Nacc. 
Interestingly, in addition to DLPFC, which is central to probabilistic reasoning 
(Esslinger et al., 2012), another frontal region that showed increased activation during 
the probabilistic processing of facial configurations intended to express fear, was the 
MNS key region BA44 and its neighbor BA6 which has also been proposed to be an 
MNS region (Van Overwalle & Baetens, 2009). Increased BA44 activation for fearful 
but not for happy blocks is in line with the results from study 2, in which BA44 also 
responded with increased activity to facial configurations intended to express fear 
compared rather than happiness. Maybe for both studies this result is due to increased 
salience for fear than happiness. As expected, the MNS is supported by 
parietal/occipital areas during the processing of ambiguous faces. One of these areas 
was the somatosensory association cortex (BA7), which also showed increased 
activation in a previous study in which participants had to decide which of two 
schematic faces expressed greater sadness (Viviani, Dommes, Bosch, Stingl, & 
Beschoner, 2018). In the light of studies on pain, that also find an involvement of the 
somatosensory association cortex, Viviani and colleagues (2018) suggest that this 
area was active, because participants did not actually share an inner experience with 
the individuals they were looking at, but basing their decisions mainly on the visual 
features of the presented faces. Likewise, in study 3, participants may not have been 
sufficiently able to share the emotional experience of the depicted face, because it was 
a morphed face with emotional ambiguity. Consequently, participants might have also 
tried to identify the dominant emotion by analyzing the visual features.  
The ACC, showing increased activation for final decisions, has previously been 
shown to be involved in emotional conflict resolution (A. Etkin, T. Egner, D. M. Peraza, 
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E. R. Kandel, & J. Hirsch, 2006), decision making (Kennerley et al., 2006) and reward 
processing (P. Kirsch et al., 2003), which might well explain its involvement in the final 
decisions of our emotional JTC task.  
While the fish-in-the-lake studies had shown that the final decision was 
associated with activation in the ventral striatum, of which Nacc is a major part, the 
whole-brain results of study 3 additionally suggest an involvement of the putamen, 
which lies next to the Nacc in the dorsal striatum, and is also involved in dopaminergic 
signaling, and in reward and decision making (Balleine, Delgado, & Hikosaka, 2007). 
Importantly, Nacc activation during final decisions was even stronger for fear than 
for happiness. As facial configurations intended to express fear can be considered 
salient, but not as rewarding (Elsherif, Sahan, & Rotshtein, 2017; Zheng et al., 2017) 
as happy faces (Spreckelmeyer et al., 2009), increased Nacc activation during fearful 
faces could indicate that salience was the decisive factor. Interestingly also, this effect 
of increased Nacc activation was enhanced in participants who had a greater tendency 
to a JTC bias, i.e. considering less evidence before making the final decision. Altered 
activation of the ventral striatum had also been reported in patients with schizophrenia 
(Rausch et al., 2014), who are known to exhibit a JTC bias, especially when they have 
delusions (Moritz & Woodward, 2005). Possibly, also our healthy participants who 
showed a JTC bias, perceived increased salience of these stimuli due to altered 
dopaminergic signaling, as would be expected in patients with schizophrenia or 
psychosis (Esslinger et al., 2012; Kapur et al., 2005). 
With regard to the two-pathway models, the results indicate an involvement of 
the MNS during the processing of the ambiguous faces during probabilistic reasoning. 
Supporting the assumption that the MNS alone cannot solve the ambiguous face task, 
DLPFC, as well as parietal areas, which are considered part of the slow c-system 
(Satpute & Lieberman, 2006), also showed increased activation. During the final 
decision, Nacc reaching into putamen and dorsal ACC showed enhanced activation, 
all of which are part of the x-system (Satpute & Lieberman, 2006). So, while the 
probabilistic reasoning is supported by brain regions generally associated with slow 
and deliberate processing, the final decision relies on regions that support fast and 
automatic processes. This involvement of fast and automatic processes during the final 
decision might also explain how aberrant salience can reduce the amount of evidence 
considered and therefore fosters a JTC bias. 
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5.3.1 Limitations and future implications of study 3 
Study 3 provides a basis for the research on decision making on ambiguous 
emotions. However, the study could be adapted in several ways to further deepen the 
understanding of decision making and emotion processing. On the one hand, one 
could adapt the paradigm, on the other hand, one could include a different participant 
sample. Study 3 only included healthy participants and looked at specific schizophrenia 
traits. The logical next step regarding the sample is to apply the paradigm to patients 
with schizophrenia in comparison to a healthy control group, which we are currently 
doing. With regard to the paradigm, it would be interesting to confirm the findings with 
other emotions. For example, one could use happy-angry morphs, to see whether the 
salience theory also holds true for angry faces, which would be expected since facial 
configurations intended to express anger are an indicator of threat. Further, one could 
investigate more deeply the role of flexibility and stability of reasoning with respect to 
the decision on the emotions. In particular, it would be interesting to determine the 
factors associated with sticking to one’s initial assumption despite evidence supporting 
the contrary, versus quickly changing one’s rule, based on comparatively little 
evidence. While the latter seems closely associated with the JTC bias linked to 
dopaminergic signaling, the former might either just lie on the opposite end of the 
spectrum, and therefore also be explained by dopamine, but it could also involve a 
completely different factor, such as education (C. E. Evans, Kemish, & Turnbull, 2004), 
or testosterone level (K. L. Evans & Hampson, 2014). In addition, in samples clearly 
associated with dopamine dysfunctioning, which besides schizophrenia might include 
Parkinson’s disease, one could also investigate the effect of medication status. In this 
regard, it is important to mention that schizophrenia medication does not seem to 
alleviate the problems in social cognition (Kucharska-Pietura & Mortimer, 2013), which 
indicates that it remains essential to investigate the core mechanisms of social 
cognition especially with regard to neurochemistry. 
Another clear next step to advance the understanding of the neural mechanisms 
underlying (disturbed) social decision-making is to complement the fMRI activation 
analyses with functional connectivity analyses, which I am implementing for our current 
study with the schizophrenia sample. Altered functional connectivity has already been 
linked to the social-cognitive characteristics of individuals with autism (Supekar et al., 
2013) and also schizophrenia (Mukherjee et al., 2014) which is a disorder closely linked 
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to disconnection (Friston & Frith, 1995). Based on the findings from this study, we 
expect altered connectivity of the Nacc in the schizophrenia group. 
In sum, all three studies provide further insights into the neural correlates of 
social-cognitive processes. While different neural processes share a common neural 
basis, there is, as one could expect, also individual task activation. Importantly, while 
regions of the MNS seem to be central to social-cognitive processing, they are not the 
only regions showing increased activation and might not be sufficient for all tasks. In 
the next sections, I will integrate the different findings of my PhD work into models of 
social cognition. 
5.4 Models of social cognition 
To illustrate the findings of my PhD work, I created model 1, combining the 
findings of studies 2 and 3 with regard to the processing of fearful and smiling faces. 
Model 2, being a generalization of model 1 integrates different social-cognitive 
processes that can be active when interacting with others, including affective 
processes such as empathy and ToM. 
5.4.1 Model 1: Neural correlates of the perception of fearful and smiling faces 
One core assumption of this thesis is that the MNS provides a fundamental 
mechanism underlying social cognition. Therefore, it is essential to understand how 
exactly the MNS is involved in social-cognitive processes. While study 2 was 
concerned with the MNS’ role in valence discrimination, study 3 focused on ambiguous 
faces, which were expected to comprise additional regions besides the MNS. In model 
1, I aimed at combining these findings, taking the theory of embodied simulation as a 
theoretical foundation.  
When looking at facial configurations intended to express emotions, fusiform 
gyrus, amygdala and MNS regions show increased activation and allow the 
understanding of the basic facial features and the underlying emotion. Thanks to the 
shared representation in the MNS, one knows whether the other feels happiness or 
fear. In case of ambiguous emotions, Nacc is involved in the final decision, as fearful 
faces evoke stronger activation possibly due to their increased salience. Facial 
configurations perceived as expressing happiness are experienced as rewarding and 
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also activate amygdala and Nacc, but possibly to a lesser degree than fear. The 
fusiform gyrus is not only involved in the basic perception of faces, but also quickly 
identifies changes in emotional valence, i.e. when someone looks at a smiling face 
following a fearful one, and vice versa. In this latter case, when a facial configuration 
perceived as being fearful follows a smiling one, activation is increased in STS and 
IFG reaching into insula, i.e. MNS and mentalizing system. Again, this could be 
explained by the increased salience of the fearful stimuli. As discussed in section 5.2., 
one could assume that the dopamine associated with Nacc function also modulates 
the MNS. The connection of dopamine and the MNS is evident, because the MNS is 
typically spatially overlapping with motor areas, involved in movements, and dopamine 
is a key neurotransmitter for motor control (for a more detailed explanation, please 
refer to section 5.2). 
 
 
Model 1. Brain regions involved in the perception of fear and happiness in facial 
configurations. Amy = Amygdala, FG = Fusiform Gyrus, IFG = Inferior Frontal Gyrus, 
Nacc = Nucleus accumbens, STS = Superior Temporal Sulcus. 
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5.4.2 Model 2: Processing and reacting to an emotional face 
While model 1 focusses on specific emotions, model 2 depicts a more general 
level, integrating different social-cognitive skills with different processing demands and 
associated brain regions. Since this model is mainly based on the paradigms of studies 
1 to 3, all being centered around facial stimuli, face perception is at the core of the 
model and builds the basis for all further processes. While automatic processes are 
prevalent, there are also cognitive ones which may involve deliberate reasoning. In 
addition, with increasing complexity of the processes, processing time also increases. 
It is important to discuss the relevance of x- and c-system (Satpute & Lieberman, 
2006) to my thesis. The ROIs of studies 1 to 3 were chosen based on previous research 
on social cognition and included regions of the MNS, mentalizing system and 
processing of facial configurations perceived as being emotional. Many of these ROIs 
are also associated with the x-system, explaining the prominence of the x-system in 
my discussion. However, one should not conclude that these social-cognitive skills do 
not include regions of the c-system, because we did not explicitly test for it. With regard 
to the ROIs, the results of my PhD thesis indicate that the fast x-system comprises 
many regions identified as a common neural basis of social cognition, including 
amygdala and STS. Additionally, fusiform gyrus is part of the temporal lobe, which is 
also associated with the fast x-system. Also the ambiguous faces in study 3 activated 
regions associated with the x-system, such as Nacc and putamen during decisions on 
the general emotion. As expected, DLPFC and parietal regions, considered part of the 
slow and deliberate c-system, are involved in probabilistic reasoning during the 
processing ambiguous facial configurations. The whole brain analyses additionally 
reveal increased activation in regions that are not included in the ROIs, which can 
inform future studies, including possible studies aiming to distinguish automatic versus 
controlled processes in social cognition. For example, also medial temporal gyrus and 
medial frontal gyrus, both considered part of the c-system, show increased activation 
during neutral face processing, emotion perception and cognitive empathy.  
To truly confirm their categorization into c- and x-system, Satpute and 
Lieberman (2006) recommend researchers to design dual tasks that require parallel 
processing of social-cognitive skills for which automaticity is to be investigated and 
specific cognitive tasks for which the associated brain functioning is well-established. 
Consequently, future studies should follow their suggestions to confirm the 
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automaticity of the MNS and associated regions, so they could be included in an 
updated model of the x- and c-system, deepening our understanding of the neural 
mechanism of social cognition. 
 
 
Model 2. Social cognitive processes and associated brain regions. Brain regions are 
colored with respect to their categorization into x-system, c-system or MNS. Note: The 
STS is part of both x-system and mentalizing system. Amy = Amygdala, DLPFC = 
Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex, FG = Fusiform Gyrus, IFG = Inferior Frontal Gyrus, IPL 
= Inferior Parietal Lobe, Nacc = Nucleus accumbens. 
5.5 Limitations and implications for future research 
In my studies, brain activation was measured while participants performed the 
tasks, most of which also required button presses. While one can infer from button 
presses and brain activation that participants followed the instructions, additionally 
applying eye-tracking or recording facial movements would be of advantage. I let the 
participants practice the tasks until they felt familiar with them, and I attended this 
practice to make sure they solved the tasks correctly. Still, it would be useful to confirm 
that they focused their attention and behaved as intended by the study design. 
Especially in study 1, when participants were told to imitate faces, it would be good to 
have the recorded proof that they really did. When asked, participants reported to have 
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followed the instruction and imitated the presented faces. In addition, the movement 
artefacts support this at least for part of the subjects. Also with regard to 
methodological aspects, study 1 provided these valuable insights, so in study 2 I 
additionally used a face cam to monitor and record participants’ faces during the tasks. 
Besides ensuring their compliance with tasks such as the imitation task, it also helps 
ensuring their wakefulness in paradigms that do not require button presses.  
As briefly mentioned above, studies 1 and 2 included genetic analyses, which will 
help us gain more insights on the influence of genetic predispositions, e.g. variations 
in genes regulating the dopaminergic pathway, on social cognition. Dopamine has 
received comparably little attention in the field of social cognition research, but as 
mentioned above, especially with regard to the assumed role of the MNS for social 
cognition, dopamine appears as a fruitful candidate neurotransmitter. Dopamine is also 
related to mental disorders, which are associated with abnormal social functioning. 
Finally, dopamine is related to mechanisms which might modulate social-cognitive 
processes, such as direction of attention, salience or motivation, as also suggested by 
the results of study 2 and 3. One example of a well-studied common genetic variant 
with respect to the dopamine system is the single-nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) 
rs4680 (Meyer-Lindenberg et al., 2006). It affects the COMT gene which codes for the 
enzyme that breaks down prefrontal dopamine. Studies point to differences in 
prefrontal fMRI-BOLD related to this SNP (Mier, Kirsch, & Meyer-Lindenberg, 2010). A 
multitude of further findings exists regarding rs4680, including increased risk for 
schizophrenia (Egan et al., 2001; Shifman et al., 2002). Interestingly, COMT genotype 
in schizophrenia seems also related to differences in distress and empathy (Poletti et 
al., 2013). The imaging genetics results of my studies, including an elaborate 
discussion of the value and explanatory power of these analyses will be subject of a 
future publication (Schmidt et al., in preparation). 
As stressed as a challenge in this thesis, there are limits to the investigation of 
MN using indirect methods, and the conclusions we can draw from them. Having 
adopted several approaches to nevertheless measure mirror neuron populations as 
accurately as currently possible using non-invasive techniques, I want to mention one 
very important and rising research area which can add substantially to the 
understanding of neural mechanisms, including MN. This field of research is 
computational neuroscience, which, roughly speaking, aims to computationally model 
the brain or selected networks and mechanisms. For example, Hass and colleagues 
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(2016), successfully established a model of the PFC, which replicated in vivo 
electrophysiological behavior. In collaboration with Sadeghi and Hass, the data from 
studies 1 and 2 are also used to inform computational models of the MNS. 
While the computational aspects of data analyses are becoming stronger, the 
computational settings, in which social-cognitive paradigms are commonly placed, 
might soon be augmented by more realistic settings. This development, known as 
second person neuroscience, might provide more reliable insights in social cognition, 
as social processes would not be a mere response to the picture or video of a face, 
but instead including a social interaction (Redcay & Schilbach, 2019). This could be 
accomplished by measuring the brain activation of two persons interacting with each 
other. However, even if one of these persons were the experimenter, the behavior 
could not be replicated identically between subjects, simply because the experimenter 
is human, and might be in a different mood, or show slight deviations in facial 
configuration or tone of voice. Another option would be to use avatars in a virtual reality, 
which could be programmed to exhibit the same behavior to each participant. 
Obviously, research on social cognition can greatly benefit from the advancements in 
these new technologies. Ultimately, these approaches might also help to identify the 
basic mechanisms of social cognition, as demanded by Schaafsma and colleagues 
(2015). 
5.6 Conclusions 
The results of the presented studies point to a shared neural basis of different 
social-cognitive skills, mainly in regions associated with the MNS. Studies 1 to 3 add 
to a set of few studies using only pictures of faces as stimuli, and modulating the social-
cognitive processes by task instruction. The distinct activation patterns, in addition to 
the common regions, indicate a successful implementation of this strategy. Importantly, 
sVx analyses reveal common activation within and across participants across tasks, 
and also fMRI adaptation is a valuable method for the investigation of the MNS using 
fMRI. Tasks too complex to rely solely on automatic MNS processing, additionally 
activate structures previously identified in probabilistic decision-making tasks that used 
non-social stimuli. In particular, salience of facial configurations intended to express 
fear drives Nacc activation when deciding on the dominant emotion in ambiguous facial 
stimuli. 
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To come back to the consideration from the introduction, the MNS might be the 
underlying network that allowed the successful non-verbal communication between 
you and your caregivers when you were a baby, and research keeps advancing the 
understanding of the neural functioning. 
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6 SUMMARY 
In my PhD thesis, I present three functional magnetic resonance imaging studies 
aimed at investigating neurobiological mechanisms underlying social cognition. My 
thesis focuses on fast and automatic processes that are proposed to build the basis of 
social understanding, and might be activated in parallel to more effortful deliberate 
mechanisms. The proposed neural substrate of fast and automatic processes are 
mirror neurons, which according to the theory of embodied simulation allow humans to 
understand other individuals’ actions, and even emotions and intentions. Since non-
invasive techniques cannot be applied to measure mirror neurons, but only neural 
populations assumed to constitute the mirror neuron system, experimental paradigms 
and analysis routines that allow approximation of mirror neuron functions need to be 
developed. 
In study 1, I demonstrated that different social cognitive skills, including imitation, 
affective empathy and theory of mind share a common neural basis, located in regions 
associated with the mirror neuron system. In addition to standard analyses, a shared 
voxel analysis was applied that revealed common activation for social-cognitive 
processes not only across, but also within participants. 
Study 2 was set up to investigate whether the mirror neuron system can 
distinguish the valence of facial configurations. The use of a functional magnetic 
resonance imaging adaptation paradigm allowed to determine neural populations 
sensitive to emotional valence. While the fusiform gyrus was sensitive to changes from 
fearful to smiling faces and also from smiling to fearful faces, Brodmann area 44 
reaching into insula, and superior temporal sulcus, i.e. regions more commonly 
associated with the mirror neuron system and with the so called mentalizing network, 
showed particularly increased activation for switches from smiling to fearful faces.  
Study 3 was dedicated to the investigation of decision making in the context of 
ambiguous facial configurations. While probabilistic decision making on these facial 
configurations lead to activation in the executive control network, final decisions for an 
emotion resulted in nucleus accumbens activation. In addition, perceiving fear in a face 
lead to higher nucleus accumbens activation during final decisions than perceiving 
happiness. This finding can be linked to salience processing in the nucleus 
accumbens. 
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In conclusion, all three studies show an involvement of fast and automatic 
processing regions for different social-cognitive processes. Study 3 additionally 
examined the interaction with slower and more deliberate processes, as involved in 
probabilistic decision making on ambiguous faces. The mirror neuron system seems 
to be critically involved in different social-cognitive tasks and also sensitive to emotional 
valence. In cases when automatic processing is not possible, as when presented with 
ambiguous facial configurations, brain regions commonly associated with probabilistic 
decision making assist, and the nucleus accumbens, possibly by directing salience, is 
involved in the final decision. These results deepen the understanding of the 
mechanisms of social cognition and encourage the use of sophisticated methods in 
experimental paradigms and analysis. 
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